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A Longitudinal Study: The Impact of a Comprehensive Emergency Management 
System on Disaster Response in The Commonwealth of The Bahamas 
Erin P. Hughey 
ABSTRACT 
 Global trends show increasing losses from disasters as the number of 
people at risk grows by 70 to 80 million per year (United Nations, 2004).  
Although the frequency of natural disasters may be constant the human 
interaction with the given hazard has shifted through changes in development 
practices, environmental protection as well as the distribution of population and 
wealth.  In an effort to combat the negative social, economic, and environmental 
impacts of hazards, strategies for identifying vulnerable populations and 
implementing mitigation measures is a high priority in hazards research.  
However despite our best efforts disasters have and will continue to negatively 
impact communities resulting in loss of life and property.  To that end nations 
must establish effective emergency response capabilities to meet the needs of all 
residents potentially at harm. 
 This study examined the establishment of a comprehensive emergency 
management (CEM) system in the nation of The Bahamas.  Employing a 
longitudinal study design to examine the six study hurricanes: Andrew 1992, 
Floyd 1999, Michelle 2001, Frances 2004, Jeanne 2004, and Wilma 2005.  The 
 xv
goal of this research was two fold; first, to test Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology 
for evaluating the management of disaster response to determine if it could be 
operationalized and second, to compare response operations under CEM with 
response operations prior to its implementation.   
 Mixed methods were used to collect and analyze data.  Data for the study 
were collected over a six-year period from 2001-2007.  The following data 
collection techniques were employed for this study:  (1) archival research, (2) 
structured surveys, (3) semi-structured interviews, and (4) participant 
observation.  Data were analyzed in using three key tools: First, the surveys and 
closed-ended questions associated with the interviews were analyzed using 
standard statistical techniques.  The data were then applied to 8 of the 10 criteria 
for measuring the management of national disaster response operations as 
outlined by Quarantelli (1997a).  Finally, data were applied to the Model of 
Community Response to Disaster (Hughey, 2003). 
 Results indicated that Quarantelli’s (1997a) model for evaluating the 
management of disaster response could be operationalized.  Findings also 
revealed an association between the implementation of a CEM system and 
improvements in disaster response within The Bahamas. 
 
 1
 
 
 
Chapter One:  
Introduction 
 
Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) is the integrated 
approach of managing all-hazards through all four phases of the 
emergency management cycle.  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 Global trends show increasing losses from disasters as the number of 
people at risk grows by 70 to 80 million per year (United Nations, 2004).  
Although the frequency of natural disasters may be constant the human 
interaction with the given hazard has shifted through changes in development 
practices, environmental protection as well as the distribution of population and 
wealth.  In an effort to combat the negative social, economic, and environmental 
impacts of hazards, strategies for identifying vulnerable populations and 
implementing mitigation measures has and continues to be a high priority in 
hazards research.  However despite our best efforts disasters continue to 
negatively impact communities resulting in loss of life and property.  To that end 
nations must establish effective emergency response capabilities to meet the 
needs of all residents potentially at harm. 
 Disaster response is a challenge for every jurisdiction.  Meeting the 
immediate and long-term needs that result from a disaster is a complex task that 
requires a multifaceted integrated approach involving a variety of agencies and 
organizations.  The hazards literature has shown that a ‘one size fits all’ cookie 
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cutter approach to disaster response is ineffective.  For example, White’s (1969a) 
and (1974) research acknowledges that differences within communities require 
distinctive solutions for each location.  CEM builds on that foundation through a 
program of risk and vulnerability assessments as well as cataloging of resource 
availability.  This process allows for the identification of jurisdiction specific 
challenges and further facilitates a coordinated environment well suited for 
effective response to disasters.  Emergency management practitioners have 
reported that a centralized and coordinated emergency management system 
improves all phases of the emergency management cycle (mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery) by decreasing the duplication of services 
and improving communication between all agencies (Krep, 1991a).   
This research examines the effectiveness of CEM as a national strategy 
for managing disaster response.  The Commonwealth of The Bahamas was 
selected as the study site for this research, which takes into consideration the 
geography, politics, and economic conditions within the nation.  Six hurricane 
events were selected for this research study; three before the 2002 
implementation of a CEM system and three after.  This research expands beyond 
a comparison between response operations to address key research questions 
surrounding the value and effectiveness of emergency management strategies.  
Furthermore, this research provides a longitudinal examination of the 
development and implementation of a national comprehensive emergency 
management system.   
 3
The Bahamas was selected as a study site for two key reasons: (1) 
Geography: The Bahamas faces many challenges to disaster response due in 
part to its unique geography.  The Bahamas is an archipelago of over seven 
hundred islands and cays that stretches almost 100,000 square miles from Great 
Inagua in the south to Walker’s Cay in the north (Office of the Prime Minister, 
2007). (See Map 1.1)  With a dispersed population, inhabiting approximately 20 
main islands a coordinated emergency response effort is a considerable 
challenge.  Moreover, the location of The Bahamas gives it a high and recurrent 
risk for hurricanes.  (2) In 2002 The Bahamas began the process of developing a 
CEM system.  This process has been documented from the beginning and 
provides for a longitudinal study of CEM suitability for island nations.   
1.2 Research Goal and Objectives 
 The goal of this research is two fold; first, to document the development of 
a comprehensive emergency management system within The Bahamas and 
second, to compare response operations under CEM with response operations 
prior to its implementation.  This longitudinal approach to hazards research is not 
often used; rather the research norm has been to administer case studies 
following an event.  Although many of the case studies conducted in hazards 
research have provided us with critical findings, the longitudinal approach 
facilitates the establishment of baseline indicators to gauge progress over long 
periods.  Long range research, such as this, also facilitates a broader 
understanding of the complex and ever evolving dynamics surrounding disaster 
response within a given location.   
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1.2.1 Research Objectives 
1. To identify and report areas of success, as well as potential barriers to 
effective disaster response under the CEM system, in an effort to add 
to the geography literature on hazards. 
2. Test the validity of Quarantelli’s (1997) methodology for evaluating the 
management of disaster response operations. 
3. To determine the geographic, and political challenges to emergency 
management within the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.   
4. To identify techniques being utilized within the Commonwealth of The 
Bahamas to respond to and recover from the impacts of disasters.   
1.3 Background 
 This research was initially undertaken through a partnership with The 
Commonwealth of The Bahamas and the University of South Florida’s Global 
Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Action (Global-CDMHA).  
Over a six year period (2001-2007) this researcher worked directly with the 
government of The Bahamas to build the foundation for a national emergency 
management structure based on fundamental hazard and emergency 
management theories.   
 The Bahamas has a long history of extreme events that has required the 
mobilization of national resources.  Despite extensive experience with disasters, 
as recently as June of 2002 The Bahamas had no formalized national disaster 
response policy or plan in place.  This research includes an evaluation of national 
response to six hurricanes as well as the political development of a national 
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agency to coordinate emergency response.  The study design provided unique 
insight into the development process through interviews with top members of the 
government, including the Prime Minister.  This dissertation research further 
facilitated the first geography hazard study to document and analyze the impact 
of the CEM system from conception through implementation.  It is through this 
process that we were able to identify the value of the CEM system.  This 
research also sheds light on the unique concerns of island nations, beyond just 
the challenge of remoteness.  It provides insight and relevance to both 
researchers and practitioners in a way that allows for the implementation of 
successful response and recovery initiatives to reduce or eliminate human 
suffering.   
1.4 Study Site: The Geography of The Bahamas 
Issues of geography relate directly to the ability of The Bahamas to 
respond and recover from disasters, with particular consideration given to 
hurricanes.  The Commonwealth of The Bahamas is an archipelagic nation which 
extends over 100,000 sq mi. of the southwestern edge of the North Atlantic 
Ocean, with some 700 islands and over 2000 cays totaling a land area of 5,833 
sq. mi. (Office of The Prime Minister, 2007).  The Bahamas are just 50 miles east 
of Florida and extend 750 miles south-east to within 50 miles of Cuba and Haiti 
(Office of The Prime Minister, 2007).  (See Map 4.1)  According to the Bahamas 
Environment, Science and Technology (BEST) Commission the largest of The 
Bahamas Islands is Andros, with an area of 2,300 square miles.  Eighty percent 
of Andros is less than one meter above mean sea level leaving it particularly 
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vulnerable to storm surge during a hurricane.  Harbour Island, with an area of 
one and a half square miles (1 ½ sq. mi.), and Spanish Wells, with an area of half 
a square mile (½ sq. mi.) are the two smallest inhabited islands (BEST 
Commission, 2007).   
Traditionally the Islands of The Bahamas are divided into three regions: 
Northwest, Central and Southeast Islands.  The islands included in the Northwest 
are: Abaco, Andros, Bimini, Eleuthera, Grand Bahama, New Providence and The 
Berry Islands.  Central Islands include Cat Island, Long Island, Exuma and its 
Cays, Rum Cay and San Salvador.  The Southeast Islands include Acklins, 
Crooked Island, Inagua, Mayaguana and Ragged Island.  (See Map 4.1) There 
are more than twenty inhabited islands with the main population centers being 
located on the Islands of New Providence and Grand Bahama.  The Capital City 
of Nassau is located on the island of New Providence and Freeport, referred to 
as the ‘second city’ is located on the island of Grand Bahama.  The term ‘Family 
Islands’ is used to describe all surrounding islands.   
1.4.1 Climate 
Consideration of The Bahamas climate is important to identifying and 
understanding challenges associated with emergency planning, response and 
recovery.  The Bahamas is a typical tropical maritime wet/dry climate. The wet 
season occurs during the summer months and is usually in association with 
tropical activity such as hurricanes (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2006). 
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The islands of The Bahamas are insulated from North America by the Straits of 
Florida and do not experience extremes in temperature.   
 Humidity in the Bahamas is extremely high, principally during the summer 
months.  Winds are predominantly easterly throughout the year and averages 
below 10 knots (11.5 mph).  The Bahamas Department of Meteorology (2006), 
reported average rainfall on the Island of New Providence at 2 inches a month 
from November through April and 6 inches a month from May through October.  
1.4.2 Geology 
As shown in Figure 1.2 The Bahamas are low, carbonate islands that rest 
on two large bank systems; The Little Bahama Bank in the northern Bahamas; 
and the Great Bahama Bank which extends from central to southwestern 
Bahamas (Gerace et. al., 2002).  The Bahamas Platform, extends more than 840 
miles, from the coast of Florida to the island of Hispaniola.  The Bahama Platform 
became exposed as a result of four major glacial advances during the 
Pleistocene.  Weathering later altered the landscape creating kart formations 
such as caves, sink holes and solution pits (Weech, 2000).   
 The Islands of the Bahamas have generally low relief.  According to data 
obtained through the BEST Commission (2007), Cat Island is home to the 
highest point in the Bahamas at 206 ft.  The capital city of Nassau on the Island 
of New Providence has ridges rising to about 100 ft.  Consideration for the 
geology of the region must be taken into consideration when developing plans to 
address response and recovery activities especially when dealing with the 
hurricane hazard.  For examples, should islands with little relief have evacuation 
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plans to move populations off the island in the event of a hurricane or should they 
shelter in place?  Additionally, what type of resources would it take to move an 
entire island population, where would you move them, and for how long? 
 
Figure 1.2 – Geology of the Bahamas (Source: Curran,1985)  
1.4.3 Bahamas Hydrologic Setting 
 Due to the porosity of limestone, water from rainfall and runoff is rapidly 
delivered underground, resulting in a scarcity of freshwater rivers and streams in 
the Bahamas (Gerace, 2002)  Despite being surrounded by water, it is freshwater 
that is a scarce commodity on the islands.  The Bahamas has no freshwater 
rivers or lakes and until recently has relied exclusively on groundwater.  It is 
important to note however that not all groundwater in the Bahamas is salt free.  
“The groundwater resources of The Bahamas are comprised of freshwater, 
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brackish, saline and hypersaline waters found in the near and deep subsurface” 
(BEST Commission, 2007:16).  Many of the islands have large brackish lakes 
and others are infiltrated by tidal creeks.   
 The scarcity of freshwater creates a variety of challenges for a nation on a 
daily basis.  Couple a limited water supply with the impact of a hurricane and the 
situation quickly becomes critical.  Having a limited supply of potable water for 
residents and tourists must always be a concern for The Bahamas.  Cant 
(1996:331) cited a limited supply of fresh water facilities as, “a major obstacle to 
economic development in The Bahamas and other small carbonate islands.”   
 In early 2000, following Hurricane Floyd, The Bahamas began the process 
of developing the necessary infrastructure to allow for large desalinization 
facilities on several of the islands.  This effort was intended to ease freshwater 
limitations and ensure adequate amounts of water were available to both 
residents and tourists (Bahamas Water and Sewerage Corporation, 2006).  In 
addition, construction has begun on desalinization plants at many of the large 
tourist resorts (i.e. Atlantis, Club Med, Sandals).  Despite these efforts potable 
water following a disaster remains a top priority.  One of the challenges in 
response to recent hurricanes is how best to transport water supplies.  Usually, 
transported between islands by barge the loss of ports and docks as a result of 
strong storm surge and heavy winds makes this option impossible in the 
immediate aftermath of a storm.  Additionally with one gallon of water weighing 
eight pounds it is not practical to transport large quantities of water by airliners. 
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1.4.4 Demographics  
The Bahamas have a relatively small population base dispersed among its 
twenty (20) main inhabited islands, with an annual growth rate of 0.86% since 
1980.  The official 2005 government census reported a population of 303,611.  
Twenty-six and a half percent of the population is between the ages of 0-14, 
66.1% of the population is between the ages of 15-64, and only 6.4% of the 
population is over the age of 65 (Bahamas Census Office, 2005).  Table 1.1 
shows the population is centered in the two main urban areas of New Providence 
and Grand Bahama.  Although New Providence, is a small island with only 80 
square miles (80 sq. mi.) of area, it is home to 69% of the nations population.  
Grand Bahama, with approximately 530 square miles (530 sq. mi.) in area, is 
home to 15% of the population. (BEST Commission, 2007)  The remaining 
population is scattered throughout the Family Islands.   
Having a population dispersed throughout a large geographic area adds to 
the complexity of disaster planning and response.  Special considerations must 
be made for communication and logistic challenges that can exist.  It is also 
critical to note that although The Bahamas has a relatively small population with 
just over 300,000 there is a sharp increase in overall island population as a result 
of the tourism industry. 
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POPULATION IN ISLANDS CENSUS YEARS 1970 - 2000 
Island 1970 1980 1990 2000 
New 
Providence 101,503 135,437 172,196 210,832 
Grand Bahama 25,859 33,102 40,898 46,994 
Abaco 6,501 7,271 10,003 13,170 
Acklins 936 618 405 428 
Andros 8,845 8,307 8,177 7,686 
Berry Islands 443 509 628 709 
Bimini 1,503 1,411 1,639 1,717 
Cat Island 2,657 2,215 1,698 1,647 
Crooked Island 715 562 412 350 
Eleuthera 6,247 8,331 7,993 7,999 
Exuma and 
Cays 3,767 3,670 3,556 3,571 
Harbour Island 2,238 1,133 1,219 1,639 
Inagua 1,109 924 985 969 
Long Island 3,861 3,404 2,949 2,992 
Mayaguana 581 464 312 259 
Ragged island 208 164 89 72 
Rum Cay 80 78 53 80 
San Salvador 776 747 465 970 
Spanish Wells 983 1,167 1,372 1,527 
The Bahamas 168,812 209,514 255,049 303,611 
Table 1.1 - Population in islands Census Years 1970-2000 (Source: Bahamas 
Census Office Department of Statistics, 2005) 
According to the Bahamas Ministry of Tourism, more than 5 million tourists 
visited The Bahamas during the 2005 calendar year.  Therefore, all disaster 
planning and response activities must take into consideration not only the needs 
of its citizens but also the needs of tourists.  Appropriate planning activities must 
be implemented not only for the purposes of improving disaster response and 
saving lives but also to ensure the economic stability of the nation by maintaining 
a strong tourism industry.     
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Island Total Population Males Females
Number of 
Households 
The 
Bahamas 303,611 147,778 155,833 87,714 
New 
Providence 210,832 101,610 109,222 59,707 
Grand 
Bahama 46,994 23,035 23,959 13,977 
Abaco 13,170 6,711 6459 3929 
Acklins 428 227 201 134 
Andros 7,686 3,780 3906 2145 
Berry 
Islands 709 416 293 265 
Biminis 1,717 886 831 552 
Cat Island 1,647 854 793 559 
Crooked 
Island 350 172 178 132 
Eleuthera 7,999 3,933 4066 2408 
Exuma and 
Cays 3,571 1,875 1696 1133 
Harbour 
Island 1,639 799 840 493 
Inagua 969 476 493 302 
Long Island 2,992 1,533 1459 961 
Mayaguana 259 129 130 96 
Ragged 
Island 72 44 28 26 
Rum Cay 80 45 35 30 
San 
Salvador 970 497 473 279 
Spanish 
Wells 1,527 756 771 586 
Table 1.2 – Bahamas Island Population (Source: Bahamas Census Office 
Department of Statistics, 2005) 
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Key Labour Force Statistics 
1999-2004 
ITEM 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total Labour 
Force 
All Bahamas 
New Providence 
Grand Bahama 
 
157,640
113,240
23,900
 
164,675
117,900
25,055
 
167,980
119,700
25,190
 
173,795 
123,380 
26,350 
 
176,330
125,385
26,465
Employed 
Labour Force 
All Bahamas 
New Providence 
Grand Bahama 
 
145,350
104,440
21,625
 
153,310
109,770
23,345
 
152,690
108,255
23,580
 
154,965 
108,685 
24,050 
 
158,340
111,725
24,000
Unemployed 
Labour Force 
All Bahamas 
New Providence 
Grand Bahama 
 
12,290
8,800
2,275
 
11,365
8,130
1,710
 
15,290
11,445
1,610
 
18,830 
14,695 
2,300 
 
17,990
13,660
2,465
Labour Force 
Participation 
Rate 
All Bahamas 
New Providence 
Grand Bahama 
 
76.8%
77.7%
75.3%
 
76.2%
78.1%
75.2%
 
76.4%
77.6%
74.4%
 
76.5% 
78.0% 
76.0% 
 
75.7%
77.5%
74.7%
Unemployment 
Rate 
All Bahamas 
New Providence 
Grand Bahama 
 
7.8%
7.8%
9.5%
 
6.9%
6.9%
6.8%
 
9.1%
9.6%
6.4%
 
10.8% 
11.9% 
8.7% 
 
10.2%
10.9%
Table 1.3 – Key Labour Force Statistics (Labour Force Data is not available for 
the Year 2000, which was a Census year. The Census is a major national 
project; therefore the Department during that year undertook no other household 
surveys) Source:  Bahamas Department of Statistics 
Table 1.4 below provides additional demographic information about the 
Commonwealth of The Bahamas.  Although the population is growing in terms of 
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numbers of births, there is a negative net migration of residents.  This is 
attributed to limited education and job opportunities within the country (Bahamas 
Census Office Department of Statistics, 2005).  Increased numbers of 
Bahamians are moving to the United States and neighboring Caribbean nations.   
THE BAHAMAS DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
Birth Rate 18.69 births / 1000 population (2002 est.) 
Death Rate 7.49 deaths / 1000 population (2002 est.) 
Net Migration Rate -2.63 migrant(s) / 1000 population (2002 est.) 
Infant Mortality Rate 17.08 deaths/ 1000 live births (2002 est.) 
Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
Total Population:  69.87 years 
Females:  73.49 years (2002 est.) 
Males:  66.32 years (2002 est.) 
Ethnic Groups 
85% Black 
12 % White 
3% Asian and Hispanic 
Religion 
32% Baptist 
20% Anglican 
19% Roman Catholic 
6% Methodist 
12% Other Protestant 
3% None or unknown 
2% Other 
Languages 
English 
Creole (among Haitian immigrants) 
Literacy (age 15+) 
Total Population: 98.2% 
Male:  98.5% 
Female:  98%  
Table 1.4 Demographics (Source:  Bahamas Census Office Department of 
Statistics) 
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1.4.5 Political Structure  
 The Commonwealth of The Bahamas gained independence from Great 
Britain on July 10, 1973.  As a Constitutional Parliamentary Democracy the 
government structure is based on the Westminister model.  This three branch 
governmental structure (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial) is led by The Prime 
Minister and elected by the people.  Table 1.5 below provides an overview of the 
governmental structure of The Bahamas.   
THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAHAMAS 
Executive Branch 
? Head of Government: Prime Minister 
? Nominal Chief of State: Queen Elizabeth 
II (since February 6, 1952), represented by 
Governor General  
? Cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the 
governor general on the prime minister's 
recommendation 
Legislative Branch 
Bicameral Parliament 
? The Senate (16-member body appointed 
by the governor general upon the advice of 
the prime minister and the opposition 
leader for five-year terms)  
? The House of Assembly (40 seats; 
members elected by direct popular vote to 
serve five-year terms) 
Judicial Branch 
? Supreme Court 
? Court of Appeal 
? Magistrates Courts 
Table 1.5 – The Governmental Structure of The Bahamas (Source: Office of The 
Prime Minister, 2007) 
 The Commonwealth of The Bahamas has a two party political system; The 
Free National Movement (FNM) and The Progressive Liberal Party (PLP).  Table 
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1.6 below displays the Prime Ministers and their party affiliation that have served 
The Bahamas since gaining independence in 1973.  
PRIME MINISTERS COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS 
Term Prime Minister Political Party 
July 10, 1973 – Aug.1992 Lynden O. Pindling Progressive Liberal Party 
Aug. 1992- May 2002 Hubert A. Ingraham Free National Movement 
May 2002 – May 2007 Perry G. Christie Progressive Liberal Party 
May 2007 - Present Hubert A. Ingraham Free National Movement 
Table 1.6 – Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas 
 
 The political environment within The Bahamas plays a significant role in 
the functioning of the emergency management structure.  The Office of The 
Prime Minister establishes the tone and direction for national emergency 
management and ultimately is seen as the responsible agent.  For purposes of 
this research, an interview with Prime Minister Perry G. Christie was conducted 
on January 25, 2007. 
1.4.6 Economy 
 Bahamians are tied to the land and sea for economic stability and growth.  
Agriculture has been a key component of the economy and continues to be in the 
Family Islands were residents are fishermen and/or farmers.  It was not until the 
development of the modern tourism industry that Bahamians began to move 
away from agriculture and more towards the service industries.  According to 
data from the Central Bank of The Bahamas, tourism currently accounts for over 
fifty percent (50%) of the GDP and directly or indirectly employs half of the 
nations labor force (Central Bank of The Bahamas, 2006).  Table 1.7 below 
provides 2004 and 2005 economic data on the nation. 
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ECONOMY OF THE BAHAMAS 
GDP (2005) $5.8 Billion 
Growth Rate (2005) 2.7% 
Per capita GDP (2005) $18,062 
Natural Resources (2005) Salt, aragonite, timber 
Tourism (2005) 50% GDP 
Government Spending 
(2004) 20% of GDP 
Financial Services (2005) 15% of GDP 
Construction (2004) 10% of GDP (products are largely tourism related) 
Manufacturing (2004) 8% of GDP (products – plastics, pharmaceuticals, rum) 
Agriculture and Fisheries 
(2004) 
3% of GDP (products – fruits, vegetables, 
lobster & fish) 
Trade (2005) 
? Exports -$450.8 million – (plastics, fish, 
salt, rum, chemicals)  
? Imports – 2.57 billion – (foodstuffs and 
animals, machinery and transport 
equipment, chemicals, mineral fuels) 
Table 1.7– Economy of The Bahamas (Source: Central Bank of The Bahamas) 
 Imports and Exports are a large component of the economy of The 
Bahamas.  In 2005, $2.57 billion worth of goods were imported into the 
commonwealth.  Key imports include food related goods, animals, machinery, 
transport equipment, chemicals, and mineral fuels. Key suppliers to The 
Bahamas include; United States (84%), Curacao (7.2%), Puerto Rico (1.9%), 
European Union (1.2%), and Japan (1.2%) (Central Bank of The Bahamas, 
2005).  Exports in 2005 were $450.8 million consisting of plastics, fish, salt, 
chemicals and rum.  Main market destinations of Bahamian exports by 
destination: United States (66.6%), European Union (18.3%), Canada (5.1%), 
and South Africa (1%) (Central Bank of The Bahamas, 2005). 
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Distribution of Household by Income Group 
All Bahamas, New Providence and Grand Bahama: 2004 
ALL BAHAMAS NEW PROVIDENCE GRAND BAHAMA Income 
Group  
B$ Number. Amount B$ Number Amount B$ Number Amount B$ 
0-5,000 4,475 11,187,500 2,625 6,562,500 620 1,550,000
5,001-
10,000 7,655 57,412,500 4,745 35,587,500 1,450 10,875,000
10,001-
15,000 8,490 106,125,000 5,855 73,187,500 940 11,750,000
15,001-
20,000 8,235 144,112,500 5,535 96,862,500 1,470 25,725,000
20,001-
40,000 29,735 892,050,000 20,435 613,050,000 4,920 147,600,000
40,001-
60,000 18,680 934,000,000 13,160 658,000,000 3,125 156,250,000
60,001-
80,000 10,185 712,950,000 7,245 507,150,000 1,540 107,800,000
80,001-
100,000 5,210 468,900,000 4,020 361,800,000 550 49,500,000
100,001 & 
OVER 4,905 539,550,000 3,830 421,300,000 440 48,400,000
NOT 
STATED 2,295 - 1,550 - 275 -
TOTAL 99,865 3,866,287,500 69,000 2,773,500,000 15,330 559,450,000
Table 1.8 – Distribution of Household by Income Group: All Bahamas, New 
Providence and Grand Bahama 2004 (Source:  Bahamas Department of 
Statistics) 
 
  
 To ensure continued economic growth within The Bahamas it is necessary 
to ensure tourism, agriculture, and manufacturing are adequately equipped to 
plan, mitigate, respond and recover from a potential disaster.  This requires that 
all national emergency management policies and procedures integrate public and 
private industry to ensure economic stability within the nation.   
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Number of Households and Household Income,  
All Bahamas, New Providence 
and Grand Bahama: 2004 
ISLAND 
Number 
of  
Households 
Total 
Household 
Income  
B$ 
Mean 
Household 
Income 
B$ 
Median 
Household  
Income 
B$ 
ALL BAHAMAS 97,570 3,866,287,500 39,626 33,600 
NEW 
PROVIDENCE 67,450 2,773,500,000 41,119 34,066 
GRAND 
BAHAMA 15,055 559,450,000 37,160 30,820 
Table 1.9– Number of Households and Household Income: All Bahamas, New 
Providence and Grand Bahama 2004 (Source:  Bahamas Department of 
Statistics) 
 
1.4.7 Hurricane Risk 
The Bahamas have a long history of hurricane activity with records 
stretching as far back as the 1500’s.  Tropical weather is a reality of living on the 
islands and residents take the threat of hurricane activity seriously.  Long before 
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology was around to issue hurricane 
warnings residents looked to the sea and sky for clues about approaching 
weather.   
“Before the onset of an approaching storm, the sea-level often rose 
to above normal positions.  By watching the rise in the sea-level the 
locals could tell whether there was an approaching storm.  Today 
this rise in the sea-level just before the onset of the storm and 
during the storm is referred to as the storm surge.  Just before the 
onset of an approaching hurricane the seas would give these 
residents a small window of opportunity to prepare for a hurricane 
or to evacuate to a hurricane shelter” (Neely, 2006:21) 
 
The geographic location of The Bahamas gives it a high and recurrent risk 
for hurricanes.  The Bahamas has recorded the largest number of storm events 
passing within 60 nautical miles of the major Caribbean Islands.  In fact, five of 
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the top six affected islands of the Caribbean lie within the Bahamas chain; in 
descending order of frequency are Abaco, Grand Bahama, Bimini, New 
Providence and San Salvador (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2006).  
This low-lying archipelagic nation has experienced multi-island, multi-year, and 
multi-hurricane impacts.   
The commonwealth of the Bahamas is affected by hurricanes of two 
different origins, Cape Verde and the Western Caribbean.  The island chain lies 
on the most common route of the more dominant Cape Verde Hurricanes, which 
form over the Atlantic mainly during the mid hurricane season (August-October) 
(Dean and Rolle, 1999).   
1.4.7.1 Bahamas Hurricane History 
The Bahamas has a rich hurricane history.  A culture tied to the land and 
sea the country has endured numerous hurricanes with records stretching as far 
back as 1500.  Table 1.10 below highlights the storms for which I was able to find 
a record.  This table does not presume to capture all of the tropical activity to 
have impacted the islands.  However, these data do hope to place in perspective 
the challenges facing The Bahamas with regards to hurricane preparedness and 
response.  
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HURRICANES AFFECTING STUDY AREA 
Year Mon/Day Name Deaths Damage Landfall 
1554 unknown 1554 unknown 2 ships & crew Great Inagua 
1563 unknown 1563 35 reported 
‘Urca of Tristan 
de Salvatierra’ 
ship & crew 
Grand 
Bahama 
1595 unknown 1595 unknown 
17 spanish 
treasure bearing 
ships & crew 
Abaco 
1599 End of June 1599 unknown 1 ship & crew Great Inagua 
1609 unknown 1609 32 reported ‘Sea Adventure’ & crew 
Central 
Islands 
1622 9/15 1622 550 reported 
Spanish Terra 
Firma Fleet & 
crew 
Central 
Islands 
1623 unknown 1623 150 reported two ships & crew 
Central 
Islands 
1630 unknown 1630 unknown two ships & crew Grand Bahama 
1641 September 1641 unknown one ship & crew Southeastern Bahamas 
1692 10/24 1629 unknown unknown 
Central & 
Northwest 
Islands 
1713 1
st week of 
September 1713 unknown one ship & crew 
Northwest 
Islands 
1715 7/30 1715 1000 reported 10 ships & crew 
Southeastern 
Bahamas 
1720 unknown 1720 unknown 2 ships & crew Central Bahamas 
1729 August 1729 unknown 
Significant 
damage to 
Nassau 
New 
Providence 
1733 7/15 1733 unknown 16 ships & crew Southeastern Bahamas 
1796 10/3 1796 unknown 
Damage homes 
in northern 
settlements 
Northwest 
Islands 
1800 August 1800 unknown 9 ships & crew Inagua 
1804 9/5 1804 unknown 
Numerous ships 
reported missing 
and damage to 
settlements 
throughout the 
island chain. 
Inagua 
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1806 8/30 1806 unknown 
26 ships 
destroyed in 
Nassau Harbour.  
Damage to cotton 
machines in the 
Exumas. 
South and 
Central 
Islands 
1806 9/14 1806 unknown 
124 homes 
destroyed (2/3 of 
the settlement) 
will the remaining 
homes suffering 
some degree of 
damage. 
Eleuthera 
1813 7/26 1813 unknown 
1/3 of the Nassau 
settlement was 
damaged or 
destroyed 
New 
Providence 
1814 10/4 1814 unknown 
Damage to crops, 
ships in Nassau.  
Roof damage 
was also reported 
South and 
Central 
Islands 
1815 8/9 1815 unknown One ship and crew 
Southern 
Islands 
1815 8/29 1815 unknown 
Damage to 
homes on 
Eleuthera & 
Spanish Wells 
Eleuthera 
1815 9/20 1815 22 reported 
Damage to 
homes on Cat 
Island and Salt 
ponds on Inadua 
Southern 
Islands 
1818 10/14 1818 unknown 16 ships destroyed & crew 
Central 
Islands 
1819 9/18 1819 unknown Damage to ships in port 
New 
Providence 
1819 9/22 1819 unknown 
Major damage to 
agriculture and 
ships in port 
Abaco, 
Winward Little 
Island, Egg 
Island, 
Stocking 
Island 
1822 9/26 1822 unknown 
Damage to 
agriculture and 
housing. 
New 
Providence, 
Abaco, 
Exuma 
1824 9/13 1824 unknown 
Nassau: damage 
to the church, 
barracks, jail and 
103 homes were 
destroyed. 
Central 
Islands 
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1830 8/11 1830 unknown 
Major Damage to 
homes and crops 
in the northern 
islands.  One ship 
and crew were 
lost. 
Entire 
archipelago 
chain 
impacted with 
significant 
damage to 
San Salvador, 
Eleuthera & 
Grand 
Bahama 
1837 7/30 1837 (1) unknown 
Numerous ships 
sank in port 
throughout the 
Central and 
Northern Islands 
San Salvador, 
Eleuthera & 
Grand 
Bahama 
1837 8/4 1837 (2) 25 reported Over 30 ships destroyed 
Entire 
archipelago 
chain 
impacted 
1837 8/16 1837 (3) unknown 
Flooding in Grand 
Bahama & 
destroyed homes 
in San Salvador. 
Homes, crops 
and livestock 
were impacted on 
Long Island.  
Almost all homes 
were destroyed 
on Rum Cay. 
Central and 
Northern 
Islands 
1837 9/12 1837 (4) unknown 
Nassau reported 
damage to ships 
and homes. 
New 
Providence 
1837 10/15 1837 (5) 
“A captured 
slave ship 
with 500 
aboard was 
wrecked at 
Governor’s 
Harbour 
with many 
fatalities” 
(Neely, 
2006:30) 
19 ships in 
Nassau Harbour 
Central 
Islands 
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1844 10/5 1844 unknown 
“we experienced 
a severe 
hurricane on the 
banks of the night 
of Oct. 5th and the 
loss of lives and 
property has 
been greater than 
in any previous 
gale for some 
years” (Redfield, 
1846:343) 
Central 
Bahamas 
1848 Late Aug. 1848 unknown 
Damage to 
homes and 
businesses 
throughout the 
islands 
Entire 
archipelago 
chain 
impacted 
1866 9/24 1866 387 reported 
Over 1034 
persons were 
reported 
homeless as a 
result of the 
storm.  Wide 
spread damage 
throughout the 
islands. 
Entire 
archipelago 
chain 
impacted 
1883 9/4 1883 50 reported 
“tremendous 
amount of 
property damage” 
(Neely, 2006:31) 
Entire 
archipelago 
chain 
impacted 
1899 unknown 1899 200 plus Damage to ships and homes 
Major impact 
reported on 
Andros and 
Exuma 
1926 8/2 
1926 (1) 
Nassau 
Hurricane of 
1926 
106 
Cat. 4 storm.  
Delivered 
flooding rains and 
loss of crops.  
Major damage to 
structures in 
Nassau.  Several 
thousand 
residents were 
left homeless. 
Entire 
archipelago 
chain 
impacted 
1926 9/17 
1926 (2) The 
Great Miami 
Hurricane 
unknown 
Cat 3 storm.  
Significant 
flooding and 
damage to crops. 
South and 
Central 
Islands. 
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1928 9/14 
1928 Lake 
Okeechobee 
Hurricane 
Unknown 
Cat 4 storm. 
Destroyed homes 
and businesses.  
Damage to crops 
and ships 
reported 
throughout the 
islands. 
Entire 
archipelago 
chain 
impacted. 
Major damage 
reported in 
central and 
northern 
islands. 
1929 9/25 1929 Hundreds 
Cat 5 storm. 
Destroyed 
Andros, capsized 
ships in Nassau 
Harbour, and 
destroyed 
buildings in 
downtown 
Nassau.  Wide 
spread damage 
was reported 
throughout the 
islands 
Entire 
archipelago 
chain 
impacted 
1933 7/25 1933 (1) unknown unknown 
Entire 
archipelago 
chain 
impacted 
1933 8/27 1933 (2) unknown unknown 
South and 
Central 
Bahamas 
1933 9/7 1933 (3) unknown unknown 
Entire 
archipelago 
chain 
impacted 
1933 10/1 1933 (4) unknown unknown Northwestern Islands  
1933 10/25 1933 (5) unknown Tropical storm 
Central and 
Northwestern 
Islands 
1960 9/7 Donna 
114 deaths 
from the 
Leeward 
Islands to 
The 
Bahamas 
Category 4 
Hurricane 
Southern 
Islands of The 
Bahamas 
1965 9/6 Betsy 1 death Category 4 Hurricane 
Northwestern 
Islands  
1979 9/3 David None Category 1 Hurricane 
Andros & 
Bimini 
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1992 8/23 Andrew 4 deaths Category 4 Hurricane 
Central and 
Northwestern 
Islands 
1996 10/18 Lili 0 Category 2 Hurricane 
Northwestern 
Islands 
1999 9/14 Floyd 
2 Category 4 
Hurricane 
Central and 
Northwestern 
Islands 
2001 11/05 Michelle 0 Category 2 Hurricane 
Northwestern 
Islands 
2004 9/2-5 Frances 
2 
Category 4 
Hurricane 
Entire 
archipelago 
chain 
impacted 
2004 9/25 Jeanne 0 Category 2 Hurricane 
Northwestern 
Islands 
2005 10/24 Wilma 1 Category 3 Hurricane 
Northwestern 
Islands 
2007 10/31 Noel 0 Tropical Storm Northwestern Islands 
Table 1.10 Hurricanes Impacting Study Area (Source:  Nelly (2006), Government 
of The Bahamas (2005)) 
 
1.4.7.2  Hurricane Andrew1992 
Just prior to the impact of Hurricane Andrew in August of 1992 the nation 
went through a change in government lead by Hubert A. Ingraham.  This was the 
first change in government since The Bahamas gained independence in 1973 
and the first national disaster response in the nation’s history.  The last major 
hurricane to impact The Bahamas was Hurricane Betsy in 1965, while the nation 
was still under British rule.   
 On August 23, 1992, Hurricane Andrew passed over Eleuthera, the Berry 
Islands and South Bimini causing severe flooding and property damage.  Four (4) 
Bahamian lost their lives as a result of hurricane Andrew. Of critical concern for 
the nation following landfall were the immediate emergency needs of food and 
clean water.  The logistics of meeting these needs proved challenging with 
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extreme damage to transportation routes (airports, ports, and roadways). The 
movement of goods between the Family Islands immediately following the event 
was nearly impossible.  Prime Minister Ingraham placed The Royal Bahamas 
Defence Force (RBDF) in charge of responding to hurricane generated needs.  
(See Appendix B for detailed storm development and impact information.)   
 
1.4.7.3 Hurricane Floyd 1999 
Hurricane Floyd devastated the central and northern islands of The 
Bahamas.  The key concerns for the nation were meeting immediate emergency 
needs of food and clean water to all areas impacted.  Damage to well fields, and 
transportation routes (airports, ports, and roadways) prevented the movement of 
emergency goods between islands as well as on the island.  A detailed 
discussion on the development and impact of Hurricane Floyd can be found in 
Appendix B of this dissertation.  
 
1.4.7.4  Hurricane Michelle 2001 
A national response to Hurricane Michelle was conducted through the Cabinet 
Office with direct reporting to the Office of The Prime Minister.  Although 
Hurricane Michelle was not as destructive as Hurricanes Andrew or Floyd, the 
impact to the nation’s capital highlighted gaps in emergency response 
capabilities.  Hurricane Michelle response activities were spearheaded by the 
RBDF with disorganized levels of support from a variety of ministries and 
organizations.   
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 Long-term recovery operations for Hurricane Floyd were still underway 
when Hurricane Michelle impacted the nation.  As a result many of the critical 
personnel brought together to coordinate recovery efforts for Floyd also took on 
the challenge of Hurricane Michelle.  Applying the amended version of 
Quarantelli’s (1997a) criteria for evaluating the management of disaster response 
operations reveals that the national response to Michelle was not successful. 
 
1.4.7.5 Hurricane Frances 2004 
 Every island in The Bahamas was impacted by Hurricane Frances.  The 
category 4 hurricane remained over the nation for more than 72 hours (Bahamas 
Department of Meteorology, 2004a).  Of major concern following the passage of 
Frances was clean water with extensive damage reported to the water well fields.  
Transportation routes (airports, ports, and roadways) sustained considerable 
damage prevented the movement of emergency goods between islands as well 
as on the island (NEMA, 2004a, Hughey, 2004b).   
 Disaster response operations were for the first time coordinated by NEMA 
through the National EOC.  The EOC was located in the Churchill Building on the 
first floor just below the Cabinet Office and the Office of The Prime Minister 
(NEMA, 2004a; Office of the Prime Minister, 2004a; Hughey, 2004b).  Table 6.14 
shows that seven of the eight criteria were not accomplished.  The results of the 
evaluation are discussed in detail below. 
“My fellow Bahamians and residents of The Bahamas.  Good Morning.  
You are aware by now that our beloved country and home – The 
Commonwealth of The Bahamas – is preparing for the almost certain 
landfall of Hurricane Frances.  It is of the utmost importance that you 
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know and accept that Hurricane Frances as presently constituted is 
regarded as the strongest and most intense hurricane force that has 
threatened our country.  Hurricane Frances has sustained winds of 
140mph which makes it a Category 4 Hurricane and the potential exists 
for further strengthening.  Make no mistake about it, this is a very intense 
and powerful hurricane that must be taken with the utmost seriousness by 
all of our citizens and visitors. 
As, I speak to you, the island of Great Inagua, Mayaguana, Acklins and 
Crooked Island and our neighbours the Turks and Caicos Islands are 
beginning to feel the wrath of Frances.  While hurricane warnings remain 
in effect for these areas, in another hour the Government of The Bahamas 
will issue hurricanes warnings for the Central Bahamas to include Long 
Island, San Salvador, Exuma and Cays, Ragged Island, Long Cay, Cat 
Island, Rum Cay, South Eleuthera and South Andros.  This means that 
hurricane conditions can be felt in the warning areas within 24 hours.  A 
watch will also be issued for the Northwest Bahamas, including New 
Providence, North Eleuthera, Spanish Wells, Harbour Island, North and 
Central Andros, Bimini, Berry Islands, Abaco and Grand Bahama.  
Hurricane Conditions can be felt in the watch areas within 36 hours.    
On the present course it will affect New Providence and Eleuthera by 
Thursday night and Friday morning.  The Northern Bahamas including 
Abaco and Grand Bahama will likely be affected during Friday afternoon 
and Saturday morning.  For the purpose of impressing upon you the 
compelling need for urgent action, I shall again state that Hurricane 
Frances is a major and potentially very dangerous hurricane.  Hurricane 
force winds extend some eighty (80) miles from the centre.  Tropical storm 
force winds extend some 185 miles from the centre.  This hurricane is 
therefore a large and powerful system with the potential to severely and 
negatively affect many of the communities in our country.   
As Prime Minister, I therefore urge all Bahamians and residents of The 
Bahamas to take this threat seriously and to rush to complete all 
precautions, not in panic, but with a clear-headed resolve and a sober 
sense of purpose. 
A hurricane of this strength generally has a storm sea surge of between 13 
and 18 fee above the normal tide.  Persons who live in coastal areas, 
small cays, low lying areas and areas that are prone to flooding should 
evacuate their homes before the hurricane hits and weather conditions no 
longer allow safe evacuations.  In addition persons who do not consider 
their dwellings to be sound should contact their local Administrators at 
the earliest opportunity. 
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I have asked the Secretary to the cabinet to allow non-essential staff of 
Public Service to leave work today at 12:00 noon so as to enable them to 
complete the task of securing their homes and property.  I also ask 
businesses to release their staff early so that they can likewise secure their 
property and homes. 
I need hardly tell you that early preparation is essential for mitigating the 
damage that can be done by such a large and powerful hurricane.  I am 
also exhorting businesses not to engage in what is commonly known as 
price gouging or profiteering.  This is truly a time of emergency when civil 
responsibility and conduct befitting good citizenship ought to be 
paramount in the minds of all our people.     
I urge you to continue to listen by radio to hurricane updates so that you 
may act on an informed basis.  All of our emergency operations systems 
are in place at both the national level in New Providence and throughout 
the Family Islands.  Every effort has been made to strengthen our 
communications and emergency response capacities and where necessary 
to put in place additional specially selected personnel.   
Additional resources, both skilled manpower, equipment and material 
resources, have been made available to the Bahamas by the United States 
Government, Caricom countries and other agencies and we are on 
standby.  On behalf of the Bahamian people I would take this opportunity 
to thank all of them for the consideration they have exercised in our 
favour.  
My fellow Bahamians although we have made every human effort to 
prepare ourselves for Hurricane Frances, it is for me, on your behalf, to 
acknowledge that we are ultimately in the hands of God.  We pray for His 
guidance at this time and for safekeeping during this time of crisis and 
peril 
We have faced many such perils in the course of the centuries and have 
always pulled through.  With God’s good grace we shall do so again.  Be 
of good courage then for our faith is in the God of all creation; the God 
who rides upon the storm.”  (Remarks by the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister 
Perry Christies, On Hurricane Frances.  1st September, 2004.)    
 
1.4.7.6 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 
 As Hurricane Jeanne approached the Islands of The Bahamas, 
emergency personnel were just beginning the process of trying to recover from 
 31
Hurricane Frances.  Frances, a category four hurricane, had slowly marched its 
way up the archipelago less then three weeks earlier.  With drained resources, 
tired response personnel, and already extensive damage to critical facilities 
Jeanne compounded an already extreme emergency situation. 
1.4.7.7 Hurricane Wilma 2005 
Hurricane Wilma was the only storm requiring a national response to cause 
any significant damage to The Bahamas during the 2005 Hurricane Season.  
One death was reported as a result of Hurricane Wilma and was directly related 
to storm surge inundation.  The concentrations of damages were mainly in the 
vicinities of the northwestern islands. 
1.5 Problem Statement 
 A large gap exists in the hazards research with regards to emergency 
management strategies, specifically the value of the Comprehensive Emergency 
Management (CEM) system.  The traditional hazard case studies have not 
facilitated the necessary understanding of CEM which requires the integration of 
all four phases of the emergency management cycle.   
Research by Pelling and Uitto (2001) identified remoteness, and lack of 
natural resources as major challenges for island nations making them 
increasingly vulnerable to disasters, but little is know about approaches utilized 
effectively to manage these challenges.  No island specific emergency 
management techniques have been established as best practices.  Additionally, 
no analysis has been conducted to see if emergency management techniques 
utilized in large developed nations such as the United States and Canada are 
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transferable and adequately meet the needs of island nations.  Also lacking in the 
hazards literature is a longitudinal study that examines the development, 
application, and evolution of emergency management techniques within island 
nations. 
1.6 Research Questions 
 The primary intent of this longitudinal study is to examine the validity of 
CEM as a national strategy for managing disaster response.  The following 
research questions were examined within the context of the study site.   
1. Can Quarantelli’s (1997) methodology for evaluating the management of 
disaster response be operationalized?  
2. Can CEM, a United States emergency management strategy, be an 
effective strategy for an archipelagic nation?  
3. Did the implementation of a CEM system improve disaster response?  
1.7 Research Hypotheses 
1. It is hypothesized that Quarantelli’s (1997) can be applied successfully to 
evaluate disaster response operations. 
2. It is hypothesized that CEM is an effective and successful emergency 
management strategy for The Commonwealth of The Bahamas. 
3. It is hypothesized that the implementation of CEM will improve all areas of 
disaster response. 
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1.8 Research Design 
This exploratory research utilized a longitudinal study design that 
incorporated a mixed methods approach to answering the research questions.  A 
comprehensive literature review was conducted to ensure that findings were 
placed in the appropriate context.  Through exhaustive archival research, six 
study hurricanes (Andrew 1992, Floyd 1999, Michelle 2001, Frances 2004, 
Jeanne 2004, and Wilma 2005) were reconstructed from development to landfall.  
National Government response to all six of the hurricanes was evaluated utilizing 
an amended version of Quarantelli’s (1997a) Ten Criteria for Evaluating the 
Management of Community Disasters to test the metric and determine its 
usefulness.  Traditional hazards methodologies such as structured surveys and 
interviews were also utilized in the research design as a way to further examine 
the impact of CEM on emergency response in the Commonwealth of The 
Bahamas.  
1.9 Organization of the Dissertation 
 Chapter two provides a review of the foundational literature in the field of 
hazards with specific attention provided to our understanding of hazard concepts 
and theoretical models.  Also provided in chapter two is discussion on the key 
components of comprehensive emergency management. 
 Chapter three details the study design and methodology, to include data 
collection, data application and analysis, as well as advantages and limitations of 
the methodology. 
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 Chapter Four begins the results section of the research and provides 
discusses the research findings associated with the application of Quarantelli’s 
(1997a) eight criteria for evaluating disaster response.    
 Chapter five discusses the results associated with data collection from the 
structured surveys and the semi-structured interviews.    
 Chapter Six examines the application of The Model of Community 
Response to Disasters.  This theoretical model was applied in two distinct 
phases:  (1) pre-CEM phase and (2) post-CEM phase.   
 Chapter Seven provides a summary and discussion of results associated 
with each of the research questions and places the findings within the current 
literature on hazards.  A set of general conclusions and suggestions for future 
research are also provided.   
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Chapter Two:  
Literature Review 
 
“The increasingly complex nature of hazards means that geography 
matters now more than ever.” (Cutter, 1994: xiv)  
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Hazards research requires an understanding of the complex interactions 
between the natural and social systems.  This chapter provides a review of key 
research studies that have influenced the way we think about hazards.  
Historically, hazards research has come from the three intellectual disciplines of 
geography, sociology, and engineering.  However, with the occurrence of large 
multi-jurisdictional disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and 
Hurricane Katrina 2005, hazards research has considerably intensified and 
expanded.   A variety of disciplines including public health, public administration, 
economics, and psychology have all produced important hazards research.  This 
expansion is both timely and necessary as we in the academic community work 
to develop better strategies for saving lives and protecting property.  Found 
throughout this chapter are the foundational components needed to contextualize 
this dissertation research.     
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2.2 History of Hazards Research in Geography 
In the field of geography, hazards research traditionally focused on the 
relationship between humans and the environment.  In the mid 1940’s 
researchers at the University of Chicago began a multidisciplinary research 
agenda with sociologists and geographers to explore the environment, hazards, 
and the social interaction.  It is here that the origins of hazards research took 
root.  Gilbert F. White, a student in geography in the early 1940’s wrote a 
pioneering dissertation that first asked the questions that still direct hazards 
research today:   
? Why are certain adjustments to hazards preferred over others?   
? Why, despite investments in those adjustments, are social losses 
from hazards increasing?  (White, 1945) 
 White, internationally renowned today as the father of natural hazards 
research (Mileti, 1999) was influenced by late 1920’s philosopher John Dewey.  
Dewey (1929) explored the human ecology school of thought noting that 
humanity exists in a natural world that in innately hazardous resulting in human 
insecurity.  He further explored how environmental perils such as floods and 
earthquakes do not exist independently of society because these events are 
defined, reshaped and redirected by human activities.   
In White’s 1973 research titled Natural Hazards Research, he spoke to the 
importance of geography in hazards research.  In particular he noted that many 
geographers had neglected “the theory of man-environment relationships” and its 
applications to public policy (White, 1973:193).  “The geographer loses an 
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opportunity to apply his knowledge, skills, and insights to fundamental questions 
of the survival and quality of human life.  He [The Geographer] also fails to 
sharpen and advance theoretical thinking by testing it in a challenging arena of 
action” (White, 1973:193).  When addressing the questions associated with 
hazards research and geography, White also points out that hazards research is 
well situated within the discipline.  “The research seeks application of new 
techniques to one of the old and recurring traditions of geographical enterprise – 
the ecology of human choice” (White, 1973:194).   
White’s work further influenced the hazards field by first utilizing a 
research approach related to the study of policy activities.  This approach was 
intended to expand our understanding of the decision-making process as it 
relates to extreme events.  His work continued to develop the field by utilizing a 
research paradigm and model of decision-making focused on how man copes 
with risk and uncertainty in the midst of environmental events (White, 1936, 
1962, 1964,1974a, 1974b).  This research not only expanded the interdisciplinary 
field of hazards research he also illustrated how hazards research is a traditional 
theme in geography and places geographers in the critical role of bridging the 
gap between the physical and social sciences.   
2.3 Hazards Terminology  
To place this dissertation research into context, it is critical to review the 
theoretical debate over the definition of hazards terminology.  Researchers have 
worked to define and conceptualize ‘natural hazards.’  As in all fields, attempting 
to classify events is critical.  Research must be placed within the appropriate 
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theoretical framework in order to obtain meaningful findings/results and move the 
discipline forward.   
As mentioned previously, hazards research is a multi-disciplinary study.  
The lack of clear and widely agreed upon vocabulary has plagued studies and 
led to some confusion.  Tobin and Montz (1997) point out that much of the 
terminology used in natural hazards has been used interchangeably, including 
references to hazard, disaster, risk, and vulnerability.  Additionally, Chakraborty, 
et al., (2005) note how problematic the estimation of risk and vulnerability can be, 
partly due to a lack of accurate data and partly due to the way in which available 
data are utilized.  It is because of these challenges that before moving forward in 
an effort to expand the literature we must first fully understand the current state 
of the discipline.   
It is through the examination of our current frameworks within natural 
hazards research that we are better able to reshape and expand our views.  The 
following section provides discussion on the discourse surrounding hazards 
terminology and the theoretical frameworks currently being applied.  This 
provides the opportunity to perhaps rethink and re-conceptualize our 
understanding of hazards, facilitating a new way of examining our research 
questions.  Furthermore, it is by doing this that we will ultimately influence the 
shape of the potential solutions, as well as the shape and character of the means 
we use to attain those solutions and make them operational.   
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2.3.1 Defining the Field of Natural Hazards 
Many of the early dominant views in the field of natural hazards research 
identified disasters as a result of geophysical processes.  A geophysical event 
was seen as a trigger for loss of life and damage to property. This approach 
identified the root cause of large-scale death and destruction as directly 
attributed to the extremes of nature rather than encompassing the social 
structures.  White (1945) identified natural hazards as the result of interacting 
natural and social forces.  Table 2.1 below provides a temporal examination of 
how the field of natural hazards has been defined.  Although White’s work 
identified an interaction between the physical and social components other 
researchers were slow to move away from viewing natural hazards as only a 
geo-physical process.   
By the early-1980’s steps towards a more human explanation of natural 
hazards was taking hold.  Hewitt (1983) research strongly spoke out against the 
overwhelming attention devoted to geophysical process and neglect of social 
forces.  Throughout the mid-1980’s and 1990’s natural hazards research 
embraced the physical and human components influencing hazards.  Our current 
understanding of ‘natural hazards’ as a field of study is one that embraces the 
human and physical geography.     
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Author Year Natural Hazard Definition 
White, Gilbert F. 1945 Natural Hazards are the result of interacting natural and social forces. 
Burton and Kates 1964 
Those elements of the physical environment 
harmful to man and caused by forces 
extraneous to him. 
American 
Geological Institute 1984 
A naturally occurring or man-made geologic 
condition or phenomenon that presents a risk or 
is a potential danger to life or property. 
Smith, Keith 1996 
The potential for extreme geophysical events, 
such as floods, to create an unexpected threat 
to human life and property. 
Tobin and Montz 1997 The potential interaction between humans and extreme natural events. 
United Nations 2004 
A potentially damaging physical event, 
phenomenon or human activity that may cause 
the loss of life or injury, property damage, social 
and economic disruption or environmental 
degradation. 
Table 2.1 Selected Definitions of Natural Hazards 
2.3.1.1 Defining Disaster 
The definition of ‘disaster’ has followed a similar path as the development 
of the field of natural hazards.  Historically disasters were seen as ‘Acts of God’ 
and generally outside human control.  Dynes & Drabek (1992) suggest that 
disaster events were made worse by the idea that residents could do nothing to 
reduce the impact.   
“When such events occurred in communities, they created great fear and 
personal trauma.  This created social chaos, making local communities 
incapable of effective action requiring outside authorities, especially the 
military, were needed to re-establish command and control” (Dynes & 
Drabek, 1992:12).   
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Author Year Disaster Definition 
Sheehan & Hewitt 1969 Those events leading to 100 deaths, 1000 injuries, or $1 million in damages. 
Brown & Goldin 1973 Disasters are inherently political phenomena and should be so conceptualized. 
Dynes 1974 
The physical agent, the physical consequences 
of the agent, the way in which the impact of the 
physical agent is evaluated, and the social 
disruption and social changes brought about by 
the physical agent and its impact. 
Quarantelli & 
Dynes 1977 
Disaster is primarily a social phenomenon and 
is thus identifiable in social terms. 
Kreps 1984 
Disasters are events observable in time and 
space, in which societies or their larger sub-
units incur physical damages and losses and or 
disruption of their routine functions.  Both the 
causes and consequences of these events are 
related to the social structures and processes of 
society or their sub-units. 
Dynes 1988 Disasters are events, occurrences, situations which are socially disruptive.   
Taylor 1989 
Catastrophic events that (a) interfere severely 
with everyday life, disrupt communities, and 
often cause extensive loss of life and property, 
(b) overtax local resources, and (c) create 
problems that continue far longer than those 
that arise from the normal vicissitudes of life. 
Glickman et. al. 1992 The death of 25 persons. 
Tobin & Montz 1997 Disaster is defined as an event that has a large impact on society. 
Weichselgartner 2001 
Disasters are more accurately seen as social 
phenomena whereas the overall damage due to 
natural hazards is the result both of natural 
events that act as ‘triggers’ and a series of 
societal factors. 
Table 2.2a – Selected Definitions of Disaster 
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Author Year Disaster Definition (Continued) 
McEntire 2004 
Disasters are the disruptive and/or deadly and 
destructive outcome or result of physical or 
human-induced triggering agents when they 
interact with and are exacerbated by 
vulnerabilities of diverse but overlapping 
environments. 
United Nations 2004 
A serious disruption of the functioning of a 
community or a society causing widespread 
human, material, economic or environmental 
losses which exceed the ability of the affected 
community or society to cope using its own 
resources. 
Table 2.2b – Selected Definitions of Disaster 
Table 2.2 highlights a variety of selected disaster definitions that have 
been used within the hazards literature.  The common theme among all of the 
definitions is the impact to society.  Without an adverse reaction to the society a 
disaster does not exist.  Brown and Goldin (1973) push the idea of ‘disaster’ 
further by identifying disasters as the result of political phenomena or ‘society’, 
removing completely a geophysical trigger.  
 Dynes (1974, 1988) and McEntire (2004) utilize a qualitative measure to 
define ‘disaster’ identifying ‘disruption to society’ as a disaster.  Quantitative 
measures have also been utilized, for example, Sheehan and Hewitt (1969) 
utilized death, injuries and economic thresholds.  Currently there is no national or 
international threshold which categorically defines or identifies a disaster.  Within 
the response community a disaster is many times identified by the types of 
resources that must be mobilized in response to an event.  A full activation of all 
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agencies active in disasters, illustrates an event that is taxing on resources and 
requires a large coordinated effort, thus being identified as a disaster. 
2.3.1.2 Defining Risk 
Author Year Risk Definition 
Hammer 1972 The sum of possible alternative numbers of fatalities weighted by their probabilities. 
Zenter 1979 Risk as the total number of deaths 
Ritter 1981 Risk as the Probability of occurrence for an undesirable outcome 
UNDRO 1982 Risk is equal to loss divided by unit time 
Crouch and Wilson 1982 The probability of an event multiplied by the severity of that event. 
Crozier 1988 
Risk is the expected number of lives lost, 
persons injured, damage to property and 
disruption of economic activity due to a 
particular natural phenomenon, and 
consequently the product of specific risk and 
elements at risk. 
Petak and 
Atkisson 1982 
Risk is broken into two functions: first, the 
probability that an event, or a series of events of 
various magnitudes, will occur, and second, the 
consequences of those events 
Crozier 1988 
Risk is the expected number of lives lost, 
persons injured, damage to property and 
disruption of economic activity due to a 
particular natural phenomenon, and 
consequently the product of specific risk and 
elements at risk. 
Beck 1992 
Risk is a systematic way of dealing with hazards 
and insecurities induced and introduced by 
modernization. 
Cutter  1996 Risk is the likelihood of probability that an event will occur. 
Tobin and Montz 1997 Risk as probability of occurrence multiplied by vulnerability 
Table 2.3a – Selected Definitions of Risk 
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Author Year Risk Definition (Continued) 
United Nations 2004 
The probability of harmful consequences, or 
expected losses (death, injuries, property, 
livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or 
environment damaged) resulting from 
interactions between natural and human-
induced hazards and vulnerable conditions. 
Hyndman & 
Hyndman 2006 
Risk is essentially a hazard considered in the 
light of its recurrence interval and expected 
costs.  The greater the hazard and the shorter 
its recurrence interval, the greater the risk. 
Table 2.3b – Selected Definitions of Risk 
Table 2.3 shows some of the varying definitions of risk employed by 
hazards researchers.  Examining the table from a temporal perspective highlights 
an interesting pattern.  During the 1970s, risk was often based primarily on the 
number of fatalities, whereas in the 1980s there was at least an effort among 
academics to broaden the term to incorporate the probability of a particular 
geophysical event recurring.  By the 1990’s, researchers turned away from 
numbers of dead as a measurement of risk, and focused more on geophysical 
mechanisms and probabilities of occurrence.   
This changing emphasis reflects the evolving role of emergency 
management and hazards research within the United States and, to some extent, 
globally.  The 1970s witnessed a variety of disasters both natural and 
technological that impacted the terminology and definitions used by hazard 
researchers.  For example, the super outbreak of tornadoes in 1974 and the 
Three Mile Island nuclear power plant incident focused attention on the 
terminology used in hazard studies.  
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The 1980’s brought awareness of catastrophic man-made disasters such 
as 1984 Bhopal, India explosion at the Union Carbide Chemical Plant which 
killed thousands and sickened tens of thousands more.  The 1985 volcanic 
eruption of Nevado del Ruiz killed thousands, buried whole towns in ash, and 
mud.  Additionally, the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster in Ukraine (former Soviet 
Union) brought worldwide attention to hazards and an increased desire to further 
understand the concepts associated with risk.   
‘Risk’ and ‘risk assessment’ have raised several research questions. For 
example, Cutter (1993) noted, that there is no such thing as a risk-free or hazard-
free environment despite American preoccupation with a zero-risk society.  
Clearly the idea that any area is completely safe from a natural or man-made 
disaster is incorrect.  Graham’s (1995) research, which focuses on technological 
and environmental disasters, highlighted the need for continued research by 
academics on these concepts.  “The analytical tools of risk assessment, as 
applied to chemicals and radiation, have assumed a critical role in decision 
making in the United States” (Graham, 1985:29).  The United Nations identifies 
risk assessments as:  
“a methodology to determine the nature and extent of risk by 
analyzing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of 
vulnerability that could pose a potential threat or harm to people, 
property, livelihoods and the environment on which they depend” 
(UN 2004:18).  
 It is through our application of risk assessments that hazard practitioners 
have been able to make more informed decision about how best to utilize limited 
resources to protect lives and minimize damage.  The concept of risk and risk 
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assessment has been a hazard concept that practitioners have effectively made 
operational during the emergency management mitigation phase.   
2.3.1.3 Defining Vulnerability 
  During the 1990s researchers began to examine not only the geographic 
areas with potential risk for geophysical or technological events but also the 
populations that are most vulnerable.  Table 2.4 below displays selected 
variations of the vulnerability definitions that are being utilized in hazards 
research.  Like risk, no clear agreed upon definition has been developed and 
accepted by either academics or practitioners.     
Author Year Definition 
Timmerman 1981 
Vulnerability is the degree to which a system 
acts adversely to the occurrence of a hazardous 
event.   
UNDRO 1982 
Vulnerability is the degree of the loss to a given 
element or set of elements at risk resulting from 
the occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a 
given magnitude. 
Susman, O’Keefe, 
Wisner 1983 
The degree to which different classes in society 
are differentially at risk, both in terms of the 
probability of occurrence of an extreme physical 
event and the degree to which the community 
absorbs the effects of extreme physical events 
and helps different classes to recover. 
Kates  1985 Vulnerability is the capacity to suffer harm and react adversely. 
Crozier 1988 
Vulnerability is the degree of loss to a given 
element at risk or a set of such elements 
resulting from the occurrence of a natural 
phenomenon of a given magnitude and 
expressed on a scale of 0 (no damage) to 1 
(total loss). 
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Bogard 1989 
Vulnerability is operationally defined as the 
inability to take effective measures to insure 
against losses.   
Mitchell 1989 Vulnerability is the potential for loss. 
Panizza 1991 
The degree to which a system, including 
population, buildings, infrastructures, economic 
activity, social organization and any expansion 
and development programs in an area may 
react adversely to the occurrence of a 
hazardous event.  
Watts & Bohle 1993 
Vulnerability is defined in terms of exposure, 
capacity and potentiality.  Accordingly, the 
prescriptive and normative response to 
vulnerability is to reduce exposure, enhance 
coping capacity, strengthen recovery potential 
and bolster damage control via private and 
public means. 
Blaikie et. al. 1994 
Vulnerability refers to social and material 
conditions derived from characteristics of 
individuals and groups that make them 
susceptible to harm and loss from 
environmental hazards and that constrains their 
ability to cope with the adversity of disasters. 
Smith 1996 
Vulnerability implies a measure of risk combined 
with the level of social and economic ability to 
cope with the resulting event. 
Alexander 1997 Vulnerability is defined as a measure of loss and as a measure of exposure to a loss 
Hewitt 1997 
The attributes of persons, or activities and 
aspects of community that can serve to increase 
damage from given dangers 
Tobin and Montz 1997 
Vulnerability is a systems approach, a 
combination of the physical characteristics of 
natural hazards, political/economic factors, and 
social characteristics. 
Comfort et. al. 1999 
Vulnerability are those circumstance that place 
people at risk while reducing their means of 
response or denying them available protection. 
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Wisner et. al. 2004 
The characteristics of a person or group and 
their situation that influence their capacity to 
anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from 
the impact of a natural hazard.  
United Nations 2004 
The conditions determined by physical, social, 
economic and environmental factors or 
processes, which increase the susceptibility of a 
community to the impact of hazards. 
Chakraborty, 
Tobin, and Montz 2005 
A human-induced situation that results from 
public policy and resource 
availability/distribution, and it is the root cause 
of many disaster impacts. 
Table 2.4– Selected Definitions of Vulnerability 
As is evident in the above literature review, hazards research is multi-
disciplinary leading to a variety of interpretations of vulnerability.  Susman et al’s. 
(1983), definition of vulnerability encompasses elements of risk as well as class 
attributes such as poverty and support systems.  Panizza (1991) characterizes 
vulnerability as the adverse reaction that the ‘system’ (including population, 
infrastructure, economy, etc.) may have as a result of a hazardous event.   Like 
risk it is important for researchers to explore the different variations of 
vulnerability in an effort to better prepare practitioners so that they may make 
better planning, mitigation, and response decisions.   
2.3.2 Phases of Emergency Management 
 There is general agreement among hazards researchers and practitioners 
that there are four distinct phases of a disaster event:  mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery (NGA 1979; Clary 1985; FEMA 2003a; Kates and Burton 
1986a, 1986b).  These phases have slight variations but as explored by Clary’s 
 49
1985 work, all the phases are interrelated with the creation of boundaries as a 
simplification which aids discussion, modeling, and application.   
 Figure 2.1 illustrates the interrelated and cyclical nature of the emergency 
management phases.  FEMA (2003b:9) refers to this as the “occurrence cycle”.  
It is through this process that emergency plans are constantly reviewed and 
updated to accurately represent a jurisdictions management capability.  As 
shown in the figure 2.1, management strategies involving mitigation and 
preparedness efforts are designed to improve response and recovery.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Four Phases of Emergency Management 
 
2.3.2.1 Mitigation Phase 
Hazard Mitigation refers to “sustained actions taken to reduce or eliminate 
long-term risk to people and property from hazards and their effects” (FEMA, 
2006).  Mitigation actions involve lasting, often permanent, reduction of exposure 
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to, probability of, or potential loss from a hazard.  The National Governors 
Association in 1979 defined mitigation activities to include “arms build-up to deter 
enemy attack or legislation that takes the unstable double-bottom tanker off the 
highways” (NGA, 1979:12).  Although many researchers have removed the idea 
of an arms-build up as a potential mitigation measure it is important to 
understand the roots of mitigation lie within the military response to hazards.   
In the early to mid-1980’s hazard mitigation took a very strong structural 
path in an attempt to control the hazard through engineered concepts.  Examples 
of this engineered mitigation strategy included the implementation of zoning and 
building codes, firewalls, floodwalls, levees and dams.  Since the early-1990’s 
with hazards researchers focusing on the identification of social factors that may 
lead to vulnerability, the emergency management practitioners have slowly 
moved in a more balanced direction utilizing both structural and non-structural 
mitigation initiatives.   Additionally community and state supported events such 
as ‘Flood Awareness Week’ in combination with federal flood buyout programs 
are providing a more comprehensive understanding of the mitigation phase 
(FEMA, 2003b; American Red Cross, 2002; Hughey, 2003).   
In communities such as San Francisco, California, emergency managers 
have made a concerted effort to educate businesses and the public on simple 
measures they can take to reduce loss or injury as a result of an earthquake, 
such as fastening bookshelves, water heaters, and file cabinets to walls can 
prevent them from falling.  These structural measures in combination with an 
aggressive program designed to help business identify ‘places of refuge’ during 
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an earthquake is a simple and cost effective way, to save lives and protect 
property (San Francisco Office of Emergency Services and Homeland Security, 
2005).  
 Viêt Nam provides another notable case study on mitigation.  Since 1993 
the nation has pursued a methodical strategy of reducing risk through national 
development objectives.  The National Disaster Management Unit embarked on 
a program focused on assisting the residents of the Mekong River Delta in an 
effort to help them learn to ‘Live With the Floods’.  Mitigation measures under this 
new program have ranged from relocating extremely vulnerable communities, to 
altering the cropping calendar.  Additionally, experience gained from the 2000 
and 2001 flood events resulted in an effective mitigation measures designed to 
prevent drowning deaths of children.  According to data provided by the UN, 
2001 flooding in the Mekong River Delta killed 106 people, 99 of whom were 
children.  As a result a unique mitigation concept known as “emergency 
kindergartens” were developed.  The emergency kindergartens allow parents to 
drop off their children during the rainy season.  This allows parents to leave their 
children supervised at the time of emergency, when they are otherwise 
preoccupied with securing personal possessions and other resources crucial for 
their livelihood (UN, 2004:82).  This program in combination with a nationwide 
information system that provides real-time information for flood and storm control 
has dramatically decreased children’s deaths associated with the flood hazard.  
During the 2002 floods 918 emergency kindergartens were organized housing 
over 20,000 children.   
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2.3.2.2 Preparedness 
 Preparedness is often referred to as planning and many times the two 
terms are used interchangeably within the hazards literature.  Preparedness is 
defined as “planning how to respond when an emergency or disaster occurs and 
working to marshal the resources to respond effectively” (FEMA, 2003b:12). The 
purpose of disaster planning activities is to help save lives and minimize damage 
by preparing individuals and communities to respond appropriately when a 
disaster strikes.  Emergency planning is not a one-time event.  Rather, it is a 
continual cycle of planning, training, exercising, and revision that takes place 
throughout the four phases of the emergency management cycle.  According to 
Quarantelli (1988, 2001) disaster planning when based in scientific research 
makes an important difference in reducing unknowns.  All planning activities must 
take into consideration the geophysical components of a hazard which places a 
community at risk and the social constructs which create vulnerable populations.     
 The emergency preparedness phase is where most hazards research 
can be applied effectively.  Risk studies help to identify geographic areas that 
may have an increased probability of experiencing a given disaster.  Vulnerability 
studies have been effective at identifying those populations which may not be 
able to respond and recover from disasters.  Results from risk and vulnerability 
studies can most effectively be operationalized during the preparedness phase.   
 The goal of all preparedness activities is to anticipate problems and 
present possible solutions.  Without regular training and exercising of a disaster 
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plan the activation of the plan during a disaster can result in a dysfunctional 
response.  FEMA (2003b) identifies components of a good disaster plan as: 
? Based on facts and scientific evidence 
? Based on community resources inventory 
? Provides organizational Structure 
? Uses Simple Language 
? Elements are coordinated 
? ‘Living Document’ which is tested and updated regularly 
? A comprehensive document which provides guidelines for response to 
any disaster 
It is through preparedness and mitigation activities that response to a disaster 
can ultimately be improved.   
2.3.2.3 Response 
 Response is defined as “the period during and immediately following a 
disaster” (FEMA, 2003b).  Response activities are designed to provide 
emergency assistance to victims of a disaster and reduce the likelihood of 
secondary damage.  The response phase has five stages: (FEMA, 2003b; 
Quarentelli, 1997) 
1. Alert and Notification 
2. Warning 
3. Protection of Citizens and Property 
4. Providing of Public Welfare 
5. Restoration 
The length of each of these five stages are dependent on the hazard, for 
example alert and notification of a hurricane or flood may be several days while 
there may only be minutes or even seconds during the notification stage for a 
tornadoes.  
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The goal of the response phase is to meet the immediate emergency 
needs of the affected population (e.g. search and rescue; immediate medical 
care; public safety; evacuation). The emergency services communities are the 
first responders and primary component to the response phase.  For this reason 
it is critical that planning and mitigation activities are done in cooperation with all 
individuals and agencies responsible for respond during a disaster.   
2.3.2.4 Recovery 
Recovery is defined as “activities necessary to restore the jurisdiction to 
normal” (FEMA, 2003b).  Although researchers agree that recovery is a distinct 
phase in the emergency management process (Clary 1985; FEMA 2003a; Kates 
and Burton 1986a, 1986b) the activities (e.g. restoration of power, clearing of 
roads) and the goal of recovery is an active debate in the hazards literature 
(Berke et al., 1993; Mileti, 1999; Mitchel, 1996; Shrubsole, 1999).  Like risk and 
vulnerability definitions of recovery vary greatly.  In contrast to FEMA’s definition 
Quarantelli (1999:3) defines recovery as “attempting to and/or bringing the post 
disaster situation to some level of acceptability.  This may or may not be the 
same as the pre-impact level.”  The vague conceptualizations of recovery can 
make this phase difficult to implement.   
2.4 Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) 
To understand the application of each of the four phase of emergency 
management the concept of Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) 
must be discussed.  In the late 1970’s, United States Governors were becoming 
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increasingly concerned by the lack of national policy for managing natural and 
man-made disasters.  It was during this time that a variety of federal agencies 
had responsibilities related to disaster response but a clear national strategy for 
managing disasters was lacking.   
In 1977 amid growing concern that the federal government was ill 
equipped to aid state governments in response to a major or catastrophic 
disaster the National Governors Association (NGA) formed a subcommittee on 
disaster assistance to urge the President to establish a new centralized federal 
emergency management agency.  The NGA further requested that the federal 
government fund a year long analysis of the problems and challenges associated 
with managing all types of emergencies.   
In 1979 the research findings of the analyses were released by the NGA.  
The document presented for the first time a comprehensive emergency 
management approach aimed at aiding state leaders in coping with emergencies.  
Included in this document was the first set of emergency management tools 
based on case studies from a variety of states.  The research identified a 
fragmentation within and between federal and state agencies as a challenge to 
effective emergency management.   
The NGA report and the establishment of FEMA was the beginning of a 
large consolidation of over thirty plus federal agencies responsible in some way 
for disaster management.  For the first time, all preparedness, mitigation, 
response and recovery programs were being stressed in a coordinated manner 
at the federal level.  In the eyes of the NGA the goal of FEMA was to provide a 
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foundation for a comprehensive national emergency management system 
wherein federal, state, and local emergency management organizations become 
equal partners.   
The 1979 NGA study not only identified fragmentation at the federal and 
state level as causes for ineffective emergency management programs but also 
identified a keystone in our modern understanding of emergency response by 
identifying the intertwined relationship between preparedness, mitigation, 
response, and recovery.  For the first time in the hazards literature the NGA 
study clarifies that each mechanism is equally important to the success of the 
others and cannot be divorced from one another.   
In 1979 the term Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) was a 
new term referring to a “states responsibility and capability for managing all types 
of emergencies and disasters by coordinating the actions of numerous agencies” 
(NGA, 1979:11).  CEM was very different from the then popular term 
Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness.  Comprehensive Emergency 
Preparedness placed the emphasis “in practice if not legislative intent, on the 
preparedness phase of emergency management” (NGA, 1979:11).  The 
preparedness phase of emergency management was focused on the exclusion 
of response, mitigation, and recovery for three key reasons:  “1) A lack of federal 
funds to states to mount mitigation and long-term recovery planning; 2) a lack of 
state funds, staff, and time to coordinate these phases, and 3) a lack of 
understanding of the relationships between the four phases” (NGA, 1979:11). 
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The NGA hoped to present CEM to the federal government in an effort to 
have state and federal officials view emergency management in a more holistic 
and inter-connected context.  The intent of CEM was to develop a program which 
was capable of identifying the right agencies and individuals in a common sense 
way.  Those identified would have useful resources to bring to bear on all phases 
of the emergency management cycle and provide the motivation for them to 
apply their resources in the most productive manner and in a coordinated 
fashion.   
McEntire (2004) argues that CEM has for years organized emergency 
management into useful but perhaps, overly simplified, disaster phases.  CEM 
has been the traditional theory of emergency management.  Britton (1999), 
Oliver-Smith and Hoffman (1999) have all noted that this single perspective can 
limit understanding and expansion.  Britton further argues that CEM has trouble 
capturing the wider political, economic and cultural explanations of disasters.   
CEM, although developed in the United States, has been adopted 
worldwide.   The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) 
utilizes this same concept under the term Comprehensive Disaster Management 
(CDM).  CDM has been defined as “including integrated management of all 
natural and human-induced hazards and involving management through all 
phases of the Disaster Management Cycle” (CDERA, 2001:3).  CEM and CDM 
are used interchangeably.  Despite the title both CEM and CDM are multi-hazard, 
and multi-sectoral in their application as well as both being concerned primarily 
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with integrating vulnerability assessment and risk reduction into planning and 
management.  Figure 2.2 illustrates the framework of an effective CEM plan.    
The major components of the CEM Plan as shown in Figure 2.2 are risk 
identification and social vulnerability as applied to the four phases of emergency 
management.  The effectiveness of the model is based on a solid understanding 
of the geophysical risks that a community faces as well the social structure within 
that community that creates vulnerable populations.  Applying these two 
theoretical concepts to CEM allows emergency managers to integrate community 
specific elements to the all-hazards planning1 and response approach.    
Figure 2.2 – Framework of a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 
(Source: Hughey, 2003) 
 An advantage of the CEM system is the all-hazards approach. The 
commonalities among all types of technological and natural disasters indicate 
                                                 
1 All-Hazards approach is a term used in the response community to describe, a generic, basic response 
planning component for all types of hazards. 
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that many of the same disaster management strategies can be applied to all 
hazards. These common management approaches are a primary element of 
CEM and CDM (Hughey, 2003; Tobin et al., 2004).   The objective of CEM has 
been to build capacity to prepare and respond, as well as to implement 
institutional mechanisms to reduce the impact of these extreme events.  The 
integrated and holistic approach that is needed to minimize loss and dislocation 
can be advanced through the CEM process.   
2.5 Theoretical Frameworks In Hazards Research 
By the mid-1980’s through the 1990’s geographers and hazards research 
began to examine more closely the social frameworks that influenced how 
hazards affected individuals and groups, taking into consideration the interaction 
between geophysical aspects and the social environment.  Researchers in the 
discipline have attempted to develop theoretical frameworks in an attempt to 
model the complex social and physical components which cause disasters.  This 
section will highlight two selected theoretical models (The Hazards-of-Place 
Model and The Pressure and Release (PAR) Model) that have been instrumental 
in moving the hazards literature forward.  Contributions and gaps of each model 
will be identified and discussed.     
2.5.1 Hazards-of-Place Model 
Cutter’s 1996 Hazards-of-Place model shown below in Figure 2.3 
develops a framework for looking at the social factors that influence or shape the 
susceptibility of various groups to harm as well as those characteristics of 
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communities and the built environment which create place inequalities.  Cutter 
defines risk as an objective measure of the likelihood of a hazard event and 
defines mitigation as measures to lessen risks or reduce their impact.  These two 
components risk and mitigation combine to create what Cutter identifies as the 
hazard potential.   The Geographic Context or proximity to the hazard potential 
and the Social Fabric or experience with the hazard can create biophysical 
vulnerability, social vulnerability or both biophysical and social vulnerability.   The 
combination of the two types of vulnerability intern creates Place Vulnerability.  
 
Figure 2.3 - The Hazards-of-Place Vulnerability Model (Source:  Cutter et al. 
(2003) Modified from Cutter (1996)) 
 
Although this model provides a path for discussing vulnerability of place, a 
gap exists in the understanding of the social aspects of vulnerability in both the 
geographic literature and dialogue.  Mileti (1999), highlights components of 
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biophysical vulnerability and the vulnerability of the built environment; largely 
ignoring the socially created vulnerabilities.  There is good reason for this; 
socially constructed vulnerabilities are difficult to measure.  Current hazards 
research has utilized individual characteristics of persons (age, race, health, 
income, type of dwelling unit, employment) to estimate social vulnerability at a 
jurisdictional level (Cutter, 1996, Cutter et al., 2003).   I would argue that utilizing 
data obtained exclusively through the United States Census as the factors for 
determining social vulnerability eliminates the elements that are intrinsic to a 
community that may increase or reduce social vulnerability.  The model also fails 
to take into consideration the political and community structures which exist 
within an area.   
Cutter et al. (2003:257) describe social vulnerability in the context of the 
Hazard-of-Place model as a “multidimensional concept that helps to identify 
those characteristics and experiences of communities that enable them to 
respond to and recover from environmental hazards”.  I would argue however 
that Cutter et al (2003) selected variables for use in the study that were based on 
case studies that lack a larger theoretical or conceptual understanding of 
comparative indicators of social vulnerability.  The Hazard-of-Place model 
provides a strong foundation but does not have the ability to adapt to each 
unique community.  The model further has limitations that prevent it from 
becoming operational.   
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2.5.2 Pressure and Release Model 
Figure 2.4 the Pressure and Release (PAR) Model developed by Wisner 
(1994) has been utilized as a tool for illustrating how disasters occur when 
natural hazards affect vulnerable people.  “The image resembles a nutcracker, 
with increasing pressure on people arising from either side – from their 
vulnerability and from impact (and severity) of the hazard for those people 
(Wisner, 2004:50).”  It is only when the physical hazard and the social 
components of vulnerability come together that a disaster occurs.  The PAR 
model identifies the disaster as the intersection between the physical and social 
forces.   
The PAR model requires communities to trace the connections that link 
the impact of a hazard on people with a series of social factors and processes 
that generate vulnerability.  This model places significant responsibility on the 
structures of society believing that natural hazards and hazard vulnerability can 
best be determined by understanding the social processes that impact choice. 
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Figure 2.4 – Pressure and Release Model (Source: Wisner, 2004) 
Wisner (2004) identifies the root causes of vulnerability as economic, 
demographic and political processes which impact the allocation and distribution 
of resources among different groups.  Such root causes are directly connected to 
the function/dysfunction of the state.  Dynamic pressures are identified as the 
activities and processes that translate the effects of root causes both temporally 
and spatially into unsafe conditions.  Unsafe conditions are the specific forms in 
which the vulnerability of a population is expressed in time and space in 
conjunction with a hazard. 
Placing the recent Hurricane Katrina disaster within the PAR model for 
examination illuminates a myriad of root causes such as poor economic 
conditions of residents as well as an inadequate local emergency management 
structure.  Add to the root causes a combination of dynamic pressures like lack of 
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resources, training, and planning to create unsafe conditions within the City of 
New Orleans.  When these vulnerabilities collided with an unprecedented 
geophysical force (category four hurricane) the disaster was considerable.   
The PAR model provides a valuable tool to researchers and emergency 
managers by identifying the components that contribute to social vulnerability.  
The identification of these components allow for changes through application at 
all levels of government.  To prevent another disaster like Hurricane Katrina the 
root causes and the dynamic pressures within New Orleans will have to be 
addressed.  The PAR model provides the identification of key components that 
emergency managers and community leaders can make operational. 
The PAR model has a wide application in both small and large 
communities and at the different levels of governments.  Wisner (2004) model 
takes into consideration the larger economic and political system that impact 
individuals and communities abilities to effectively respond and recover from a 
disaster.  It additionally identifies the potential mitigation areas to improve future 
disaster response.   
2.6 Local Response to Disasters 
Disasters affect jurisdictional areas in unique ways with differences 
attributed to the type of disaster, extent of damage, and available resources.  As 
jurisdictions plan and mitigate for hazards they need to make sure that the plan 
does not fall into the common cookie cutter, one size fits all disaster plan, which 
may leave them more vulnerable.  White’s (1969, 1974) writings acknowledge 
that differences in communities require solutions to be distinctive for every area.  
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The acknowledgement of risk to a disaster and the communities understanding of 
vulnerability is required to ensure that the planning phase of a disaster is 
adequate.  Although communities are constantly faced with the risk of hazards, 
they are not all equally vulnerable.  White (1945) emphasizes the importance of 
understanding how individuals and groups make decisions about alternative 
programs for managing hazards.   
Well trained professionals are an essential component to successful 
emergency management (Kates and Burton, 1986a) although, Wolensky and 
Wolensky (1990), argue that four other elements are also required: 1) A 
foundation of supportive values for local government action, 2) The legal 
authority to act, 3) An advocacy supporting action, and 4) Necessary institutional 
resources.  Applying these five core components to the four stages of a disaster, 
the following model (Figure 2.5) is developed.  The model which was initially 
intended to examine the effectiveness of small communities to respond to 
disasters could be applied to any community regardless of size.  The model 
allows for the identification of elements that may be missing resulting in poor 
hazard management strategies.   
The Model of Community Response to Disaster (Figure 2.5) takes into 
consideration the large contextual setting in which disasters take place.  This 
model also addresses the concerns of Britton (1999), and Oliver-Smith and 
Hoffman (1999) that the traditional theory of emergency management i.e. CEM, 
overly simplifies the disaster phases and has trouble capturing the wider political, 
economic and cultural explanations of disasters.  Figure 2.5 below ensures that 
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the policy process and intergovernmental system are not divorced from one 
another by applying to the phases of mitigation, planning, response, and 
recovery the key components identified by Wolensky and Wolensky (1990) and 
Kates and Burton (1986a): 
? Well trained professionals 
? A foundation of supportive values for local government action 
? The legal authority to act,  
? An advocacy supporting action, and  
? Necessary institutional resources 
 
 
Figure 2.5 - Model of Community Response to Disaster (Source: Hughey, 2003) 
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2.6.1 Exploring the Model of Community Response to Disaster 
The hazard literature illustrates agreement among researchers with 
regards to good leadership (Kates and Burton, 1986a).  The key to an effective 
hazard management plan is good leadership and professionally trained officials.  
This element is the keystone to the above model while still illustrating that good 
hazard management is more complex then just this one feature.   
A foundation of supportive values for government action enables concepts 
to be developed into policies and provides government leaders the backing to 
spend money in an effort to build resources.  This is critical when dealing with 
jurisdictions that have a limited economic base.  Hazard mitigation and planning 
is only one of the many issues facing government and many times gets placed 
on the back burner.  If both the government and residents place importance on 
hazard management the community will be better prepared.  Often officials are 
also more willing to engage in hazard policy if constituents are encouraging of 
such action.   
Working within the constraints of any governmental systems and hazard 
mitigation boundaries, a jurisdiction can find itself with little or no legal authority 
to act.  Changing political situations can seriously impair mitigation projects 
initiated at the local level.  With new political leadership come new political 
agendas which can stop or alter mitigation measures before completion.   Case 
studies such as Tobin and Peacock (1982) evaluations of Soldiers Grove, 
Wisconsin, has shed light on the U.S. federal governments’ attitude towards 
alternative mitigation measures.  Cases in point, when dealing with the flood 
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hazard, some communities have chosen to select non-structural adjustments to 
regulate the floodplain.  However, without the authority to act and the support of 
government officials such measures can be halted, continuing to leave citizens 
vulnerable.     
It is important to realize that strong support from government leaders is 
not always enough to ensure that polices and mitigation measures come to 
fruition.  Clearly following a disaster, citizen support for action is high, but 
consensus on which alleviation strategy should be implemented is not always 
easy to achieve.  As the immediate response phase comes to an end, many 
citizens try to get life ‘back to normal’ and are faced with other urgent problems, 
such as lost wages or lost industrial production.  If a strong support for action 
does not exist within the community, policies for hazard reduction can fall through 
the cracks.     
Every jurisdiction must have an accurate assessment of available 
resources.  Being familiar with what resources and personnel are available 
during a disaster is crucial.  Although many jurisdictions have a limited economic 
base and fewer immediate resources available, through mutual-aid agreements 
with neighboring jurisdictions, resources can be easily mobilized to respond.  
Being able to quickly assess the community needs and having the knowledge of 
resource availability, aid can be requested in a timely manner to ensure all 
immediate emergency needs are met.  The application of the Model of 
Community Response to Disaster a jurisdiction can evaluate and determine gaps 
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that exist.  Identification of gaps allows for the improvement and development of 
a more effective comprehensive emergency management system.     
2.7 Discussion 
As a geographer in the field of hazards research I believe it is our 
responsibility to bridge not only the gap between physical and social sciences but 
also to bridge the gap between theoretical and applied research.  We have a 
responsibility to ensure that our research findings are presented in an effective 
and meaningful way not only to the rest of the hazards research community but 
also to emergency managers in the field.  In an effort to reduce vulnerability and 
disaster losses our research must get into the hands of decision makers and we 
must enable them to apply the findings.  Examples of research which have not 
only made significant contributions to the academic community but also to the 
emergency management community includes White (1945, 1958), Cutter (1996), 
Quarantelli (1997, 2000), Wisner et al. (2004), and Tobin et al. (2005).   
This research attempts to build upon the foundation that has been 
developed in the hazards literature and previously discussed in this chapter to 
further expand our understanding of comprehensive emergency management 
and its impact on disaster response.  The selected study design and methods are 
discussed in following chapter.  Outlined are the data collection tools and 
procedures as well as a description of data interpretation and analysis.   
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Chapter Three:  
Study Design & Methods 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This research study used a longitudinal approach to improve our 
understanding of the Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) system on 
disaster response.  The purpose of this study was to identify and report areas of 
success, as well as potential barriers to effective disaster response under the 
CEM system, in an effort to add to the geography literature on hazards.  The 
study design and methods utilized in this research tested the validity of 
Quarantelli’s (1997) methodology for evaluating the management of disaster 
response operations.  This longitudinal study design was intended to determine 
the geographic, and political challenges to emergency management within the 
Commonwealth of The Bahamas as well as identify and document techniques 
being utilized to respond to and recover from disasters.  Furthermore, the study 
design is intended to produce benchmarks for further evaluation from which we 
can continue to gauge the impact of CEM on future disasters within The 
Bahamas.  The following chapter discusses the qualitative and quantitative 
methodology that was used and includes discussion of the study design, data 
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collection tools, and procedures.  Additionally, provided in this chapter is a 
description of the process through which data were interpreted and analyzed. 
3.2 Background 
The goal of this research was two fold; first, to document the development 
of a comprehensive emergency management system within The Bahamas and 
second, to compare response operations under CEM with response operations 
prior to its implementation.  This research study used qualitative and quantitative 
methods to analyze response operations to six disasters within The Bahamas.  
Figure 3.1 below displays the six study hurricanes and their temporal relationship 
to the implementation of CEM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Timeline of selected study hurricanes 
The purpose of examining the above six hurricanes was to determine the impact 
of CEM on disaster response.  By examining three response operations prior to 
the implementation of CEM we are better able to evaluate through comparison 
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CEM 
Implementation 
Begins (2002) 
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the extent to which the national response operations were improved or 
worsened.     
Keeping with the goal of the study, it was imperative that the research 
strategy employed answer the three objectives posed by the study:   
3.2.1 Research Objectives 
1. To identify and report areas of success, as well as potential barriers to 
effective disaster response under the CEM system, in an effort to add to 
the geography literature on hazards. 
2. Test the validity of Quarantelli’s (1997) methodology for evaluating the 
management of disaster response operations. 
3. To determine the geographic, and political challenges to emergency 
management within the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.   
4. To identify techniques being utilized within the Commonwealth of The 
Bahamas to respond to and recover from the impacts of disasters.   
The research strategy additionally required that the selected methods of data 
collection and analysis address fully the research questions.    
3.2.2 Research Questions 
1. Can Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of 
disaster response be operationalized?  
2. Can CEM, a United States emergency management strategy, be an 
effective strategy for an archipelagic nation?  
3. Did the implementation of a CEM system improve disaster response?  
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Based on the literature (NGA, 1979; McLoughlin , 1985; Petak, 1985; Quarantelli, 
1997; Britton, 2001; FEMA, 2003a; McEntire 2004; Tobin et al., 2004;) it is 
hypothesized that the implementation of CEM will have improved all areas of 
disaster response.  It is further believed that the CEM system is an appropriate 
and effective strategy for disaster response within the Commonwealth of The 
Bahamas.  The following section characterizes the research strategy utilized for 
this study by detailing the study design to include the utilized methods for data 
collection and analysis. 
3.2.3 Selection of the Six Study Hurricanes 
 The selection of the six study hurricanes as displayed in Figure 3.1 above 
were based on the following criteria.   
(1) Any disaster impacting The Commonwealth of The Bahamas that 
required a response by the national government following the 
implementation of CEM.   
(2)  A matching number of disasters impacting The Commonwealth of 
The Bahamas that required a response by the national government 
prior to the implementation of CEM.   
To date Hurricanes Frances (2004), Jeanne (2004), and Wilma (2005) are the 
only disasters to impact the nation that have required a national response post 
CEM.  Although there were smaller disaster such as brush fires, localized 
flooding events, and a ferry accident that have occurred since the implementation 
of CEM none of the events required a national response; for that reason these 
events were not selected as part of this study.   
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 As a comparison group, three disasters that required a national response 
but occurred prior to the implementation of CEM were also included in this study.  
Hurricanes Andrew (1992), Floyd (1999), and Michelle (2001) were selected for 
the following reasons: (1) they were the most recent national response 
operations to take place prior to the CEM implementation, and (2) large amounts 
of data were available that documented in detail the national response initiatives.  
Excluded from this group were Hurricane Lili (1996) and The Bay Street Fire of 
2001.  Hurricane Lili was excluded due to the limited documentation dedicated to 
the national response.  During preliminary archival research only one report from 
the Ministry of Public Works could be located which addressed the national 
response initiative.  The Bay Street Fire was excluded because, although it 
created a large negative economic impact to the nation, the response to the 
disaster event required the mobilization of only three national agencies.  The 
partial mobilization of national assets as well as limited data on the national 
response removed the fire from inclusion in this study.        
3.3 Methods 
This longitudinal study used a mixed methods research approach.  The 
longitudinal design allowed for repeated observations of the impact of CEM on 
national disaster response.  Creswell and Plano-Clark (2007) define mixed 
methods research as the collection and analysis of qualitative and quantitative 
data.  Qualitative data can consist of “open-ended information that the researcher 
gathers through interviews with participants” (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007:6).  
Qualitative data can also be collected through observation and review of records 
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and reports.  For this research qualitative data were collected through the 
collection of documents, semi-structured interviews, and participant observations.  
“Quantitative data includes closed-ended information such as that found on 
attitude, behavior, or performance instruments” (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 
2007:6).  This research collected quantitative data through surveys and census 
documents.  The mixed methods utilized for data collection and analysis are 
discussed in detail below.   
 3.3.2 Data Collection Tools 
 This mixed-methods research utilized a triangulation design, the purpose 
of which was to obtain different but complementary data on the national response 
to disaster operations in The Bahamas.  Data for this study were collected over a 
six year period from 2001-2007.  This study employed the following data 
collection techniques:   
? Archival research,  
? Structured surveys,  
? Semi-structured interviews, and 
? Participant observations. 
3.3.2.1 Archival Research 
 Archival research is often utilized by researchers to provide background 
information or to provide details to events that one was unable to witness (Stake, 
1995).  For this research study archival data were a critical component in 
providing clarity with regards to national disaster operations pre- and post- CEM 
implementation.  Throughout the study period available relevant records and 
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reports regarding response to the six study hurricanes were collected.  This 
archival research was used to reconstruct each disaster with special 
consideration given to the response phase.  Archival data were additionally used 
to ‘fill in the blanks’ with regards to the social and political environment 
surrounding each event. 
 The collection of records and reports were important in this study to 
provide a more thorough understanding of national disaster response initiatives 
as well as provide insight into the dynamics surrounding emergency 
management within The Bahamas.  Archival data were collected through the 
following agencies, organizations, and ministries.   
? Department of Meteorology 
o Hurricane Andrew (1992) 
o Hurricane Floyd (1999) 
o Hurricane Michelle (2001) 
o Hurricane Frances (2004) 
o Hurricane Jeanne (2004) 
o Hurricane Wilma (2005) 
? Office of The Prime Minister 
o Report on Hurricane Andrew 
o Report on Hurricane Floyd 
o The Bahamas National Geographic Information Centre 
? The Airport Authority 
o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Frances and Jeanne 
o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Wilma  
? The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) 
o National Emergency Response Plan 
o NEMA Hurricane Frances Situation Reports 
o NEMA Hurricane Jeanne Situation Reports 
o NEMA Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne Briefing Notes 
o NEMA Hurricane Wilma Situation Reports 
? The Bahamas Red Cross 
o Hurricane Andrew Situation Report to the International Federation 
of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies 
o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne 
? The Bahamas Telecommunication Company 
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o Hurricane Floyd Report  
o Report on Hurricane Michelle 
o Report on Hurricane Frances & Jeanne 
? The Royal Bahamas Defence Force 
o Hurricane Michelle After-Action Report 
o Hurricane Frances Situation Report to NEMA 
o Hurricane Jeanne Situation Report to NEMA 
o Hurricane Wilma Situation Report to NEMA 
? The Royal Bahamas Police Force 
o Hurricane Frances Situation Report to NEMA 
? The Ministry of Finance 
o Hurricane Wilma 
? The Ministry of Health and Social Development 
o Report on Hurricane Michelle 
o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Frances 
o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Jeanne 
o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Wilma 
? The Ministry of Public Works and Transportation 
o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Frances 
o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Jeanne 
o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Wilma 
? The Ministry of Tourism 
o The Impact of the 2004 Hurricane Season on Tourism 
? Water and Sewerage Corporation 
o Report on the 2004 Hurricane Season:  Hurricanes Frances & 
Jeanne 
o Hurricane Wilma Situation Report to NEMA 
 
Further data were obtained through regional and international organizations 
active in disaster response to include:  
? The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA)   
o Comprehensive Approach for Disaster Management in the 
Caribbean 
? The United Nations (UN) 
o Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster Reduction 
To aid in the analysis of the archival data, each document was summarized and 
placed in chronological order.  This established order allowed for the easy 
identification of emerging themes and application to the six study hurricanes.   
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Strengths and Limitations of Archival Research 
 The collection of archival data were important for this study to provide a 
historic understanding of disaster response initiatives prior to the implementation 
of CEM.  It is critical when using archival materials in research to understand the 
context in which they were written or developed.  Researchers must identify the 
background of the document to determine the basis on which it was written, 
including whether it was written firsthand, through secondary resources, solicited, 
signed or edited (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  For this study archival data were 
validated through semi-structured interviews and observation data.   
3.3.2.2 Structured Survey Data 
 Over the six-year study period that data were collected I developed a 
strong working relationship with the NEMA staff and emergency management 
support agencies.  With strong support from the director of NEMA Mr. Carl Smith, 
surveys were conducted by NEMA and the originals were provided to me for 
analysis and inclusion in this study.  The Structured surveys were designed by 
NEMA for the Family Island Administrators2.  The surveys were self administered 
and voluntary.  A copy of the structured survey can be found in Appendix A of 
this document.  There are a total of twenty Family Island Administrators 
responsible for serving as the NEMA representative for each of their respective 
jurisdictions.  There was a 100% return rate for the surveys.   
                                                 
2 Family Island Administrators are elected officials who represent their respective islands.  Many 
administrators have a multi-island jurisdiction since many of the family islands are small both in 
population and geography.  Family Island Administrators also serve as the NEMA representatives 
within their jurisdictions. 
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 The structured surveys provided data on the Family Island Administrators 
perspectives on national disaster response to the six study hurricanes as well as 
information on disaster planning and training.  The SPSS statistical program was 
used to run descriptive statistics on the population.  The survey data collected 
were used in combination with archival research, semi-structured interview, and 
participatory observation data to gauge the impact of the CEM system on 
national response to the six disaster operations selected for this study.   
Strengths and Limitations of Survey Data 
 There are several benefits to using a self-administered structured survey.  
According to Bernard (2000) self-administered surveys allow respondents the 
opportunity to answer sensitive questions without the presence and pressure of a 
researcher.  This makes the respondent feel more comfortable and perhaps 
more likely to answer honestly.  Regardless of how the survey is administered 
the data obtained can have limitations relating to retrospective questions 
concerning attitudes, perception, and sequence of events.  Another challenge 
with administering surveys is participant recall.  Accurately reconstructing 
activities surrounding an event and the timing of response initiatives is difficult.  
During disaster operations a variety of response initiatives are required to take 
place simultaneously.  This requires that researchers are familiar with the 
functional activities that must be executed during a disaster.  Limitations 
associated with recall as well as question design bias must be considered when 
analyzing the data.  To validate the data and address potential limitations, survey 
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data were used in combination with archival research, semi-structured interviews, 
and participant observation data.   
 A major strength of survey data is the opportunity to collect data that can 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of the impacts of response 
operations.  The survey utilized in this research allowed Family Island 
Administrators to rate response initiatives based on their experiences and 
perspectives.  The surveys utilized both open and closed-ended questions 
allowing respondents an opportunity to use their own words to convey their 
perspective on the national response.   
3.3.2.3 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 Semi-structured interviews were conducted with NEMA staff members to 
obtain information on the national response to the six study hurricanes as well as 
validate archival and survey data.  Interviewing is a prominent means of data 
collection in the social science, and this study utilized semi-structured face-to-
face interviews.  Semi-structured interviews were selected for this research for 
two key reasons.  First, the semi-structured format ensured that essential topics 
and information were gathered while also providing an opportunity to utilize 
probing techniques to draw out additional information.  The interviews were an 
important component of this research, allowing participants the opportunity to 
convey their thoughts on the impact of CEM.     
 Table 3.1 identifies the interviewees, their official title, and the date each 
interview was conducted.  Prime Minister Perry G. Christie was selected for an 
interview to obtain data on the current and future direction of emergency 
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management within The Bahamas.  This interview provided insight into the 
political and economic importance of a comprehensive emergency management 
structure.  All six NEMA staff members were interviewed to obtain data on the 
management of response operations both pre- and post-CEM.  Interviews were 
also used to validate archival and survey data.  The interviews additionally 
provided a broad understanding of the philosophy directing current emergency 
management practices within the nation.   
Semi-Structured Interviews 
Name Official Title Interview Date(s) 
Perry G. Christie Prime Minister of The Bahamas - January 25, 2007 
Carl F. Smith 
Under Secretary, Cabinet 
Office & Interim Director 
NEMA 
- December 20, 2006 
- January 25, 2007 
- June 14, 2007 
Chrystal Glinton First Assistant Secretary 
- December 18, 2006 
- June 13, 2007 
Gayle Outten-
Moncur Senior Assistant Secretary
- December 19, 2006 
- December 20, 2006 
- January 24, 2007 
- June 14, 2007 
Luke Bethel Chief Petty Officer 
- December 18, 2006 
- June 13, 2007 
Eleanor Davis Administrative Cadet 
- December 19, 2006 
- June 13, 2007 
Wendell Rigby Supplies Officer 
- December 19, 2006 
- June 13, 2007 
Table 3.1 - Semi-Structured Interviews Conducted 
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Strengths and Limitations of Semi-Structured Interviews    
 There are a number of benefits to conducting semi-structured interviews 
including the opportunity it provides to respondents to have control over the flow 
of the interview.  Instead of forced responses, the semi-structured interview 
encourages a two way discussion between the researcher and the participant.  
According to Denzin and Lincoln (1998), semi-structured interviews allow 
respondents not only the opportunity to provide an answer but also the reasons 
behind their answers.   
 Semi-structured interviews however can prove to be difficult if the 
interviewer is not skilled at the technique.  The interviewer must identify the 
appropriate areas and times to probe as well as know when and how to move the 
discussion along.  The data obtained through the semi-structured interviews can 
be compromised if the interviewer asks leading, vague, or insensitive questions.  
Other pitfalls associated with semi-structured interviews include the interviewer’s 
failure to keep the discussion on topic, probe properly, and/or a failure to judge 
answers correctly.  One of the biggest challenges associated with semi-
structured interviews comes during the analysis phase.  The data obtained is rich 
with information however; a vast amount of irrelevant information can also be 
obtained.   
 The semi-structured interviews provided clarity to questions that emerged 
during archival research and provided support to the survey data that were 
collected.  To address and overcome the challenges associated with semi-
structured interviews I developed a strong working relationship with the NEMA 
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staff and the Prime Minister before conducting the interviews.  This allowed me 
the opportunity to develop a rapport with the interviewees and establish an open 
dialogue.  Furthermore, during the analysis phase the data were used in support 
of the archival, survey, and participant observation data.   
3.3.2.4 Participant Observation 
 The intent of the observations was to gain insight into the governmental 
and organizational dynamics surrounding disaster response within The 
Bahamas.  Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) argue that all social research is a 
form of participant observation, since we cannot study the social world without 
being part of it.  Gold (1958) outlined four methods of collecting observational 
data: (1) the complete participant, (2) the participant-as-observer, (3) the 
observer-as-participant, and (4) the complete observer.  In the context of this 
study, participant observation represents the established participant role that this 
researcher took during the implementation of the comprehensive emergency 
management system as well as the active role established during response to 
Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne.  According to Gold (1958) this identifies a more 
‘participant as observer' role.   
 For the purposes of this study it was not possible to be a non-participant 
naturalistic observer due to the pre-existing relationships nor do I believe that a 
naturalistic observation technique would allow for the untangling of intertwined 
relationships that govern emergency response within the nation.  Furthermore, it 
was not possible to go unnoticed and limit the affect of my presence on the 
behavior.  I believe my interaction with all individuals and agencies active in 
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disaster helped reduce bias and prevented participants from changing their 
behavior on my behalf.  This has lead to a more natural emergency response 
environment.  According to Becker (1958) sociologists utilize this method when 
they are especially interested in understanding a particular organization or 
substantive problem.  Due to the complex nature of disasters, participation in all 
four phases of the emergency management cycle provided a stronger 
understand of the complex social dynamics impacting national response 
operations.   
 Historically field research has been associated most strongly with 
participant observation (Becker, 1958).  Fieldwork in The Bahamas was 
undertaken over a six year period (2001 – 2007).  Actively participating in the 
development of an emergency management structure within The Bahamas I 
joined monthly disaster committee meeting, annual disaster preparedness 
conferences, planning and training activities, as well as activations of the 
National Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to include Hurricanes Frances 
and Jeanne 2004.  This component of participant observation in combination with 
the previously stated data collection methods creates a holistic research 
perspective that has produced a very rich data set.  
Strengths and Limitations of Participant Observations    
 There are two key limitations associated with observation data collection 
methods.  The first limitation is with data validity.  Observation data are 
susceptible to researcher bias and subjective interpretation.  To overcome issues 
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associated with validity the data were used in combination with archival research, 
survey, and semi-structured interview data.   
 The second limitation to observation data is ethics.  Several features of 
observation research make it vulnerable to questions of ethical malpractice.  
Invasion of privacy by venturing into private areas or by misrepresenting oneself 
as a member can be an issue.  During this study NEMA and all of its members 
were made aware of my role within the context of disaster response as well as 
data collection.   
 “One great strength of the observational method lies in the ease through 
which researchers can gain entrée to settings” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 382).  
Participant observation provides an opportunity for researchers to better 
understand the complex relationships that exist within an organization.  I had the 
opportunity with the full support of NEMA to participate in planning, training, and 
response operations.  The insight gained through participation in these activities 
allowed for the development of strong relationships with individuals and agencies 
active in disasters.  Thus, a better understanding of the complex relationships 
that exist at the national level relating to disaster response initiatives within The 
Bahamas was achieved.   
3.4 Data Application and Analysis  
 Data collected through archival research, structured surveys, and semi-
structured interview were analyzed in several ways.  First, the surveys and 
closed-ended question associated with the interviews were analyzed using 
standard statistical techniques.  The data were then applied to 8 of the 10 criteria 
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for measuring the management of national disaster response operations as 
outlined by Quarantelli (1997).  Finally, data were then applied to the Model of 
Community Response to Disaster (Hughey, 2003).  Each of these analyses 
techniques are discussed in detail below.   
3.4.1 Standard Statistical Analysis of Survey and Interview Data  
 Population data were gathered for both the surveys and interviews.  
Descriptive statistics were run utilizing the SPSS software and results are 
reported and discussed in chapter 5 of this document.  
3.4.2 Measuring The Bahamas National Response to Hurricanes: Andrew 
(1992), Floyd (1999), Michelle (2001), Frances (2004), Jeanne (2004) and 
Wilma (2005) 
 
 Emergency Management is the process of coordinating available 
resources to deal with emergencies effectively, thereby saving lives, avoiding 
injury, and minimizing economic loss (FEMA, 2003b).  The first step towards 
understanding the impact of the CEM system on the ability of The Bahamas to 
respond during a disaster required an evaluation of response operations.  
Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and Michelle were selected as three disasters which 
required a national response prior to the implementation of a CEM system.  
Hurricanes Frances, Jeanne, and Wilma were selected as three disasters which 
required a national response following the implementation of a CEM system.   
 Evaluating the management of each of the six disasters utilizing the same 
criteria provides a baseline for comparative analysis.  An amended version of 
Quarantelli’s (1997a) Ten Criteria for Evaluating the Management of Community 
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Disasters was selected.  This methodological approach is being used to both 
compare and differentiate between each hurricane response in an effort to gauge 
how effectively3 each disaster was managed.  Employing this comparative 
research methodology assisted in expanding our understanding of The Bahamas 
disaster response capabilities.  It further facilitated the verification and/or 
falsification of assumptions surrounding CEM in The Bahamas.   
 Quarantelli’s (1997a) evaluation criteria were selected for application in 
this research because it is rooted in the empirical research previously undertaken 
by social and behavioral scientist.  The criteria were developed from over 500 
different studies on disasters and mass emergencies conducted with the support 
of the Disaster Research Center (DRC). (For general summaries of the literature 
from which the evaluation criteria were developed see:  Kreps 1984, 1989; 
Drabek 1986; Dynes, Demarchi and Pelanda 1987; Auf der Heide 1989; 
Quarantelli and Pelanda 1989; Lagadec 1990; Drabek and Hoetmer 1991; Clarke 
and Short 1993; Quarantelli and Popov 1993; Cutter 1994; Dynes and Tierney 
1994; Porfiriev and Quarantelli 1996) 
 A prominent researcher in the field of hazards Dr. Quarnatelli has worked 
closely with local and federal emergency managers to bridge the gap between 
researchers and practitioners.  Quarantelli’s (1997a) research was chosen for 
application in this study to test his criteria to see first, if they can be 
operationalized and second, if they are suitable for comparing and contrasting 
                                                 
3 Effective is defined as a desired and intended result has been produced; this definition differs 
from that of efficiency which requires that the results be obtained in the best possible way.  
(Quarantelli, 1997:43) 
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the management of several response operations.  Dr. Quarantelli’s research cuts 
across natural and technological disasters and identifies that there is no 
significant behavioral differences in the two types of crises.  This is important to 
note since CEM is based on the principal that all disasters, regardless of the 
trigger require the same response mechanisms. 
 The foundation of Quarantelli’s research is, “what is crucial is not 
management per se, but good management” (Quarantelli, 1997a:39).  The key 
question then becomes what constitutes ‘good management’ and how can that 
be measured.  Quarantelli’s model, developed for evaluating the management of 
disaster response operations at the local level provided ten criteria to evaluate if 
the response was effective.  This study is examining the national response of 
The Bahamas to six hurricanes.  There are significant differences to local and 
national response requirements and even greater difference between response 
operations within the United States and an archipelagic nation such as The 
Bahamas.  Some of the major differences include:  availability of resources, legal 
authority to act, as well as strong control over governmental agency response.  
Because of these differences as well as challenges associated in measuring 
some of the criteria developed by Quarantelli, this research utilized only eight of 
the ten components.  Table 3.2 lists the criteria that were selected for this 
research to gauge effective emergency management.   
 The two criteria suggested by Quarantelli (1997a) that were omitted from 
this study are: Generating an appropriate delegation of tasks and division of labor 
and blending emergent and established organizational behaviors.  There were 
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two major challenges in including these criteria in the evaluation of effective 
emergency management within The Bahamas that lead to their exclusion.  First, 
there are no clear benchmarks within the hazards literature to measure if tasks 
were delegated appropriately nor is there agreement as to who should be doing 
the delegating.  Secondly, although research has shown that groups of private 
citizens carrying out important disaster tasks can be an essential part of the 
disaster management process (Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985) the literature is 
centered within the United States and does not take into consideration more 
remote and dispersed locations such as The Bahamas Family Islands.   In areas 
that are not easily accessible by outside groups with a small population base it is 
likely that disaster related activities are addressed within pre-established 
organizational structures such as a churches and/or local government.  
Furthermore, archival research and observation data did not identify any 
emergent organizations within the national response.  For these reasons they 
were removed from examination within this study.    
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Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Management of  
Disaster Operations Within The Bahamas 
1. Adequately carrying out generic functions; Yes/No 
2. Effectively mobilizing personnel and resources; Yes/No 
3. Adequately processing information; Yes/No 
4. Properly exercising decision-making; Yes/No 
5. Developing overall coordination; Yes/No 
6. Correctly recognizing differences between response 
and agent-generated demands; 
Yes/No 
7. Providing appropriate and accurate reports for the news 
media; 
Yes/No 
8. Having a well-functioning emergency operations center; Yes/No 
Table 3.2 - Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Management of Disaster Operations 
Within The Bahamas.  Source:  Amended from Quarantelli (1997a) 
3.4.2.1 Eight Criteria for Evaluating the Management of Disaster Response 
Operations within The Bahamas 
 Provided in this section is a detailed discussion of each of the eight criteria 
selected for use in this study.  A summary of Quarantelli’s (1997a) research as 
well as how each criterion was implemented to evaluate the six study hurricanes 
is presented.   
 The first criterion is; carry out generic functions in an adequate way.  
Regardless of the disaster agent certain functions must be carried out.  For 
evaluation of this criteria ten generic functions were identified by Quarantelli 
(1997a) and Kreps (1991b).  The ten functions include:  1) Warnings; 2) 
Evacuations; 3) Sheltering; 4) Emergency Medical Care; 5) Search and Rescue; 
6) Protection of Property; 7) Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and 
Resources; 8) Assessing the Damage; 9) Coordinating emergency management 
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activities; 10) Restoring essential public services.  As proposed by Quarantelli 
(1997a), the following two questions were applied to each of the ten generic 
functions.   
1. Was the need for the function recognized early? 
2. Was the function carried out without too many problems?  
  SAMPLE:  FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART 
FUNCTIONS 
Was the Need for the 
function recognized 
early? (Y/N) 
Was the function carried 
out without too many 
problems? (Y/N) 
1. Warning   
2. Evacuations   
3. Sheltering   
4. Emergency Medical 
Care 
  
5. Search and Rescue   
6. Protection of Property   
7. Mobilization of 
Emergency Personnel 
and Resources 
  
8. Assessing the Damage   
9. Coordinating 
emergency 
management activities 
  
10. Restoring essential 
public services 
  
Table 3.3 - Sample Function Evaluation Chart.  (Data Source:  
Quarantelli,1997a) 
 According to Quarantelli (1997a) if yes can be answered to all of the 
above questions then “it is very likely that there was adequate management of 
generic functions” (Quarantelli, 1997a:43).  To answer these questions as they 
apply to the six hurricanes included in this research study (Hurricanes Andrew 
1992, Floyd 1999, Michelle 2001, Frances 2004, Jeanne 2004, Wilma 2005) data 
 92
were gathered from a variety of sources including Official Reports from the Office 
of The Prime Minister, Hurricane After-action Reports, Observation, Survey Data 
and Personal Interviews with individuals active in the emergency response.  Due 
to the vague and subjective nature of the two questions, application to the six 
hurricanes was problematic and is discussed in detail in chapter 6 of this 
dissertation. 
 The second criterion is: Mobilize personnel and resources effectively.  
Quarantelli (1997a) argues that in the majority of disasters, there is no lack of 
necessary personnel or resources.  Research by Bolin (1990) illustrates that 
sooner or later, with no planning, needed personnel and resources become 
available.  With the exception of catastrophes such as the 2004 Tsunami, this 
has generally been true for response.  It is important to keep in mind the 
challenges associated with the mobilization and movement of 
resources/equipment between islands.  Quarantelli (1997a) further argues that 
the goal is not just mobilization or personnel and resources, but rather effective 
mobilization.  “Effective means that a desired and intended result has been 
produced; this definition differs from that of efficiency which requires that the 
results be obtained in the best possible way” (Quarantelli, 1997a:43).  The 
example of evacuation operations was given to illustrate the distinct difference 
between effective and efficient.  “An evacuation may have got the population out 
of an endangered area and been effective, but it may not have been very efficient 
in terms of the use of unnecessary resources, the time consumed by the 
problems generated” (Quarantelli, 1997a:43).   
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 To answer the question of effective mobilization of personnel and 
resources for the six hurricanes in this study the following three questions will be 
examined.   
1. Were the needed personnel and resources identified well in the 
crisis? 
2. Were they located quickly and brought to bear correctly? 
3. Were they appropriate to the problems generated by the disaster? 
 
 Quarantelli suggests that if the following questions can be answered 
positively then it would suggest that the “needed personnel and resources had 
not simply been mobilized but mobilized effectively” (Quarantelli, 1997a:44).  To 
answer this question, data were gathered from emergency operation center 
logbooks, hurricane after-action reports, official reports from the Office of The 
Prime Minister, observation, and personal interviews with individuals active in the 
emergency response.  As with criterion one, the questions proposed by 
Quarentelli (1997a) to evaluate the effective mobilization of personnel and 
resources are subjective and, as you will see in chapter 6, problematic.   
 The third criterion is: allow the adequate processing of information.  This 
criterion focuses less on the technology utilized to ensure communication but 
rather places the emphasis on the content of what, when and to whom the 
information was made available.  Although communication between the islands 
can be difficult during times of disasters, that, in itself, does not constitute poor 
management of a disaster.  The amount and type of information being made 
available for decision making can significantly impact the response phase.    As 
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Quarantelli (1997a) points out there are multiple streams of information flow 
during the response phase of a disaster: 
? Within every responding organization; 
? Between organizations; 
? From citizens to organizations; and  
? From organizations to citizens. 
 
 As a result of a disaster, staffing requirements will increase and may alter 
the regular flow of information.  The addition of new individuals to the daily flow of 
information can create real challenges.  If individuals are not properly equipped 
to provide, receive, and process information the system can become overloaded 
and inadequate for managing the disaster response operation.  An example of 
this is the requirement of around the clock staffing.  Extra demands are being 
placed on an organizations internal system which may bring about a loss and/or 
delay of information.   
 Quarantelli (1997a) contends that it is possible to evaluate the adequacy 
of information flow in a disaster.  “If organizations and/or citizens did not get the 
information they needed, clearly the disaster management was not as it should 
have been” (Quarantelli, 1997a:46).  Furthermore “information, the ability to 
process it, the relationships in a multi-person communication network and the 
authority to structure, control and regulate information across an emergency 
command affects the total effectiveness of the response system” (Wybo & 
Kowalski, 1998:131-2).   
 For the purposes of this research communication flow for each of the six 
hurricanes were evaluated.  Data were gathered from a variety of sources 
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including official reports from the Office of The Prime Minister, hurricane after-
action reports, observation, survey data, personal interviews with individuals 
active in the emergency response, and local newspaper reports. 
 The fourth criterion is: permit the proper exercise of decision-making.  
Research has illustrated that it is uncommon for the usual chain-of-command 
and/or lines-of-authority to break down during response to a disaster. The 
problems associated with decision-making are usually associated with four key 
areas:   
1. Loss of higher-echelon personnel because of overwork. 
2. Conflict over responsibility for new disaster tasks. 
3. Clashes over organizational domains between established and 
emergent groups. 
4. Surfacing of organizational jurisdictional differences. 
 
 Specific tasks such as firefighting and law enforcement have very clear 
authorities responsible for performing functions.  Rarely in a disaster operation 
does confusion over who is responsible for repairs to phone or sewer lines occur.  
The problems associated with decision making arise from the introduction of new 
challenges.  For example number one above occurs from a tendency of key 
officials to work too long during the crisis period.  “Personnel remaining on the 
job round-the-clock will eventually collapse from exhaustion or make bad 
decisions” (Quarantelli, 1997a:46).  This problem is further compounded by the 
fact that when replacements come they will lack the necessary information for 
correct decision-making partly because crucial data will not have been formally 
recorded or processed.   
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 Proper decision-making requires all relevant knowledge.  If criterion four 
was not performed sufficiently or if any of the above four difficulties discussed 
occur it is appropriate to say that the proper exercise of decision-making was not 
permitted.  To evaluate criteria four, each of the four questions identified by 
Quarantelli (1997a) were answered based on the data gathered through surveys 
of Island Administrators, interviews with individuals active in the emergency 
response, hurricane after-action reports, and observations.   
 The fifth criterion for good disaster management is: focus on the 
development of overall coordination.  Coordination during a disaster operation 
comes into play when more than one emergency organization is involved.  
Coordination is critical and required to make sure that the response operation 
goes smoothly through the facilitation of information and the synchronization of 
critical functions that may require a variety of organizations.   
 It is vital to remember that control is not coordination.  Having ‘someone in 
charge’ does not mean that the required coordination of organizations is 
occurring.  Indeed, the idea that one person is controlling response operations 
can prevent the necessary coordination required to meet the emergency needs.  
Research by (Dynes, 1994) illustrates the differences and difficulties in utilizing a 
‘command and control’ model such as the Incident Command System (ICS) as 
opposed to a ‘coordination’ model such as the Comprehensive Emergency 
Management (CEM) System in response to a disaster operation.   
 Coordination between organizations is plagued with difficulties for several 
reasons beginning with misunderstandings about what ‘coordination’ really 
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means.  According to Quarantelli (1997a) coordination is neither self-explanatory 
nor a matter of consensus.  Some groups view coordination as merely informing 
others of what they will be doing.  Others see it as the centralization of decision-
making within a particular agency or among a few key officials.  Quarantelli 
(1997a:48) defines coordination as “mutually agreed upon cooperation about 
how to carry out particular tasks.”  
 Good disaster management was evaluated on the kinds of efforts made at 
coordination and the relative absence of problems.  According to Quarantelli 
(1997a) a lack of coordination will be apparent if there are problems associated 
with the delivery of services due to disagreements between organizations 
regarding tasks.  Data relating to the delivery of services were gathered for each 
of the six study hurricanes through archival research, surveys, personal 
interviews and observation.   
 The sixth criterion identified was, correctly recognizing difference between 
response and agent-generated demands.  It is important to note that regardless 
of the disaster type, hurricane, flood, or radiological event; many of the same 
functions or activities must take place.  It is critical that these core functions, such 
as communication and logistics, are carried out in addition to the unique 
demands that are generated from a specific ‘agent’ or disaster type.  Part of 
Quarantelli’s discussion of ‘good disaster management’ requires that there is 
correct reorganization of agent- and response-generated needs and demands.  
Agent-generated needs are defined as “demands derived from the particular 
disaster agent” (Quarantelli, 1997a:42).  An example of an agent-generated need 
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would be the necessity of sandbags in response to a flood event.  Agent-
generated needs will vary considerably depending upon the disaster impact and 
specific nature of the agent.  Response-generated needs however are defined as 
“demands common to all disasters because they are produced by the very efforts 
responding organizations make to manage community disasters” (Quarantelli, 
1997a:42).  The response-generated demands are predictable and independent 
of any particular disaster agency.  For example, effective mobilization of 
personnel and resources, adequate information flow, good decision making, and 
coordination between organizations are all required regardless of the incident to 
which you are responding.  Disaster planners have termed the planning process 
to meet the needs of response-generated demands as ‘all-hazards’ planning.  
Quarantelli (1997a) asserts that the correct recognition between agent- and 
response-generated demands can be determined if criteria two through five as 
listed below were answered in a positive way.   
2. Effectively mobilizing personnel and resources 
3. Adequately processing information 
4. Properly exercising decision-making 
5. Developing overall coordination 
Evaluation of criteria six is dependent upon the assessment of these four 
components which were done through the application of date obtained during 
archival research, surveys, interviews and observations.   
 The seventh criterion of good disaster management is: provide the mass 
communication system with appropriate and accurate information.  With today’s 
technology, the media are instantly on the scene of any disaster.  The 
information being provided through the media can significantly influence the 
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perceptions and responses of disaster victims, potential volunteers, and even 
response agencies (Fry, 2003; Tobin and Montz, 1997; Quarantelli, 1996).  It is 
critical that appropriate and accurate information is being provided in a structured 
and standardized approach.   
 According to Quarantelli (1997a:50) “good disaster management should 
encourage the development of patterns of relationships that are acceptable and 
beneficial to the responding organizations, the mass media and the citizens in 
general.”  Indicators of good relationship include: 
? Cooperative interaction between organizational and community 
officials and media representatives; 
? Regularly scheduled briefings by response organizations to the 
media; 
? Citizens believe their local media are giving them a relatively 
accurate picture of what is happening. 
Quarantelli (1997a:51) argues that “when these relationships are good, members 
of the press are satisfied with the amount and quality of information that is given 
to them by officials, who in turn want them to disseminate information about the 
disasters.”  He further states that if relevant information regarding the response is 
not provided to the local media they will disseminate, even if unintentionally, 
news that is inaccurate.  A measure of good disaster management is if the media 
was provided with appropriate and accurate information.  Evaluation of this 
criterion was done using data obtained from archival research, to include 
newspapers, radio, and television archives, as well as data from interviews, and 
observations.   
 The eighth and final criterion for good disaster management is: have a 
well-functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC).  An EOC serves as the 
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nucleus for disaster response activities and facilitates the successful completion 
of the previous seven criteria.  Given the number of agencies and groups 
required to respond to any given disaster the likelihood of response 
complications resulting from poor management is high.  During a disaster 
response operation, a variety of activities are occurring simultaneously all with 
equal importance.  An EOC is intended to facilitate the effective implementation 
of all required response activities and should be seen not just as a place and 
structure but also a function (Perry 1991:204, FEMA 1995:27).   
 It is important to remember that more than just a common location is 
needed to be considered a well-functioning EOC.  Although a coordinated and 
organized response can be improved if all responding organizations are 
represented at a common location, it does not ensure success.  Response 
operations many times last for days and even weeks, this requires that the EOC 
meet minimum physical requirements.  For Example the EOC should:  
? Be located in a safe area in close proximity to key transportation 
routes; 
?  Have sufficient work space;  
? Have bathroom and sleeping facilities;  
? Have adequate communication provisions;  
? Have computers and necessary supplies; 
? Have maps and equipment inventory. 
However, the physical requirements are still not enough for an EOC to be 
considered ‘well functioning’.  An EOC is of little value if agencies and 
organizations active in response do not send liaison personnel to the EOC.  In 
addition to physical requirements for an EOC, there are social requirements that 
are equally essential.  For example the EOC should require that: 
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? Liaison personnel be knowledgeable and possess certain decision-
making responsibilities in their own organizations. 
 
An effective response is unlikely if organizational representatives at the EOC are 
low level employees.  These individuals may not only have inadequate 
knowledge of the organizations capabilities and resources, but they are also not 
involved in the decision making process.  If there is proper staffing of the EOC, 
information can be collected and disseminated appropriately to ensure that tasks 
are executed accordingly.  Additionally, proper staffing of the EOC provides for 
an ideal problem solving environment.  Complications with response operations 
can be addressed between organizations in a timely fashion to ensure effective 
response.  
 It is dangerous, however, to assume that just because the physical and 
social requirements listed above are in place that the EOC will be ‘well 
functioning’.  The EOC environment is both dynamic and stressful.  Personal 
dynamics can prevent an operation from running smoothly.  “The social climate 
of an EOC is a very stressful one: there is pressure to take action, limited and 
uncertain information, shifting priorities and overlapping lines of authority and 
responsibility” (Perry 1991:210).   
 Criterion eight for determining good disaster management, have a well-
functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC), was measured by first 
determining if the previous seven criteria were answered in a positive way.  
Additionally data were gathered through the EOC log books, hurricane after-
action reports, interviews with individuals active in disaster response, and 
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observation.  Data were applied to each of the six study hurricanes to determine 
if there was a well-functioning EOC. 
3.4.3 The Model of Community Response to Disasters 
 Evaluating the management of the six study hurricanes utilizing 
Quarantelli’s (1997a) ‘Criteria for Good Management’ provided a foundation for 
examining the impact of a CEM system.  However, to fully understand the 
findings as they apply to the dynamic political, social, and economic environment 
of The Bahamas, The Model of Community Response to Disasters was also 
applied.  (See Figure 3.2)  This theoretical framework is amended from Hughey 
(2003).   
 Combining the elements put forth by Kates and Burton (1986a) and 
Wolensky and Wolensky (1990) as applied to the four phase of emergency 
management, allowed for the identification of gap that resulted in poor hazard 
management.  This theoretical model further illustrates the importance of the 
policy process and intergovernmental system that impacts disaster response.     
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Figure 3.2- Model of Community Response to Disasters 
 The model begins with the identification of good leadership by 
professionally trained officials as argued by Kates and Burton (1986).  
Undoubtedly, well trained and experienced professionals are essential 
components to the successful management of a disaster.  However the hazards 
literature (Quarantelli, 1997a; 1997b; Mileti 1999, Mitchell 1996) has further 
illustrated that there is much more required to meet successfully the challenges 
of disaster response.  Wolensky and Wolensky (1990), argue that four other 
elements are also required: (1) a foundation of supportive values for local 
government action, (2) the legal authority to act, (3) an advocacy supporting 
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action, and (4) necessary institutional resources.  These four elements in 
combination with good leadership are then applied to the four phases of 
emergency management: (1) Preparedness, (2) Response, (3) Recovery, and (4) 
Mitigation as displayed above in Figure 3.2.   
 As discussed in Chapter Two the four phases of emergency management 
are widely accepted within the hazard research field with slight variations (Clary 
1985; FEMA 2003; Kates and Burton 1986).  The phases of disaster 
management as pointed out by Bruce (1985) are interrelated, so simplification 
and boundaries must be developed in order to discuss them individually, 
understanding that many times these phases are occurring simultaneously or 
with some overlap.  The delineation between the four phases of a disaster has 
allowed researchers and responders to find order in a disordered and chaotic 
environment.     
 The application of the model was done in two distinct phases, the pre-
CEM phase, which provides the contextual framework necessary to understand 
Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and Michelle, and the post-CEM phase, that 
examined Hurricanes Frances, Jeanne, and Wilma.  By exploring emergency 
response in these two phases ensures that the wider political, economic, and 
cultural explanations surrounding response to the six study hurricanes is 
addressed.  This type of examination further allows for a more complete 
understanding of the mechanisms that impacted response initiatives.   
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3.5 Strengths and Limitations of the Study Design 
 Longitudinal data permit the measurement of differences or change in a 
variable from one period to another, in this case the management of disaster 
operations following the implementation of a comprehensive emergency 
management system.  This allows for the description of patterns of change over 
time, and can be used to locate the causes of social phenomena and sleeper 
effects, that is, connections between events that are widely separated in time.  
The major limitations to a longitudinal study which utilized the retrospective 
design are: 
1. Recall Bias:  Retrospective questions concerning motivational, attitudinal, 
cognitive or affective state are particularly problematic because 
respondents find it hard to accurately recall the timing of changes in these 
states. 
2. Retrospective studies must be based on survivors: For this study it means 
that I was limited to those individuals who were still working for NEMA or 
The Bahamas Government.  Any individuals who have moved, changed 
jobs, or passed away were omitted and biases may arise.   
3.6 Summary 
 This chapter described the mixed methods approach employed for this 
study including the strengths and limitations associated with the four data 
collection techniques: (1) archival research, (2) structured surveys, (3) semi-
structured interviews, and (4) participant observations.  Detailed descriptions of 
the two theoretical frameworks used as well as how Quarantelli’s (1997a) criteria 
for evaluating the management of disaster response operations and the model of 
community response to disasters (Figure 3.2) were applied.  Application and 
testing of these two frameworks allowed for the development of a baseline for 
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comparison between the six study hurricanes as well as a more comprehensive 
understanding of the mechanisms impacting response.  Figure 3.3 provides a 
flow diagram for the stages of this research.   
Data Collection
Archival research
Structured surveys
Semi-structured interviews
Participant observations 
Research Questions
Quarantelli’s
Criteria for 
Evaluating 
Response
Model of 
Community 
Response
Research Findings
 
Figure 3.3 – Methodology Flow Diagram 
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Chapter Four 
Results:  Application Of Quarantelli’s Criteria For Evaluating Response 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 Chapter four discusses the research findings associated with the testing of 
Quarantelli’s (1997a) eight criteria for evaluating disaster response.  The results 
are presented in a combination of tabular and written form.  The data in this 
chapter are formatted to answer the following research questions.   
? Can Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management 
of disaster response be operationalized?  
? Based on Quarantelli’s methodology did the implementation of a CEM 
system improve disaster response?   
The criteria are applied to each of the six study hurricanes to determine if 
improvements in disaster response were identified after the implementation of 
CEM. 
 Data obtained through surveys, semi-structured interviews, archival 
research, and observations were applied to assess each of the eight evaluation 
criteria as outlined in Chapter 3.  The eight criteria were equally applied to the six 
study hurricanes in an effort to determine if Quarantelii’s methodology could be 
operationalized as well as to identify the success of pre- and post-CEM response 
operations.  
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Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Management of Disaster Response Operations 
to the Six Study Hurricanes 
 Pre-CEM Post-CEM 
 Andrew 
1992 
Floyd 
1999 
Michelle 
2001 
Frances 
2004 
Jeanne 
2004 
Wilma 
2005 
1. Adequately 
carrying out 
generic 
functions; 
No No No No No No 
2. Effectively 
mobilizing 
personnel and 
resources; 
No No No No Yes Yes 
3. Adequately 
processing 
information; 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
4. Properly 
exercising 
decision-making; 
No No No No No Yes 
5. Developing 
overall 
coordination; 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
6. Correctly 
recognizing 
differences 
between 
response and 
agent-generated 
demands; 
No No No No No Yes 
7. Providing 
appropriate and 
accurate reports 
for the news 
media; 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
8. Having a well-
functioning 
emergency 
operations 
center; 
No No No No No No 
Table 4.1 - Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Management of Disaster Response 
Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes 
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Table 4.1 displays the results of the evaluation for all six study hurricanes 
using Quarantelli’s (1997a) eight criteria.  Each criterion is examined in detail 
below to evaluate the usefulness of Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for 
evaluating the management of disaster response operations.  The methodology, 
if it can be operationalized, will be able to examine the shifts in disaster response 
as a result of CEM.  Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and Michelle were managed 
under the pre-CEM system.  Disaster response during this time was seen as the 
responsibility of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) and a ‘command 
and control’ model for disaster response was utilized.  Hurricanes Frances, 
Jeanne, and Wilma were managed under the post-CEM system.  Disaster 
response after the implementation of CEM in 2002 was the responsibility of the 
National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and ‘comprehensive 
coordination’ model for response was implemented.  
 
4.2 Examination and Application of Quarantelli’s Eight Criteria 
4.2.1 Criterion One:  Adequately Carrying Out Generic Functions 
 
The first component of Quarantelli’s methodology was to determine if 
generic emergency response functions were carried out adequately.  Regardless 
of the disaster agent certain functions must be carried out. The ten generic 
functions were evaluated for this research were identified by Quarantelli (1997a) 
and Kreps (1991b) and include 1) Warnings; 2) Evacuations; 3) Sheltering; 4) 
Emergency Medical Care; 5) Search and Rescue; 6) Protection of Property; 7) 
Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources; 8) Assessing the Damage; 
9) Coordinating emergency management activities; 10) Restoring essential public 
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services.  According to Quarantelli’s (1997a) the following two questions must be 
applied to each of the ten generic functions.   
1. Was the need for the function recognized early? 
2. Was the function carried out without too many problems? 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, if ‘yes’ can be answered to both questions then 
the function can be considered to be “adequately carried-out”.  Table 4.2 shows 
that generic functions were not “adequately carried-out” during any of the six 
disaster response operations.  A detailed description and supporting data for the 
responses in Table 4.2 are provided in Table 4.3 and sections 4.2.1.1 – 4.2.1.6.  
 
Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six 
Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion One 
 Pre-CEM Post-CEM 
 Andrew 
1992 
Floyd 
1999 
Michelle 
2001 
Frances 
2004 
Jeanne 
2004 
Wilma 
2005 
Adequately carrying 
out generic 
functions; 
No No No No No No 
Table 4.2 – Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to 
the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion On
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GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART 
 Pre-CEM Post-CEM 
Hurricane Andrew 1992 
Floyd 
1999 
Michelle 
2001 
Frances 
2004 
Jeanne 
2004 
Wilma 
2005 
FUNCTIONS 
Q1. Was 
the 
Function 
recognized 
early?* 
(Y/N) 
Q2. Was 
the 
function 
carried out 
without too 
many 
problems?* 
(Y/N) 
Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 
1. Warning Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2. Evacuations Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
3. Sheltering No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4. Emergency Medical 
Care Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5. Search and Rescue No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
6. Protection of Property Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
7. Mobilization of 
Emergency Personnel 
and Resources 
No No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8. Assessing the Damage No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
9. Coordinating 
emergency 
management activities 
No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
10. Restoring essential 
public services No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 4.3 Generic Function Evaluation Chart Applied to the Six Study Hurricanes 
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4.2.1.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion One: Adequately Carrying Out 
Generic Functions 
Table 4.4 provides a summary of the ten generic functions that were 
evaluated for this research and their application to Hurricane Andrew 1992.  
Hurricane Andrew 1992 
  GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART 
FUNCTIONS 
Was the Need for the 
function recognized 
early? (Y/N) 
Was the function 
carried out without too 
many problems? (Y/N) 
1. Warning Yes Yes 
2. Evacuations Yes No 
3. Sheltering No No 
4. Emergency Medical 
Care Yes Yes 
5. Search and Rescue No No 
6. Protection of Property Yes Yes 
7. Mobilization of 
Emergency Personnel 
and Resources 
No No 
8. Assessing the 
Damage No No 
9. Coordinating 
emergency 
management 
activities 
No No 
10. Restoring essential 
public services No No 
Table 4.4 – Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Andrew 
1992 
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 1 (Warning)   
 Based on data gathered from The Bahamas Department of Meteorology 
(1992) and interviews with NEMA staff, warnings for Hurricane Andrew were 
 113
effectively executed.  On Saturday August 22nd hurricane warnings were issued 
for the islands of the Northwest Bahamas and were maintained until 7am on 
Monday the 24th (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 1992).  Hurricane 
warnings are issued by the Department of Meteorology when hurricane force 
winds (sustained winds of 74mph or higher) are expected in an area within the 
next 24 hours or less.  The warnings issued by the Department of Meteorology 
were provide to The Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas, ZNS, who then 
communicated the warnings throughout the Islands via television and radio.   
 “I was still with the Defence Force in 1992.  Everyone was aware 
Hurricane Andrew was going to hit, we were warned to secure our homes 
and prepare for a category 5 storm” (Bethel, 2006).  
 
“The Met Department does a great job of tracking the storm and 
providing the most up to date information to the public.  From Andrew to 
Wilma Bahamians knew the storms were coming” (Outten-Moncur, 
2007a). 
 
Based on the data from the Department of Meteorology and the interviews with 
NEMA staff, the need for warnings was recognized early and the function was 
carried out with no notable problems.   
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 2 (Evacuations)   
 In 1992 there was no legal authority to act or avenue for issuing ‘official’ 
evacuation orders within the Commonwealth of The Bahamas.  Through archival 
research, interviews with NEMA staff, and informal discussions with Island 
Administrators there was no evidence that evacuations were issued.  The 
Department of Meteorology (1992) did encourage residents in unsafe structures 
to relocate and seek shelter in more secure locations.  However, ‘official’ 
requests for evacuation were not issued and national resources were not made 
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available to aid residents.  The data shows that the need for evacuations was 
recognized by the Department of Meteorology however the function was not 
carried-out effectively.  
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 3 (Sheltering)   
 The Bahamas Red Cross Society (1992) with support from the RBDF and 
the Ministry of Social Services (Office of the Prime Minister, 1992) opened 
emergency shelters throughout The Bahamas.  Data on the number of shelters 
opened, individuals housed, and services provided were not available.   
“After Hurricane Andrew passed shelters were opened.  The shelters were 
run mostly by Social Services” (Luke Bethel, December 18, 2006). 
 
Based on informal discussions with Red Cross representatives, Island 
Administrators, as well as NEMA staff it appears that many of the shelters were 
opened after Andrew made landfall to deal with the dislocation of population due 
to housing damage.  This post impact sheltering of a population is known as 
recovery shelters.  In contrast response shelters the focus of this research, are 
opened prior to landfall to provide residents with a safe location to ride out the 
storm.  As a result the available data suggests that emergency response shelters 
were not recognized early or carried-out effectively.   
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care)   
 National emergency medical care was adequate in meeting the needs of 
residents in response to Hurricane Andrew.  Four deaths were reported (Office of 
the Prime Minister, 1992) and based on informal discussions with the Minister of 
Health, and Hospital Authority representative Paul Newbold, the national 
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emergency medical system was able to coordinate response to injuries.  At no 
time was the system overwhelmed or incapable of meeting the medical needs of 
the nation.  Based on the available data, it appears that the function was 
recognized early and carried out effectively.   
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue)   
 Search and Rescue was not a formal function in 1992 during response to 
Hurricane Andrew.  According to informal discussions that I had at the 2005 
national NEMA conference in Nassau, with the Island Administrators from San 
Salvador and Bimini, search and rescue was an informal function conducted at 
the local level by a variety of organizations in a disjointed and uncoordinated 
manner.  Local residents, the police and fire department, as well as the RBDF 
provided assistance with search and rescue services.  Data obtained through 
archival research makes no reference to Hurricane Andrew search and rescue 
operations.  As a result both question posed by Quarantelli to evaluate this 
functions were assessed negatively indicating the function was not identified 
early or executed effectively.   
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property)   
 Protection of Government property was carried out by the Ministry of 
Works and Transportation (Office of the Prime Minister, 1992).  With 
responsibility for Government Buildings the Ministry of Works secured all 
government facilities by installing hurricane shutters and/or plywood to protect 
windows.  The protection of government property was recognized early and 
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carried out with no notable problems.  Many residents also took precautions with 
their property by securing windows and clearing debris. 
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 7 (Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and 
Resources)   
 The RBDF controlled disaster operations in response to Hurricane Andrew 
(Office of the Prime Minister, 1992; Bethel, 2006; Rigby, 2006).  No formal 
emergency operations center (EOC) was established to allow for a multi-
organizational response, rather the operations was controlled by the RBDF.  This 
caused several problems, including limited and/or delayed preliminary damage 
assessment reports.  The lack of a detailed assessment triggered a delay in the 
activation of resources and personnel.  General comprehensive coordination was 
lacking and was evident through the singular response by the RBDF.  
Communication was poor and potential support agencies were not activated or 
provided with updated information.  (Bethel, 2006; Rigby, 2006)  As a result there 
were significant delays in the activation and movement of emergency materials 
and personnel producing a disjointed response.  Applying the data to 
Quarantelli’s methodology shows that the need for the mobilization of emergency 
personnel and resources was not recognized early nor was it carried out 
effectively.   
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 8 (Assessing the Damage)   
 According to the Office of the Prime Ministers’ (1992) report on the impact 
of Andrew, it appears that some informal damage assessments were conducted 
by ministries to determine what type of recovery would be required (Office of the 
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Prime Minister, 1992).  This information however was related to long term fiscal 
needs to rebuild and not immediate response needs.  There is no evidence that a 
comprehensive coordinated assessment was conducted at the national level.   
“During Hurricane Andrew damage assessment was not done.  We now 
have a detailed system in place that ensures uniformed criteria for 
assessments” (Bethel, 2006). 
Because preliminary damage assessments (PDA) were not conducted it was 
difficult to determine in the immediate aftermath of Andrew the full magnitude and 
impact of the storm.  Informal discussions with Island Administrators during the 
2005 and 2006 NEMA conferences revealed that they were not aware of any 
assessments that were conducted immediately following Hurricane Andrew to 
determine the level of damage.  Anecdotal information indicated problems with 
duplication and uncoordinated reporting, that resulted in confusion.  Although the 
assessments by some ministries were conducted they focused on recovery, not 
response.  The lack of a national PDA following Hurricane Andrew indicates that 
the need was not recognized early or carried out effectively.   
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management 
Activities)   
 During response to Hurricane Andrew there was very little coordination of 
emergency management activities, and primary responsibility was assigned to 
the RBDF.  Utilizing a military ‘command and control’ model of operation there 
was limited coordination between multiple agencies.   
“Remember I was with the RBDF at that time [1992 Hurricane Andrew], 
and there was no structure like there is today to allow for coordination” 
(Bethel, 2006). 
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“During Hurricane Andrew nothing was coordinated, agencies worked 
independently there was no structure in place to ensure the Family Islands 
were prepared or able to respond” (Outton-Moncur, 2006b) 
Government ministries lead specific emergency activities related to their mission 
(Office of The Prime Minister, 1992) however, this was conducted in an 
uncoordinated and disjointed manner.  According to informal discussions with 
Island Administrators and NEMA staff, there was no centralized sharing of 
information which lead to duplications of efforts and wasting of resources.  Based 
on this information and applying Quarantelli’s methodology this function was not 
recognized early or implemented effectively. 
Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 10 (Restoring Essential Public Services)   
 The restoration of essential services such as water, electricity and phone 
were significantly delayed following Hurricane Andrew.  Eleuthera, the Berry 
Islands and South Bimini all reported interruption to services.  The Bahamas 
Telecommunication Company (BTC), The Bahamas Electric Corporation (BEC), 
and the Water and Sewerage Corporation (W&SC) all worked to restore services 
(Office of the Prime Minister, 1992).  Data regarding the length of outages could 
not be obtained.  Informal discussions with the Island Administrator from San 
Salvador at the 2005 NEMA Conference indicated that there were portions of the 
Family Islands that were without power for several months.  There are no data to 
suggest that the need for the function was recognized early or implemented 
effectively.   
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4.2.1.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion One: Adequately Carrying Out Generic 
Functions 
Table 4.5 provides a summary of the ten generic functions identified by 
Quarantelli (1997a) and evaluated for this research as they relate to Hurricane 
Floyd.   
Hurricane Floyd 1999 
GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART 
FUNCTIONS 
Was the Need for the 
function recognized 
early? (Y/N) 
Was the function 
carried out without too 
many problems? (Y/N) 
1. Warning Yes Yes 
2. Evacuations Yes No 
3. Sheltering No No 
4. Emergency Medical 
Care Yes Yes 
5. Search and Rescue No No 
6. Protection of Property Yes Yes 
7. Mobilization of 
Emergency Personnel 
and Resources 
No No 
8. Assessing the 
Damage Yes No 
9. Coordinating 
emergency 
management 
activities 
No No 
10. Restoring essential 
public services No No 
Table 4.5 – Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Floyd 
1999 
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 1 (Warning)   
 The data gathered from The Bahamas Department of Meteorology (1999) 
and interviews with NEMA staff indicate that warnings for Hurricane Floyd were 
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effectively executed.  At 5pm on September 13th, 1999 tropical storm warnings4 
were issued for the Southeast Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos Islands.  A 
hurricane watch5 was also posted for the Central Islands of The Bahamas 
(Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 1999).  The Broadcasting Corporation of 
The Bahamas, communicated the warnings throughout the Islands of The 
Bahamas via television and radio.   
“The Bahamian public responded well to the hurricane alert messages, 
and took advice given to them seriously.  This was subsequently reflected 
in the fact that there was one casualty [later reclassified as two] and 
property damage was minimized in most islands.  The department of 
Meteorology was commended by the media and the general public, for the 
issuing of timely and accurate warnings.  The response to our warning 
system was just tremendous” (Lightbourne and Dean, 1999:12).   
In response to Hurricane Floyd data indicates that need for warnings were 
recognized early and the function was carried out effectively.   
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 2 (Evacuations)   
 ‘Official’ evacuation orders in response to Hurricane Floyd were not issued 
for the Islands of The Bahamas.  Although the news media and Department of 
Meteorology did encourage residents of low lying areas and families with homes 
close to the sea to relocate to a more secure location, no ‘official’ request for 
evacuations were made (Office of The Prime Minister, 1999).  The data indicates 
that the general function of evacuations was recognized by the Department of 
                                                 
4 Tropical Storm warnings are issued by The Department of Meteorology when tropical storm 
conditions are expected in the specified area within 24 hours.  
5 Hurricane watches are issued by the Department of Meteorology to indicate that hurricane 
conditions are possible in the specified area, usually within 36 hours.  When the Department of 
Meteorology issues a hurricane watch they notify residents to prepare to take immediate action to 
protect your family and property in case a hurricane warning is issued.   
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Meteorology but not carried-out effectively.  No resources or coordination took 
place to facilitate the movement of residents in response to Hurricane Floyd. 
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 3 (Sheltering)   
 The Bahamas Red Cross Society with support from the RBDF and the 
Ministry of Social Services and Community Development opened emergency 
shelters (Ingraham, 1999).  Data on the number of shelters opened, individuals 
housed, and services provided were not available for Hurricane Floyd.  There are 
no data to suggest that the need for shelters was recognized early.  Based on the 
Prime Minister’s Communication to Parliament regarding shelter operations, it 
appears that The Bahamas Red Cross Society in coordination with Social 
Services were successful in providing shelter services (Ingraham, 1999).  
However, as with Hurricane Andrew the shelters were recovery not emergency 
response shelters.   
“Social Services worked closely with the Island Administrators to ensure 
shelters were open for those that lost their homes [as a result of Hurricane 
Floyd]”(Glinton, 2006)   
 
The need for response shelters was not recognized early nor was 
the function carried-out effectively.   
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care)   
 “At no time following the passage of Hurricane Floyd did we [The 
Bahamas] experience a medical or public health emergency related to the 
hurricane” (Ingraham, 1999:4).  National emergency medical care was adequate 
in meeting the needs of residents in response to Hurricane Floyd with only two 
deaths reported in association with the storm (Office of The Prime Minister, 
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1999).  The Ministry of Health in coordination with the Pan American Health 
Organization additionally provided support in the rapid assessment of water 
supplies, waste water and excreta disposal and solid waste management 
throughout the islands (Ingraham, 1999).  Through informal discussions with Paul 
Newbold of The Bahamas Hospital Authority, following Hurricane Andrew 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) were put in place in preparation for a 
medical emergency.  Those SOP’s were followed as identified by Prime Minister 
Ingraham (1999) and successfully executed in response to Hurricane Floyd. As a 
result, the need for emergency medical care was assessed to have been 
recognized early and carried-out with no notable problems.   
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue)   
 Search and Rescue was not a formal function in 1999 and operations 
were conducted by a variety of local and national organizations in an 
uncoordinated manner.  Based on informal discussions that I had with members 
of The Bahamas Police and Defence Force indicated that search and rescue was 
never a major focus of training or concern.  Buildings that were destroyed by 
Hurricane Floyd were searched by local residents, police or fire.  This indicates 
that the function was not recognized early or executed effectively.   
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property)   
 Protection of Government property was carried out by the Ministry of 
Works and Transportation (Office of The Prime Minister, 1999).  The Ministry of 
Works was responsible for securing government buildings by installing hurricane 
shutters and/or utilizing plywood to protect windows.  The Department of 
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Meteorology reported that residents responded effectively to their 
recommendations regarding the protection of homes in preparation for Hurricane 
Floyd (Lightbourne and Dean, 1999).  Quarantelli’s criteria were applied to this 
function and indicate that the protection of private and government property was 
recognized early and carried out with no notable problems.   
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 7 (Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and 
Resources)   
 Although an emergency operations center was established by the RBDF it 
was not a multi-agency command center.  This created several problems to 
include, limited and/or delayed preliminary damage assessment information 
intern generated a delay in the activation of resources and personnel.  A lack of 
comprehensive coordination and shared communication lead to a disjointed 
multi-organizational response.  As a result there were delays in the activation and 
movement of emergency materials and personnel.   
“Hurricane Floyd is unique in that long-term recovery was well 
organized.  A Disaster Recovery Committee was put in place by the Prime 
Minister to coordinate with Social Services and develop protocol for 
providing aid.  However, this happened weeks after Floyd impacted the 
nation and in the interim response efforts were lacking” (Outten-Moncur, 
2006a). 
 Reports from the Office of the Prime Minister (1999) indicate that the 
RBDF did provide emergency relief shipments of water, canned and dry food 
stuffs, emergency first aid kits, insect repellants and other emergency supplies 
such as batteries, flashlights and children’s disposable diapers that had been 
donated by the private sector in New Providence.  Reports further indicate that 
churches, private radio stations and numerous corporate citizens also made 
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donations.  However, the movement and distribution of emergency relief was 
difficult and many times delayed for extended periods of time.  Applying the data 
to Quarantelli’s methodology indicates that the need for the mobilization of 
emergency personnel and resources was not recognized early nor was it carried 
out effectively.  This is an example of what Quarantelli classifies as eventual 
relief.   
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 8 (Assessing the Damage)   
 A PDA is used to determine the magnitude and impact of a disaster as 
well as identify needs that require immediate attention.  Following the impact of 
Floyd, damage assessments were conducted by a variety of organizations to 
include the RBDF, Ministry of Works, OFDA, and PAHO (Office of the Prime 
Minister, 1999).  However, all of the assessments utilized different evaluation 
criteria for damage classification.  There was no uniformity to the process which 
created incomplete assessments and duplication of information.  According to 
Gayle Outten-Moncur (2006) the uncoordinated reporting during response to 
Hurricane Floyd created confusion during the response operation.  Furthermore, 
it created disorder in the collection of data for this research.  Applying the data to 
Quarantelli’s criteria indicates the need for damage assessment was recognized 
but the function was not effectively carried out.   
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management 
Activities)   
 During response to Hurricane Floyd there was very little ‘coordination’ of 
emergency management activities.  The RBDF took the lead by establishing an 
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EOC while The Bahamas Red Cross Society and Ministry of Social Services 
established shelters.  Additional ministries lead specific emergency activities 
related to there mission however in an uncoordinated and disjointed manner.   
“Everything was going so fast, things could have been more organized or 
more structured.  At that time [1999 Hurricane Floyd], I was still with the 
Defence Force, I was confused with trying to find a central point because 
there seemed to be so many different central points of operation” (Bethel, 
2006) 
Informal discussions with Island Administrators during the 2005 and 2006 NEMA 
conference, indicated that a contributing factor to the slow response of the 
national governments to Floyd was due in part to no centralized sharing of 
information.  The Island Administrator from Eleuthera also indicated there were 
duplications of effort and wasting of resources due to a lack of coordination.  
Based on Quarantelli’s criteria this general function of coordinating emergency 
management was neither recognized early nor implemented effectively.  
Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 10 (Restoring Essential Public Services)   
 The restoration of essential services such as water, electricity and phone 
services were significantly delayed following Hurricane Floyd.  Reports issued on 
October 13th 1999 indicated that a month following the event some islands were 
still struggling with water quality and water supply issues (Ingraham, 1999).   
Reports from the Water and Sewerage Corporation indicated that “coliform 
indicator bacteria have been reported, and were detected during the mission, in 
bottled water” (W&SC, 1999).  These reports were issued weeks after the 
passage of Hurricane Floyd indicating that the essential public service of clean 
drinking water had not been restored.   
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“The storm [Hurricane Floyd] wreaked havoc on the communications 
system of The Bahamas, downing hundreds of telephone and electrical 
poles and causing major damage to telecommunications towers.  Because 
of this, for a time, virtually all communications between our islands and to 
the outside world were severed.  The absence of stand-by generators on a 
number of islands, such as Cat Island, meant that for some twenty four 
hours after the eye of the storm had crossed that island emergency 
satellite telephones remained inoperable and we were without confirmed 
accurate reports” (Ingraham, 1999:81).   
The statement by Prime Minister Ingraham, confirms previously provided data 
that assessments were not conducted in a timely manner as well as illustrates 
that the need for restoration of essential public serves were recognized early.   
4.2.1.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion One: Adequately Carrying Out 
Generic Functions 
Table 4.6 provides a summary of the ten generic functions as they were 
applied to Hurricane Michelle.   
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 1 (Warning)   
 According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology (2001) and NEMA 
staff members, warnings for Hurricane Michelle were effectively executed.  
According to reports issued by the Department of Meteorology (2001) at 6am of 
Saturday, November 3rd, residents of the Northwest and Central Bahamas were 
urged to monitor the progress of Hurricane Michelle as a Tropical Cyclone Alert6 
was issued.  A Hurricane Watch was posted by 11pm that evening for the 
following islands:  Bimini, Grand Bahama, Abaco, The Berry Islands, Andros, 
New Providence, Eleuthera, Exuma, Cat Island, Ragged Island, Long Island, 
                                                 
6 When a tropical cyclone can possibly bring storm or hurricane conditions to some part of The 
Bahamas within 60 hours an alert is issued by the Meteorological Department. 
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Rum Cay and San Salvador.  The warnings issued by the Department of 
Meteorology were broadcast on ZNS radio and television channels.   
“Everyone took Michelle very seriously.  Forecasted to directly impact the 
Island of New Providence, residents were uneasy.  It is rare for a 
Hurricane to impact the capital.  Warnings were issued and most residents 
took action” (Outten-Moncur, 2006b).  
The data indicates that as with Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd, the need for 
warnings in response to Michelle was recognized early and the function was 
carried out with no notable problems. 
Hurricane Michelle 2001 
  GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART 
FUNCTIONS 
Was the Need for the 
function recognized 
early? (Y/N) 
Was the function carried 
out without too many 
problems? (Y/N) 
1. Warning Yes Yes 
2. Evacuations Yes No 
3. Sheltering Yes Yes 
4. Emergency Medical 
Care Yes Yes 
5. Search and Rescue Yes Yes 
6. Protection of Property Yes Yes 
7. Mobilization of 
Emergency Personnel 
and Resources 
No No 
8. Assessing the Damage Yes No 
9. Coordinating 
emergency 
management activities 
No No 
10. Restoring essential 
public services Yes No 
Table 4.6 – Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Michelle 
2001 
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Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 2 (Evacuations)   
 In 2001 there continued to be no legal authority to act or avenue for 
issuing ‘official’ evacuation orders.  As Hurricane Michelle approached, The 
Department of Meteorology, at 11pm on Saturday, November 3rd informed 
residents “to begin securing their properties, and to evacuate the following 
islands and cays:  Cat Cay, Red Bays, Ocean Cay, Berry Islands, the Upper-
Exuma Cays and similar Cays in the Watch area” (Bahamas Department of 
Meteorology, 2001:10-11).  Evacuation orders within The Bahamas are voluntary 
and once warnings were issued it was the responsibility of residents to obtain the 
means to evacuate.   
“Michelle did not cause me to evacuate my home.  I live on high ground 
and am not prone to flooding, plus my home is a very strong structure.  
Two or three members of my wife’s family stayed with us during the 
storm” (Rigby, 2006)  
 
“Department of Social Services and the Red Cross opened shelters in 
church facilities and schools on the island of New Providence” (Glinton, 
2006). 
Although no ‘official’ evacuation orders were issued by The Government of 
The Bahamas or the RBDF, the Department of Meteorology did encourage 
residents in unsafe structures to relocate.  Although the need for evacuations 
was recognized by the Department of Meteorology the function was not carried 
out in a formal, uniformed way to aid residents.  
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 3 (Sheltering)   
 The Bahamas Red Cross Society with support from the RBDF and the 
Ministry of Social Services and Community Development opened emergency 
shelters in response to Hurricane Michelle (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001).  
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Data on the number of shelters opened, individuals housed, and services 
provided were not available for Hurricane Michelle.  Informal discussions with 
NEMA staff members however, indicated that the need for shelters was 
recognized early and the function was carried out without too many problems 
(Glinton, 2006; Outten-Moncur, 2006b).  Unlike Andrew and Floyd, Hurricane 
Michelle impacted the capital city of Nassau where resources and personnel 
were available to effectively carry out the function of sheltering.  
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care)   
 The Island of New Providence, home to over 69% of the nation’s 
population, was significantly impacted by Hurricane Michelle.  The Bahamas 
Ministry of Health (2001) reported no major emergencies or deaths in association 
with Hurricane Michelle.  According to Paul Newbold, representative with The 
Bahamas Hospital Authority, all area hospitals and clinics were functioning 
normally.  National emergency medical capabilities were adequate to meet all 
health related needs generated as a result of Hurricane Michelle.  Based on 
available data it appears that the need for emergency medical care was 
recognized early and the function was carried out with no notable problems.   
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue)   
 Flooding was the major concern with Hurricane Michelle.  Although 
damage to buildings was reported, unlike Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd, the 
islands did not experience extensive damage.  The requirement for urban search 
and rescue was minimal and was successfully addressed by the RBDF and the 
Fire Department (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001).  Also important was the 
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need for maritime search and rescue in response to a sailboat with Haitian 
migrants on the Shores of Long Island (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 
2001).  This was also successfully addressed by the RBDF.  Based on available 
data it appears that search and rescue requirements in response to Hurricane 
Michelle were recognized early and carried out effectively.  
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property)   
 Protection of Government property was carried out by the Ministry of 
Works and Transportation.  With responsibility for Government Buildings the 
Ministry of Works secured government facilities by installing hurricane shutters 
and utilizing plywood to protect windows.  Business owners in downtown Nassau 
also utilized sandbags to protect against flooding.  According to informal 
discussions with NEMA staff members many residents of New Providence did 
not take any mitigative action to protect their properties in preparation for 
Hurricane Michelle believing that the hurricane would not hit them.  Based on the 
official after action report issued by the Bahamas Department of Meteorology 
(2001), warnings were issued to residents to secure property illustrating that the 
need for the function was identified early.  Yet many residents did not heeding 
warnings.  To ensure consistent and uniformed evaluation of this generic function 
the focus stayed on the protection of government property as it had in response 
to Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd.  The data shows that the need for the function 
was both recognized early and carried out effectively by the Ministry of Works 
and Transportation.  
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Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 7 (Mobilization of Emergency Personnel 
and Resources)   
 Hurricane Michelle was the first hurricane to make landfall on the island of 
New Providence since Hurricane Janice in 1958.  Mobilization of personnel was 
very difficult since many residents were responding to needs at their own home 
and were not available to participate in official response operations.  Additionally, 
as with Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd the RBDF established an EOC, however it 
was not multi-agency.  This created several problems, including limited PDA 
information intern a delaying the activation of resources and personnel (Office of 
The Prime Minister, 2001).   
“We [the nation of The Bahamas] were not prepared to deal with a direct 
hit to Nassau.  Many residents did not secure food and water prior to 
landfall.  The heavy rain and sea surge washed out many of the roads 
making it difficult for emergency personnel and residents to move around 
the island” (Davis, 2006).   
“Hurricane Michelle brought awareness about emergency management 
and the need to have a well coordinated response” (Outten-Moncur, 
2006b). 
As with previous response operations a lack of comprehensive coordination and 
shared communication created a disjointed multi-organizational response.  The 
need for the mobilization of emergency personnel and resources was not 
recognized early nor was it carried out effectively.   
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 8 (Assessing the Damage)   
 According to the Office of the Prime Minister (2001) damage assessment 
in response to Hurricane Michelle was completed by multiple ministries and 
organizations.  The uncoordinated function produced inconsistent reporting, for 
instance, the RBDF (2001) indicated extensive damage to ports on the north side 
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of New Providence, while the Ministry of Works reported no damage (Office of 
the Prime Minister, 2001).   
“Had uniformed assessment protocol been in place response could have 
been better organized” (Bethel, 2006). 
Duplicated information and uncoordinated reporting caused a slowdown in 
response efforts.  The need for damage assessment was recognized, however 
the function was not effectively carried out.   
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management 
Activities)   
 During response to Hurricane Michelle there was very little coordination of 
emergency management activities.  Ministries responded independently of one 
another to needs as they arose.   
“Following Michelle it was difficult to communicate as a result of downed 
phone lines.  Offices were closed and government employees were dealing 
with issues at their home so it was hard to get things done” (Rigby, 2006). 
As during Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd the RBDF established an EOC at the 
Cabinet Office, providing support and briefings to the Office of the Prime Minister 
(Office of the Prime Minister, 2001).  Overall response activities were 
uncoordinated, with no centralized sharing of information resulting in duplication 
of efforts (Bethel, 2006).  The coordination function was not recognized early nor 
was it implemented effectively.   
Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 10 (Restoring Essential Public Services)   
 Interruption to essential public services such as water, electrical power, 
and telecommunication operations were significant for the northwestern and 
central islands of The Bahamas (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2001; 
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Office of the Prime Minister, 2001).  An estimated 200,000 residents were 
affected by power outages (BEC, 2001).  Extensive flooding compromised the 
delicate fresh water system of the nation as well as damaged key 
communications hubs on the island of New Providence.  Data suggests that the 
need to restore essential public services were recognized early however, a lack 
of planning, resources, and information produced extensive delays in executing 
the function (Office of the Prime Minster, 2001).  
4.2.1.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion One: Adequately Carrying Out 
Generic Functions 
Table 4.7 provides a summary of the ten generic functions as they apply to 
Hurricane Frances.  Data obtained through interviews, surveys, and archival 
research indicate that most of the generic functions were both recognized early 
and carried out without too many problems.  However, according to Quarantelli 
(1997a) for us to answer yes to the first criteria we must answer yes to all ten 
functions.  Since generic function seven (7), mobilization of emergency personnel 
and resources, was not carried out without too many problems criterion one must 
be answered no.  A detailed review of the ten generic functions is provided 
below. 
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Hurricane Frances 2004 
  GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART 
FUNCTIONS 
Was the Need for the 
function recognized 
early? (Y/N) 
Was the function 
carried out without too 
many problems? (Y/N) 
1. Warning Yes Yes 
2. Evacuations Yes No 
3. Sheltering Yes Yes 
4. Emergency Medical 
Care Yes Yes 
5. Search and Rescue Yes Yes 
6. Protection of Property Yes Yes 
7. Mobilization of 
Emergency Personnel 
and Resources 
Yes No 
8. Assessing the 
Damage Yes Yes 
9. Coordinating 
emergency 
management 
activities 
Yes Yes 
10. Restoring essential 
public services Yes Yes 
Table 4.7 – Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Frances 
2004 
Hurricane Frances Generic Function 1 (Warning)   
 The Bahamas Department of Meteorology (2004a) issued its first alert on 
Hurricane Frances at 6pm on August 30th when the projected tracks indicated 
that the hurricane would impact the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the Islands of 
the Southeast Bahamas.  Within twelve hours of the first alert Frances was 
upgraded to a Hurricane Watch.  Hurricane Warnings were issued at noon on 
August 31st for The Turks and Caicos Islands and the Southeast Islands of the 
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Bahamas.  A Hurricane Watch was still in effect for the Central Islands of The 
Bahamas and a Hurricane Alert was issued for the Northwestern Islands 
(Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2004a).   
 At noon on September 1st, Hurricane warnings for the Central Bahamas 
were issued as the warnings for the Southeast Islands remained in effect.  The 
Northwest Bahamas remained under a Hurricane Watch.  By 9am that evening 
while Frances was some 80 miles east-southeast of the Island of Mayaguana, 
Hurricane Warnings were issued for the entire archipelago.  The Broadcasting 
Corporation of The Bahamas, communicated the alerts, watches, and warnings 
throughout the Islands of The Bahamas via television and radio (Bahamas 
Department of Meteorology, 2004a; NEMA, 2004a). 
  Warnings were also issued through ZNS by the Director of the National 
Emergency Management Agency, Mr. Carl Smith and Prime Minister Perry 
Christie (NEMA, 2004a; Hughey, 2004b).  The need for warnings were 
recognized early and based on available data the function was carried out with 
no problems.  The Bahamian public responded well to the hurricane alert 
messages securing their homes and property.  All available data indicates that 
the general function one, warning, was both recognized early and effectively 
carried-out. 
Hurricane Frances Generic Function 2 (Evacuations)   
 As with the previous three hurricanes examined in this study no legal 
authority to act or avenue for issuing ‘official’ evacuation orders was in place 
during response to Frances.  Utilizing the media, NEMA in coordination with the 
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Department of Meteorology, encouraged residents of low lying areas and families 
with homes close to the water to relocate to more secure areas (Bahamas 
Department of Meteorology, 2004a; NEMA, 2004a).  These were voluntary 
actions Bahamians were encouraged to heed.  Also important to note, although 
the government in the form of NEMA encouraged the population to move the 
responsibility to take action remained with residents.  Data gathered indicates in 
response to Hurricane Frances the need for the function was recognized early 
but the facilitation and execution of the function was not carried-out effectively 
(Hughey 2004b).   
Hurricane Frances Generic Function 3 (Sheltering)   
 The RBDF with strong support from The Bahamas Red Cross Society, 
Ministry of Social Services, and the Ministry of Health, opened emergency 
shelters in response to Hurricane Frances throughout the islands (NEMA, 2004a; 
Hughey, 2004b).  Island Administrators, serving as the NEMA representative on 
the Family Island, reported back to the national EOC on a regular basis with the 
status of shelter operations.  Around 2am on September 2nd, Prime Minister Perry 
Christie participated in calls to the Island Administrators from the national EOC 
(See Picture 4.1).  On the morning of September 2nd, the following islands 
confirmed that shelters had been opened or would be opening within the next few 
hours:  Inagua, Mayaguana, Acklins/Crooked Island/Long Cay, Long Island, 
Exuma, San Salvador & Rum Cay, Cat Island, North, Central and South Andros, 
Nassau, Chub Cay, Great Harbor Cay, Abaco, Grand Bahama, Bimini, Cat Cay, 
Ocean Cay, and Walker’s Cay (See Picture 4.2).  NEMA was able to quickly 
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identify the need for shelters and coordinate the carrying-out of the shelter 
function with few problems.  
 
Picture 4.1 – National Emergency Operations Center in Response to Hurricane 
Frances, September 2, 2004.  Prime Minister Perry Christie, RBDF Personnel, 
and Erin Hughey work to evaluate the status of shelters on the Family Islands.  
(Source:  Global Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Action) 
 
 
Picture 4.2 – Hurricane Frances Shelter, Island of New Providence.  (Source:  
Erin Hughey)   
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Hurricane Frances Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care)   
 All emergency medical care needs were coordinated by Emergency 
Support Function (ESF) 8, Health and Medical Services (National Response 
Plan, NEMA 2002).  The Ministry of Health was the lead agency responsible for 
coordinating emergency medical care, with strong support from the Hospital 
Authority, Public Health Department, Department of Agriculture, and Mental 
Health Services.  Additional support came from the Pan American Health 
Organization (PAHO), which arrived in country in anticipation of Frances.  Picture 
4.3 below displays members of ESF 8 working to coordinate the national 
response effort to Hurricane Frances.  
 
Picture 4.3 – ESF 8 Health and Medical Service in support of Hurricane Frances 
response efforts.  (Source: NEMA) 
 
There were two (2) deaths associated with Hurricane Frances (Bahamas Ministry 
of Health, 2004).  Minor medical issues were also reported, according to the 
Ministry of Health, response to all health related issues were coordinated 
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effectively by ESF 8 personnel.  Rapid assessments of water supplies, waste 
water, and solid waste management throughout the islands were carried out 
soon after the passing of the storm (Bahamas Ministry of Health, 2004).  The 
need for emergency medical care was recognized early and based on available 
data the function was carried out with no notable problems.   
 
Picture 4.4 – ESF 8 Health and Medical Service in support of Hurricane Frances 
response efforts.  (Source: NEMA) 
Hurricane Frances Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue)   
 Search and Rescue operations were coordinated under ESF 10a Urban 
Search and Rescue.  The RBDF was the lead agency responsible for 
coordinating search and rescue operations, with strong support from the Royal 
Bahamas Police and Fire Departments, Ministry of Works and Utilities, Public 
Hospital Authority, and the Department of Land and Survey (NEMA, 2004a; 
Hughey, 2004b).  Unofficial search and rescue operations were also conducted 
by residents throughout the islands.  ‘Search and Rescue’ operations were, for 
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the first time in the history of emergency response within The Bahamas, an 
official function (NEMA, 2002).  The need for search and rescue was recognized 
early through pre-planning and was carried out without too many problems.  As a 
result of the independent or unofficial search and rescue initiatives that did take 
place after Hurricane Frances, NEMA has attempted to bring training to the 
family island to establish community response unites.  This ensures citizens who 
are participating in the function of ‘search and rescue’ have the necessary skills 
to be successful and prevent injury (Bethel, 2006; Outten-Moncur, 2006b).    
Hurricane Frances Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property)   
 Protection of Government property was carried out by The Bahamas 
Ministry of Works and Transportation (2004a) as outlined in the National 
Response Plan (NEMA, 2002).  With responsibility for Government Buildings the 
Ministry of Works secured government facilities by installing hurricane shutters 
and utilizing plywood to protect windows.  The Department of Meteorology 
(2004a) reported that residents responded effectively to their recommendations 
regarding the protection of homes in preparation for Hurricane Frances.  Through 
personal observation (Hughey, 2004b) residents and business owners of Nassau 
secured windows, sandbagged doors and cleared debris from surrounding areas. 
(See Pictures 4.5 and 4.6)  The protection of private and government property 
was recognized early and carried out with no notable problems.   
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Picture 4.5 – The protection of property in preparation for Hurricane Frances 
(2004) (Source: Erin Hughey) 
 
 
Picture 4.6 – The protection of government property in preparation for Hurricane 
Frances (2004). (Source: Erin Hughey) 
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Hurricane Frances Generic Function 7 (Mobilization of Emergency Personnel 
and Resources)   
 Relief supplies and distribution were coordinated under ESF 7 (NEMA, 
2002).  NEMA was the lead agency responsible for coordinating the mobilization 
of emergency personnel and resources, with strong support from the RBDF, 
Ministry of Finance, Public Hospitals Authority, Ministry of Transportation and 
Aviation, Ministry of Works and Utilities, and the Department of Social Services 
(NEMA, 2004a).  On September 1, 2004, NEMA activated the National EOC in 
response to Hurricane Frances.  All agencies and organizations active in disaster 
response were notified via fax, e-mail and/or phone that the EOC had been 
activated and their designated EOC representatives were to report to the 
Churchill Building in downtown Nassau.  Many, although not all, support 
agencies sent representatives to the EOC, an initial briefing by NEMA staff on 
the situation took place the afternoon of September 1st (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 
2004a).   
EOC staff established lines of communication with their respective agency 
as well as with their Family Island contacts (Hughey 2004b).  This coordination 
was intended to allow for the sharing of information throughout the EOC, 
facilitating the matching of needs with available resources.  Required personnel 
and resources were identified well at the start of the crisis and the function was 
soundly carried out for the first 12 hours (NEMA, 2004a).  However, following 
landfall, communication became difficult due to downed phone lines and power 
outages hindering the coordination of resources (NEMA, 2004a).  Difficulties with 
communication resulted in delays, slowing the activation and movement of 
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emergency materials.  The need for the mobilization of emergency personnel and 
resources was recognized early but not fully effectively carried out.   
 
Picture 4.7 – National EOC, RBDF confirms the status of Frances with a 
Meteorologist from The Bahamas Department of Meteorology.  (Source: Erin 
Hughey) 
  
 
Picture 4.8 – Hurricane Frances National EOC (Source:  Erin Hughey) 
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Hurricane Frances Generic Function 8 (Assessing the Damage)   
 Public Works and Engineering, ESF 3 was responsible for damage 
assessment activities (NEMA, 2002).  The Ministry of Works and Utilities was the 
lead agency responsible for coordinating damage assessment with strong 
support from The Bahamas Electricity Corporation, The Bahamas 
Telecommunication Company, Water and Sewerage Corporation, BEST 
Commission, and the Department of Environmental Health.  For the first time in 
the history of emergency response within the Bahamas, this team worked 
together to assess damage on each of the islands.  The teams then provided a 
formal damage assessment report back to NEMA, from which response decision 
could be based (NEMA, 2004a).   
 Additional international organizations such as USAID and the International 
Red Cross also accompanied many of the damage assessment teams (Hughey, 
2004b; NEMA 2004a). (See Pictures 4.9 and 4.10)  This team effort provided a 
comprehensive understanding of the damage to each of the islands and the 
needed response.  All damage assessments were completed within 72 hours of 
the storm passing over Grand Bahama (Bahamas Ministry of Public Works & 
Engineering, 2004).  This coordinated effort allowed for a timely and appropriate 
response.  The need for damage assessment was recognized early, and the 
function was executed with few problems.      
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Picture 4.9 – Hurricane Frances Damage Assessment Team (Source: NEMA) 
 
 
Picture 4.10 – Hurricane Frances, OFDA Damage Assessment Team (Source: 
NEMA) 
Hurricane Frances Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management 
Activities)   
 Hurricane Frances was the first response effort by the newly formed 
National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).  Although problems with 
information flow did arise, the activation of a national EOC allowed for 
collaborative response efforts (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004a).  Through 
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regularly scheduled briefings and situation reports, agencies were able to 
coordinate activities (NEMA, 2004).  This centralized sharing of information lead 
to effective service delivery.  The need for coordination was recognized early and 
implemented with few problems.    
Hurricane Frances Generic Function 10 (Restoring Essential Public Services)   
 ESF 1: Transportation, ESF 2: Communication, and ESF 3: Public Works 
and Engineering, were responsible for coordinating the restoration of essential 
public services (NEMA, 2002).  The Ministry of Transport and Aviation, The 
Royal Bahamas Police Force, and The Ministry of Works and Utilities were the 
lead agencies responsible for coordinating the restoration of essential public 
services (NEMA, 2002).  The restoration of water, electricity and phone services 
were quick to be restored in the south and central Islands of The Bahamas; 
approximately 48 to 72 hours following the storm (BEC, 2004; BTC 2004).  More 
significant delays were reported on the Island of Grand Bahama due to flooding 
that was later exacerbated by the impact of Hurricane Jeanne (NEMA, 2004a).  
 Immediately following the preliminary damage assessment reports the 
three emergency support functions worked together to prioritize the restoration of 
services.  Of greatest concern was (1) damage to the fresh water wells in the 
Northwestern Islands of The Bahamas, (2) restoration of transportation routs 
(airports and ports), and (3) electrical and telecommunication services (NEMA, 
2004).   The restoration of essential public services was both recognized early 
and carried-out with few problems.  
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4.2.1.5 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion One:  Adequately Carrying Out 
Generic Functions 
Table 4.8 provides a summary of the ten generic functions as they apply 
to Hurricane Jeanne.   
 
Hurricane Jeanne 2004 
  GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART 
FUNCTIONS 
Was the Need for the 
function recognized 
early? (Y/N) 
Was the function 
carried out without too 
many problems? (Y/N) 
1. Warning Yes Yes 
2. Evacuations Yes No 
3. Sheltering Yes Yes 
4. Emergency Medical 
Care Yes Yes 
5. Search and Rescue Yes Yes 
6. Protection of Property Yes Yes 
7. Mobilization of 
Emergency Personnel 
and Resources 
Yes Yes 
8. Assessing the 
Damage Yes Yes 
9. Coordinating 
emergency 
management 
activities 
Yes Yes 
10. Restoring essential 
public services Yes Yes 
Table 4.8 – Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Jeanne 
2004 
 As noted with Hurricane Frances, due to extensive planning the 
identification of key functions were recognized early.  The results shown in Table 
4.8 and the discussion below illustrate that all of the generic functions were 
recognized early.  Evacuations were the only function that was not carried out 
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effectively.  Despite the improvements in recognition and implementation of all 
ten generic functions as compared to the previous four hurricanes since yes can 
not be answered to all questions in all categories Criterion One is classified as 
not being effectively carried-out in response to Hurricane Jeanne.   
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 1 (Warning)   
 Hurricane Jeanne was a meandering storm that began to approach The 
Bahamas approximately ten days after the nation had been hit by Frances 
(Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2004b).  Jeanne’s development and path 
were a challenge for forecasters and their models.  The storm moved east and 
away from The Bahamas before looping back and making landfall on the 
northwestern islands.  According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology 
(2004b) fifty-eight (58) alerts were issued during the threat and passage of 
Jeanne.  The first news item was issued at 6:00pm on Monday, September 13 
when a new tropical depression formed east of the Leeward Islands.  Eighteen 
hours later, while moving toward the west-northwest at 12 mph, the depression 
was upgraded to tropical storm status and was named Jeanne (Bahamas 
Department of Meteorology, 2004b). 
 At 6:00pm, Tuesday, September 14, tropical storm warnings were issued 
for the Southeast Bahamas and a tropical storm watch was issued for the islands 
of the Central Bahamas.  All warnings were lifted at 6:00 am on Sunday, 
September 19 when tropical storm Jeanne began to move away from the 
Southeast Bahamas.  The warnings, issued by the Department of Meteorology 
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were communicated to the public through the Broadcasting Corporation of The 
Bahamas (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2004b; Hughey, 2004b). 
 The Department of Meteorology resumed alerts four days later at 6:00am 
on Thursday, September 23 as Jeanne regained hurricane status and turned 
back towards The Bahamas (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2004b).  At 
this time the National EOC was still activated in response to Hurricane Frances 
and in coordination with the Department of Meteorology, NEMA issued warnings 
to residents during already scheduled media briefings (NEMA 2004a; NEMA 
2004c).  The need for warnings were recognized early and coordinated through 
NEMA to ensure the public was prepared.   
“Everyone was keeping their eye on Jeanne as we worked to recover from 
Frances.  Trevor [Trevor Basden, Meteorologist assigned to NEMA 
during response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne from The Bahamas 
Department of Meteorology] continued to remind us that another storm 
was out there.  When is began to move East we thought we were out of the 
woods” (Bethel, 2006) 
Based on information gathered through NEMA documents, The Bahamas 
Department of Meteorology, NEMA staff members and personal observation, the 
need for warnings was clearly recognized early and carried out with no notable 
problems.   
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 2 (Evacuations)   
 As discussed previously during discussion of Hurricane Frances, in 2004 
there was no legal authority to act or avenue for issuing ‘official’ evacuation 
orders in response to Hurricane Jeanne.  NEMA in coordination with the 
Department of Meteorology notified the public that: 
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“If you live in a coastal zone, or in a structure which might not be strong, 
have an evacuation plan.   
? If you must evacuate, remember to shut of electricity and gas.   
? Take your survival kit, shelters do not provide food, water, bedding 
or other essential items.   
? Provide for your pet, if necessary.  Pets are not allowed in 
shelters” (NEMA, 2004c).   
Utilizing the regularly scheduled briefings that had been established during 
Hurricane Frances, NEMA strongly encouraged residents to take appropriate 
action.  The need for evacuation in response to Hurricane Jeanne was 
recognized and encouraged early.  Many residents heeded the warnings and 
took action early (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b).  However, since resources 
were not made available to aid residents in an evacuation or facilitate an 
evacuation location the function was not carried-out effectively. 
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 3 (Sheltering)   
 Shelter Services, ESF 6 was responsible for all activities surrounding 
shelter operations (NEMA, 2002).  The RBDF was the lead agency responsible 
for coordinating shelter openings with support from The Department of Social 
Services, Ministry of Health, and The Bahamas Red Cross.  Hurricane Frances 
response and recovery operations were still underway as Jeanne threatened the 
central and northwestern islands of The Bahamas (Hughey, 2004b).  Many of the 
same shelters that were serving as recovery shelters for Frances remained open 
(RBDF, 2004a; NEMA, 2004b).  Data confirms that the need for shelters was 
recognized early and the function was well coordinated and carried out 
effectively. 
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Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care)   
 With a strong emergency medical teams already assembled in response 
to Hurricane Frances, assets were already in place to address Hurricane Jeanne 
(NEMA, 2004b).  Medical care continued to be coordinated by ESF 8, Health and 
Medical Services (NEMA, 2002).  The Ministry of Health was the lead agency 
coordinating the operation, with aid provided by the Hospital Authority, Public 
Health Department, Department of Agriculture, and Mental Health Services.  
PAHO, already in country assisting with response and recovery to Frances 
provided additional support to the ESF 8 team (NEMA, 2004b).  There were no 
deaths or serious injuries associated with Hurricane Jeanne.  However, mental 
health services were provided on the Islands of Abaco and Grand Bahama which 
were seriously impacted by both storms (Bahamas Ministry of Health, 2004b).  
Applying Quarantelli’s criteria for evaluation indicates that the need for 
emergency medical assistance was recognized early and carried out effectively 
in response to Hurricane Jeanne. 
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue)   
 As with Hurricane Frances search and rescue operations in response to 
Jeanne were coordinated under ESF 10a Urban Search and Rescue (NEMA, 
2002).  The RBDF was the lead agency responsible for coordinating search and 
rescue operations, with support from the Royal Bahamas Police and Fire 
Departments, Ministry of Works and Utilities, Public Hospital Authority, and the 
Department of Land and Survey.  Unofficial search and rescue operations were 
also conducted by residents throughout the islands (RBDF, 2004).  Many of the 
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response teams were already in place as a result of Hurricane Frances and were 
able to quickly jump back into action in response to Jeanne (RBDF, 2004).  Data 
indicates that the need for search and rescue was recognized early and carried-
out with no notable problems. 
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property)   
 Protection of government property was carried out by the Ministry of 
Works and Transportation in response to Hurricane Frances (NEMA 2002; 
NEMA, 2004a).  Many of the government buildings were still secured with 
hurricane shutters or plywood when warnings were issued for Hurricane Jeanne.  
NEMA in coordination with the Department of Meteorology urged residents in the 
northwestern Bahamas to again secure their homes and take appropriate 
precautions (NEMA, 2004c).  Apply Quarantelli’s evaluation criteria indicates that 
the protection of private and government property was recognized early and 
carried out with no notable problems.   
“Once residents installed shutters or plywood for Frances it didn’t come 
down until after hurricane season” (Rigby, 2006). 
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 7 (Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and 
Resources)   
 Relief supplies and distribution were coordinated under ESF 7.  NEMA 
was the lead agency responsible for the mobilization of emergency personnel 
and resources, with support from the RBDF, Ministry of Finance, Public Hospitals 
Authority, Ministry of Transportation and Aviation, Ministry of Works and Utilities, 
and the Department of Social Services (NEMA 2002).  The national EOC had 
been fully operational since September 1st as a result of Hurricane Frances and 
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remained functioning in response to Hurricane Jeanne (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 
2004b).  Already existing agency liaisons remained at the EOC to coordinate 
response operations.  EOC staff maintained lines of communication with their 
respective agency as well as with their family island contacts.  The coordination 
with Family Island Administrators and the National EOC was critical to ensuring 
that available resources appropriately matched emergency needs.  With 
depleting assets as a result of two hurricanes in three weeks information sharing 
and strong coordination was critical (Hughey, 2004b).   
 Required personnel and resources were identified well and activated to 
respond to Hurricane Jeanne.  Communication issues that had plagued response 
to Hurricane Frances were addressed through onsite training prior to landfall of 
Hurricane Jeanne (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b).  Applying Quarantelli’s 
evaluation criteria indicates that the need for the mobilization of emergency 
personnel and resources was recognized early and carried out effectively.     
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 8 (Assessing the Damage)   
 Public Works and Engineering, ESF 3 was responsible for damage 
assessment activities (NEMA, 2002).  As with response to Frances, The Ministry 
of Works and Utilities, took the lead in coordinating the effort with strong support 
from The Bahamas Electricity Corporation, The Bahamas Telecommunication 
Company, Water and Sewerage Corporation, BEST Commission, and the 
Department of Environmental Health (Bahamas Ministry of Works, 2004b; 
NEMA, 2004b).  The same damage assessment teams established during 
frances were again used to assess the damage to the Family Islands (Bahamas 
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Ministry of Works, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b).  The teams worked well at 
coordinating information and providing a picture of the situation on the ground.  
This allowed for a quick response and effective matching of assets and needs 
(NEMA, 2004c).   
 International organizations such as USAID and the International Red 
Cross that had been in country to assist with response to Frances also 
accompanied many of the Hurricane Jeanne damage assessment teams 
(Hughey, 2004b; NEMA 2004c).  All damage assessments were completed 
within 48 hours of the storm passing over Grand Bahama.  This coordinated 
effort allowed for a timely and appropriate response.  The need for damage 
assessment was recognized early, and the function was executed with few 
problems. 
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management 
Activities)   
 Emergency coordination activities related to Hurricane Jeanne benefited 
from the impact of Hurricane Frances three weeks earlier.  With the EOC in place 
and activated, many of the ‘kinks’ related to information flow in response to 
Frances had been worked out (Hughey, 2004b).  The EOC was successfully 
facilitating collaborative response efforts between numerous agencies and 
organizations (NEMA, 2004c).  Already established briefings and situation 
reports continued in response to Jeanne and allowed for the centralized sharing 
of information.  Application of Quarnatelli’s evaluation criteria indicates that the 
function was recognized early and implemented with few problems.   
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“Jeanne was easier and harder.  Because the EOC was activated for 
Frances, we had all the right people together to quickly make decision 
about Jeanne.   However, we were all tired” (Outten-Moncur, 2006b). 
Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 10 (Restoring Essential Public Services)   
 As with Hurricane Frances ESF 1: Transportation, ESF 2: Communication, 
and ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering, were responsible for coordinating the 
restoration of essential public services (NEMA, 2002).  The Ministry of Transport 
and Aviation, The Royal Bahamas Police Force, and The Ministry of Works and 
Utilities were the lead agencies responsible for coordinating the restoration of 
essential public services (NEMA, 2002; NEMA, 2004b).  The main challenge to 
restoration of services was flooding.  Many of the essential services such as 
water and electricity were delayed in the northwest Bahamas following Frances 
do to extensive flooding (BEC, 2004b).  Many of the hardest hit areas were also 
impacted by Jeanne resulting in extended delays.  Minor outages or interruptions 
to services in the Central Bahamas were brought back on line within 48 hours of 
the passage of Jeanne (BEC, 2004b).   
 Immediately following the completion of damage assessment reports the 
three ESF’s worked together to prioritize the restoration of services.  Of greatest 
concern was (1) damage to the fresh water wells in the Northwestern Islands of 
The Bahamas, and (2) the restoration of transportation routs (airports and ports) 
(Bahamas Port Authority, 2004; Bahamas Water and Sewerage Corporation, 
2004).  The data suggests that the restoration of essential public services was 
both recognized early and implemented without any major problems.  
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4.2.1.6 Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion One:  Adequately Carrying Out 
Generic Functions 
Hurricane Wilma (2005) was the final storm that was examined in the 
post-CEM phase.  Table 4.9 provides a summary of the evaluation of the ten 
generic functions. As with Hurricane Jeanne all ten functions were recognized 
early however, general function two, evacuations were not carried-out effectively. 
A discussion on each function is provided below. 
Hurricane Wilma 2005 
  GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART 
FUNCTIONS 
Was the Need for the 
function recognized 
early? (Y/N) 
Was the function 
carried out without too 
many problems? (Y/N) 
1. Warning Yes Yes 
2. Evacuations Yes No 
3. Sheltering Yes Yes 
4. Emergency Medical 
Care Yes Yes 
5. Search and Rescue Yes Yes 
6. Protection of Property Yes Yes 
7. Mobilization of 
Emergency Personnel 
and Resources 
Yes Yes 
8. Assessing the 
Damage Yes Yes 
9. Coordinating 
emergency 
management 
activities 
Yes Yes 
10. Restoring essential 
public services Yes Yes 
Table 4.9 – Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Wilma 
2005 
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Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 1 (Warning)   
 On Sunday, October 23, 2005 hurricane warnings were in effect for the 
islands of the Northwest Bahamas including Grand Bahama, Abaco, Bimini, 
Berry islands, Andros, Eleuthera, and New Providence (Bahamas Department of 
Meteorology, 2005; NEMA, 2005).  The Bahamas Department of Meteorology 
tracked Wilma as it moved over the Yucatan Peninsula, Cuba, and Florida 
always keeping NEMA up to date on the storms status.  NEMA in coordination 
with the Department of Meteorology, issued warnings to residents of the 
northwest Bahamas and encouraged residents in costal areas to relocate to 
shelters or more secure facilities (NEMA, 2005).  The need for warnings were 
recognized early and based on available data the function was carried out with 
no problems.  The northwestern islands had been significantly impacted by 
Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne the year before and residents took quick action 
in response to the warnings.   
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 2 (Evacuations)   
 As with the previous five storms examined there was still no legal avenue 
for issuing mandatory evacuations in response to Wilma.  NEMA (2005) in 
coordination with the Department of Meteorology (2005) issued the now standard 
public notification:   
“If you live in a coastal zone, or in a structure which might not be strong, 
have an evacuation plan.   
? If you must evacuate, remember to shut of electricity and gas.   
? Take your survival kit, shelters do not provide food, water, bedding 
or other essential items.   
? Provide for your pet, if necessary.  Pets are not allowed in 
shelters” (NEMA, 2005).   
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NEMA strongly encouraged residents to take appropriate action in response to 
Wilma and to continue monitoring the storm (NEMA, 2005).  Application of 
Quarantelli’s evaluation criteria suggests that the need for evacuation in 
response to Hurricane Wilma was recognized and encouraged early.  What was 
lacking was the effective execution of the function through aid to residents or the 
establishment of evacuation centers or location points. 
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 3 (Sheltering)   
 ESF 6 Shelter Services, coordinated all shelter operations in response to 
Hurricane Wilma the same as had been done in response to Hurricanes Frances 
and Jeanne (NEMA, 2002; NEMA 2005).  The RBDF was the lead agency 
responsible for shelter operations with strong support from The Ministry of Social 
Services, The Ministry of Health, and The Bahamas Red Cross Society (RBDF, 
2005).  Emergency shelters were opened throughout the northwestern islands of 
the Bahamas.  NEMA provided coordination between ESF 6, Island 
Administrators, and the public to inform them of the location and services 
provided at the shelters (NEMA, 2005).  The need for shelters was recognized 
early and the function was well coordinated and carried out without any notable 
problems. 
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care)   
 Emergency medical care in response to Hurricane Wilma was coordinated 
by ESF 8 Health and Medical Services (NEMA, 2002).  The Ministry of Health 
was the lead agency responsible for coordinating emergency medical care, with 
support from the Hospital Authority, Public Health Department, Department of 
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Agriculture, and Mental Health Services (NEMA 2002, NEMA 2005).  There was 
only one (1) death associated with Hurricane Wilma and was attributed to storm 
surge inundation (Bahamas Ministry of Health, 2005; NEMA, 2005).  Rapid 
assessments of water supplies, waste water, and solid waste management were 
conducted by the ESF 8 team following the passage of Wilma (Bahamas Ministry 
of Health, 2005).  Application of Quarantelli’s evaluation criteria indicates that the 
need for emergency medical care was recognized early and the function was 
carried out with no problems.   
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue)   
 Since 2002 and the implementation of a CEM system search and rescue 
operations were addressed by ESF 10a Urban Search and Rescue (NEMA 2002; 
NEMA 2005).  The RBDF was the lead agency responsible for search and 
rescue operations, with strong support from the Royal Bahamas Police and Fire 
Departments, Ministry of Works and Utilities, Public Hospital Authority, and the 
Department of Land and Survey (RBDF, 2005).  The most extensive need for 
search and rescue was reported on the Island of Grand Bahama (NEMA 2005).  
As with many of the previous disaster operations unofficial search and rescue 
operations were also conducted by residents.  The Data indicates that the need 
for search and rescue was recognized early and carried out without too many 
problems.   
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property)   
 The Ministry of Works and Transportation was responsible for the 
protection of government property in preparation for Hurricane Wilma (NEMA, 
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2002; Bahamas Ministry of Public Works, 2005).  With responsibility for 
Government Buildings the Ministry of Works secured government facilities 
throughout the northwestern islands by installing hurricane shutters and plywood 
(Bahamas Ministry of Public Works, 2005; NEMA, 2005).  NEMA reported that 
residents responded effectively to recommendations regarding the protection of 
homes (NEMA, 2005).  The data suggests the protection of private and 
government property was recognized early and carried out with no notable 
problems in response to Hurricane Wilma. 
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 7 (Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and 
Resources)   
 ESF 7 Relief Supplies and Distribution coordinated the mobilization of 
emergency personnel and resources (NEMA, 2002).  NEMA, with support from 
the RBDF, Ministry of Finance, Public Hospitals Authority, Ministry of 
Transportation and Aviation, Ministry of Works and Utilities, and the Department 
of Social Services activated the National EOC to coordinate assets in an effort to 
successfully respond to immediate emergency needs generated by Wilma 
(NEMA, 2005).  A partial activation of the national EOC occurred on the morning 
of October 22nd and was fully staffed and operational in response to Wilma 
twenty-four hours later (NEMA, 2005).  All agencies and organizations were put 
on alert the early morning of October 22nd and notified of the potential full 
activation of the EOC.  A few key players, such as the Department of 
Meteorology and the RBDF were activated on the 22nd and staffed the EOC in 
coordination with NEMA (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2005; NEMA, 
2005; RBDF, 2005).   
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 Once the EOC was fully activated agency liaisons reported to the Churchill 
Building in Nassau and quickly established lines of communication with their 
respective agency as well as with their Family Island contacts.  This coordination 
allowed for the sharing of information throughout the EOC, facilitating the 
matching of needs with available resources (NEMA, 2005).  NEMA effectively 
mobilized emergency personnel and resources quickly assessing the need and 
implementing procedures with no notable problems.  
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 8 (Assessing the Damage)   
 ESF 3, Public Works and Engineering coordinated all damage 
assessment activities in response to Wilma (NEMA, 2005).  The Ministry of 
Works and Utilities was the lead agency responsible with strong support from 
The Bahamas Electricity Corporation, The Bahamas Telecommunication 
Company, Water and Sewerage Corporation, BEST Commission, and the 
Department of Environmental Health (Bahamas Ministry of Public Works, 2005).  
The same damage assessment teams that had been established during 
Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne were again utilized.  The use of these teams 
allowed for consistency in reporting and streamlined information flow (Bahamas 
Ministry of Public Works, 2005; NEMA, 2005).  The coordination of damage 
assessment was very successful in providing a comprehensive representation of 
the situation on the ground.  It further allowed for a quick response and effective 
matching of assets and needs.  
 International assistance was also provided by USAID and the International 
Red Cross.  All preliminary damage assessments were completed within 48 
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hours of Wilma passing over Grand Bahama (NEMA, 2005).  The coordinated 
effort allowed for a timely and appropriate response.  Thus, the need for damage 
assessment was recognized early, and the function was executed with few 
problems.    
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management 
Activities)   
 Hurricane Wilma was the third national disaster response operation 
coordinated by NEMA.  Having fully implemented the CEM system and the 
national response plan NEMA was well equipped and trained to coordinate 
emergency management activities.  The national EOC was successfully activated 
with well established communication lines between NEMA and The Family 
Islands (NEMA, 2005).  Information flow was insured through regularly published 
situation reports and media briefings (Bahamas Department of Meteorology; 
NEMA, 2005).  All of these activities facilitated centralized sharing of information 
and coordinated service deliver.  Thus the coordination of emergency 
management activities in response to Hurricane Wilma was recognized early and 
implemented with few problems.    
Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 10 (Restoring Essential Public Services)   
 According to the National Response Plan, ESF 1: Transportation, ESF 2: 
Communication, and ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering, were responsible for 
coordinating the restoration of essential public services following Hurricane 
Wilma (NEMA, 2005).  The Ministry of Transport and Aviation, The Royal 
Bahamas Police Force, and The Ministry of Works and Utilities were the lead 
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agencies coordinating this functional response (NEMA, 2005).  The main 
challenge to the restoration of services was flooding in Grand Bahama (Bahamas 
Department of Meteorology, 2005).  Essential services were delayed in areas 
that experienced extreme flooding or suffered damage requiring the rebuilding of 
infrastructure (BEC, 2005; BTC 2005).   
 Immediately following the completion of Hurricane Wilma preliminary 
damage assessment reports ESF 1, 2, and 3 worked together to prioritize the 
restoration of services (NEMA, 2005).  Minor outages or interruptions to services 
in the Central and Northwest Bahamas were brought back on line within 72 hours 
of the passage of Wilma.  The restoration of essential public services was both 
recognized early and implemented without any major problems.  
4.2.1.7 Criterion One Summary  
 Referring back to Table 4.3, a complete examination of each of the ten 
generic functions as they apply to the six study hurricanes reveals an interesting 
pattern.  What emerges is a clear improvement in the early recognition of each of 
the ten functions.  Based on the data, this improvement can be associated with 
the implementation of a CEM system in 2002.  The development of a national 
response plan that outlined responsibility and standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) for each of the functions prior an event enabled The Bahamas to more 
quickly identify critical functions and needs.  The plan however, did not always 
result in each function being carried-out effectively although there was a noted 
improvement in post-cem response operations. 
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 Testing of Quarantelli’s methodology reveals a lack of detailed evaluation 
criteria for the ten generic functions can allow for subjective interpretation.  This 
can also lead to difficulty when attempting to compare response operations.  The 
metric needs to be better refined to ensure consistent application to reduce 
interpretation errors.   
4.2.2 Criterion Two: Effectively Mobilizing Personnel and Resources 
Similar to generic function seven, criterion two of Quarantelli’s 
methodology is effectively7 mobilizing personnel and resources.  Table 4.10 
displays the results of criterion two as it was applied to the six study hurricanes. 
A detailed description and supporting data for the responses in Table 4.10 are 
provided in Table 4.11 and sections 4.2.2.1 – 4.2.2.6. 
Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six 
Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Two 
 Pre-CEM Post-CEM 
 Andrew 
1992 
Floyd 
1999 
Michelle 
2001 
Frances 
2004 
Jeanne 
2004 
Wilma 
2005 
Effectively Mobilizing 
Personnel and 
Resources 
No No No No Yes Yes 
Table 4.10 - Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to 
the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Two 
4.2.2.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Two: Effectively Mobilizing 
Personnel and Resources  
 In response to Hurricane Andrew effective mobilization of personnel and 
resources did not occur.  As highlighted previously during the review of the 
                                                 
7 “Effective means that a desired and intended result has been produced; this definition differs 
from that of efficiency which requires that the results be obtained in the best possible way” 
(Quarantelli, 1997a:43). 
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generic functions, the response operation, commanded by the RBDF, did not 
coordinate national assets to manage the disaster.  A decentralized response to 
disaster-generated needs lead to multiple agencies conducting simultaneous 
operation in a disjointed manner.  As a result needed personnel and resources 
were not identified quickly or brought to bear accordingly (Office of the Prime 
Minister, 1992, Bethel 2006).     
Criterion Two:  Effectively Mobilizing Personnel and Resources 
Pre-CEM Post-CEM  
Andrew 
1992 
Floyd 
1999 
Michelle 
2001 
Frances 
2004 
Jeanne 
2004 
Wilma 
2005 
Q1. Were the 
Needed personnel 
and resources 
identified well in the 
crisis? 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Q2. Were they 
located quickly and 
brought to bear 
correctly? 
No No No No Yes Yes 
Q3. Were they 
appropriate to the 
problems generated 
by the disaster 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Table 4.11 – Criterion Two: Effectively Mobilizing Personnel and Resources 
4.2.2.2 Hurricane Floyd Criterion Two:  Effectively Mobilizing Personnel 
and Resources 
 In response to Hurricane Floyd effective mobilization of personnel and 
resources did not occur.  Through discussions with NEMA staff members Gayle 
Outten-Moncur (2007b) and Luke Bethel (2006) needed personnel and resources 
were not identified quickly during the response period.  Due to the decentralized 
nature of the response, agencies and organizations responded without a clear 
understanding of critical needs or available assets.  Multiple damage 
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assessments were conducted (Outten-Moncur 2006a) but without a mechanism 
to share the information necessary resources and personnel could not be 
brought to bear correctly.   
 To compound the issue, international donations were arriving at an 
accelerated pace (Ingraham, 1999).  Personnel and resources many times were 
not well matched to the needs of the nation or logistically could not be delivered 
to residents in need (Bethel, 2006).  It took several weeks to establish a formal 
flow of information that would allow residents to seek assistance and for The 
Bahamas government to adequately move resources into the appropriate impact 
areas (Glinton, 2006).   
4.2.2.3 Hurricane Michelle Criterion Two:  Mobilize Personnel and 
Resources Effectively 
 As with Andrew and Floyd, effective mobilization of personnel and 
resources in response to Hurricane Michelle did not occur.  Michelle made 
landfall on the Island of New Providence and the impact on the functioning of 
government caused difficulty in mobilizing personnel and resources (Office of the 
Prime Minister, 2001).  Mobilization of personnel in response to Hurricane 
Michelle was very difficult since many residents were responding to needs at 
their own home (Davis, 2006).  Also compounding problems with resources was 
the decentralized emergency response by a variety of agencies and 
organizations.  A clear understanding of critical needs was not achieved.  Without 
this, resources were not able to be moved into the most critical areas.   
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4.2.2.4 Hurricane Frances Criterion Two:  Mobilize Personnel and 
Resources Effectively 
 In response to Hurricane Frances, effective mobilization of personnel and 
resources did not fully occur (NEMA, 2004a).  Needed personnel and resources 
were identified well during the first part of the crisis period.  However, Hurricane 
Frances impacted the entire archipelago leaving the nation under direct impact 
from a category 4 hurricane for over 72 hours.  NEMA served as the lead agency 
responsible for coordinating the mobilization of emergency personnel and 
resources under ESF 7 (NEMA, 2002).     
 The mobilization of personnel and the delivery of essential resources were 
hindered significantly when communication between the islands failed (Hughey, 
2004b; BTC 2004).  RBDF personnel had been stationed throughout the family 
islands with satellite telephones prior to Frances impact.  Satellite phones had 
also been provided to the Family Island Administrators to ensure communication 
with NEMA.  However, due to operator error and a lack of training, many of the 
satellite phones were useless (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004).  This resulted in 
misappropriation of resources.  A combinations of errors and issues prevented 
resources from being brought to bear correctly and quickly (NEMA, 2004).   
4.2.2.5 Hurricane Jeanne Criterion Two:  Mobilize Personnel and 
Resources Effectively 
 In response to Hurricane Jeanne, effective mobilization of personnel and 
resources did occur, due in part to Hurricane Frances (Hughey, 2004b; Outten-
Moncur, 2006b).  The National EOC had been fully operational since September 
1st and remained functioning in response to Hurricane Jeanne.  Already existing 
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agency liaisons remained at the EOC improving the movement of critical 
personnel (NEMA, 2004b; NEMA, 2004c).  Established lines of communication 
between the National EOC, agency representative, and Family Island 
Administrators were well established and functioning effectively (Hughey, 2004b; 
NEMA, 2004b).   
 Resources had been inventoried during response to Frances and allowed 
for the quick mobilization of assets.  Communication issues that had plagued 
response to Hurricane Frances were addressed through onsite training prior to 
Jeanne’s landfall (NEMA, 2004b).   
“I traveled to many of the Family Islands and trained them on the use of 
Satellite Phones (Rigby, 2006).” 
Additionally assets such as food and water were staged in Grand Bahama in 
anticipation of Jeanne (NEMA, 2004b; NEMA, 2004c).  Application of the 
evaluation criteria insinuates that the need for the mobilization of emergency 
personnel and resources was recognized early and carried out effectively in 
response to Hurricane Jeanne.    
4.2.2.6 Hurricane Wilma Criterion Two:  Mobilize Personnel and Resources 
Effectively 
 Effective mobilization of personnel and resources did occur in response to 
Hurricane Wilma.  Needed personnel and resources were identified well during 
the first part of the crisis period when an alert was issued to all agencies and 
organizations active in disaster response (NEMA, 2005).  NEMA served as the 
lead agency responsible for coordinating the mobilization of emergency 
personnel and resources under ESF 7 (NEMA, 2002; NEMA, 2005).   
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 Through the activation of the National EOC the mobilization of personnel 
and resources was achieved (NEMA 2005).  Communication issues that had 
created problems in response to previous hurricanes were addressed through 
coordination with the RBDF, The Bahamas Telecommunication Company, and 
NEMA.  The coordination between agencies allowed for the successful 
mobilization of personnel and resources in response to Hurricane Wilma.   
“By the time Wilma impacted us, everyone know what to do and the 
response ran smoothly” (Outten-Moncur, 2006b).    
4.2.2.7 Criterion Two Summary 
 As previously displayed in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 an improvement in the 
effective mobilization of personnel and resources occurred following the 
implementation of a CEM system.  As with criterion one, an association with the 
improvement in the function and the development of a national emergency 
response plan is noted.  The development of a response plan outlined activities 
and procedures that facilitated the government’s ability to locate and bring to 
bear the correct personnel and resources in an appropriate way.  It is also 
important to note that the association between CEM and improvements in 
criterion two do not rule out the potential impact or importance that experience 
may have played in noted improvements to response operations. 
4.2.3 Criterion Three:  Allow The Adequate Processing of Information 
 This criterion focuses less on the technology utilized to ensure 
communication but rather places the emphasis on the content of what, when and 
to whom the information was made available.  Tables 4.12 displays the research 
findings for criterion three as they apply to the six study hurricanes. An 
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improvement in information processing is noted after the implementation of CEM. 
A detailed description and supporting data for the responses in Table 4.12 are 
provided in Table 4.13 and sections 4.2.3.1 – 4.2.3.6.  
 
Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Management of Disaster Response Operations 
to the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Three 
 Pre-CEM Post-CEM 
 Andrew 
1992 
Floyd 
1999 
Michelle 
2001 
Frances 
2004 
Jeanne 
2004 
Wilma 
2005 
Adequately 
processing 
information 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Table 4.12 - Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to 
the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Three 
 
Criterion Three:  Allow the Adequate Processing of Information 
Pre-CEM Post-CEM Allowed for the 
adequate processing 
of information… Andrew 1992 
Floyd 
1999 
Michelle 
2001 
Frances 
2004 
Jeanne 
2004 
Wilma 
2005 
Q1. within every 
responding 
organization 
___ ___ ___ Yes Yes Yes 
Q2. between 
organization No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Q3. From citizens to 
organizations ___ ___ No Yes Yes Yes 
Q4. from 
organizations to 
citizens 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 4.13 – Application of Criterion Three: Allow the Adequate Processing of 
Information 
 
4.2.3.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Three: Allow the Adequate 
Processing of Information 
Table 4.14 displays the research findings for criterion three as they apply 
to Hurricane Andrew.  Not enough data existed to determine if adequate 
processing of information was occurring within every responding organization.   
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According to interviews with NEMA staff and informal discussions with members 
of the RBDF, there was very little information sharing between organizations 
during the response phase.   
“During Andrew we [Ministry of Social Services] were not aware of what 
other ministries’ were doing” (Glinton, 2006)  
The status of information processing from citizens and organizations was not 
able to be determined.  During the response phase of Hurricane Andrew a formal 
line of communication between citizens and response organizations was not 
identified.  Emergency police and fire phone numbers did exist, however, 
telephone lines in the central and northwestern islands were down.  Additionally, 
no direct communication lines were established to address exclusively hurricane 
generated needs.   
 The Department of Meteorology had a strong line of communication 
established with citizens through The Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas.  
ZNS provided regular information to the public regarding hurricane warnings.  
Archival research showed that newspaper articles notified residents of shelter 
locations, however the articles appeared after Andrew made landfall.  Therefore, 
applying the evaluation process developed by Quarantelli (1997a) it becomes 
apparent that processing of information in response to Hurricane Andrew was not 
adequate.  
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Evaluation of Hurricane Andrew 
Information Processing 
Allow the adequate processing of 
information… Yes/No 
Within every responding organization ---  
Between organizations No 
From citizens to organizations --- 
From organizations to citizens Yes 
Table 4.14 – Evaluation of Hurricane Andrew Information Processing 
 
4.2.3.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Three: Allow the Adequate 
Processing of Information 
According to interviews with NEMA staff, informal discussion with 
members of the RBDF as well as information obtained through after-action 
documents, adequate information sharing between organizations did not occur 
(Water and Sewerage Corporation 1999; Lightbourne and Dean, 1999; Bethel, 
2006; Outten-Moncur, 2006b).   
“Ensuring quick access to information through improved communication 
is a priority for the government and something that is being address” 
(Ingraham, 1999:92).   
“In response to Hurricane Floyd, as with Andrew, we [Ministry of Social 
Services] were not made aware of how other ministries’ were responding” 
(Glinton, 2006)  
Data were not available to determine if there was adequate processing of 
information within every organization responding to Hurricane Floyd.  Limited 
data relating to the status of information processing from citizens to 
organizations.  During the response phase of Hurricane Floyd a formal line of 
communication between citizens and response organizations was not identified.  
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Emergency police and fire phone numbers as with Andrew existed but with 
damage to phone lines down in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane 
communication was limited. Additionally, no direct communication lines were 
established to address exclusively hurricane generated needs (Rigby, 2006).   
 A strong line of communication between the response organizations and 
the citizens of The Bahamas existed through The Broadcasting Corporation of 
The Bahamas.  ZNS provided regular information to the public regarding 
hurricane warnings and shelter locations.  As with Hurricane Andrew, 
Meteorologist Basil Dean provided regular updates on the status of the storm 
broadcast on ZNS radio and television (Dean and Rolle, 1999).  
 Applying the available data to Quarantelli’s methodology (Table 4.15) 
indicates that the adequate processing of information did not take place during 
response to Hurricane Floyd in 1999.   
Evaluation of Hurricane Floyd 
Information Processing 
Allow the adequate processing of 
information.. Yes/No 
Within every responding organization ---  
Between organizations No 
From citizens to organizations --- 
From organizations to citizens Yes 
Table 4.15 – Evaluation of Hurricane Floyd Information Processing  
4.2.3.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Three: Allow the Adequate 
Processing of Information 
This researcher was unable to determine based available data the status 
of information flow within every responding organizations.  Interview data suggest 
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that processing of information between agencies did not take place.  The 
Hurricane Michelle report issued by the office of the Prime Minister (2001) also 
supports challenges associated with information flow between agencies.  Service 
deliver was delayed as a result of inadequate communication between 
organizations.   
 As with the previous two storms formal lines of communication between 
citizens and response organizations were not identified.  Emergency police and 
fire phone numbers were available however, telephone lines were down in the 
immediate aftermath rendering communication non-existent. Additionally, no 
direct communication lines were established to address exclusively hurricane 
generated needs.   
Evaluation of Hurricane Michelle 
Information Processing 
Allow the adequate processing of 
information.. Yes/No 
Within every responding organization --- 
Between organizations No 
From citizens to organizations No 
From organizations to citizens Yes 
Table 4.16 – Evaluation of Hurricane Michelle Information Processing 
 A strong line of communication between the response organizations and 
the citizens of The Bahamas was made available through ZNS.  ZNS provided 
regular information to the public regarding hurricane warnings, shelter 
information and public safety concerns.   
 Based on the results displayed in Table 4.16, and applying the evaluation 
process developed by Quarantelli (1997a) as discussed in the methodology 
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(chapter 3) of this document it is clear that adequate processing of information 
did not take place during response to Hurricane Michelle. 
4.2.3.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Three:  Allow the Adequate 
Processing of Information 
Hurricane Frances was the first hurricane to impact The Bahamas 
following the implementation of CEM.  Data obtained from Official NEMA 
situation reports, interviews with NEMA staff members, and personal 
observations indicate that organizations were adequately processing information 
internally.  A strong communication line had been established between the EOC 
to each of the agencies and organizations active in disaster response (Hughey, 
2004b).  The respective agencies had EOC liaisons which provided a link 
allowing for the sharing of information (NEMA, 2004a).  Based on the response 
activities generated, it appears that the organizations were able to adequately 
process information in an effort to meet immediate emergency needs. 
 The activation of the national EOC and the presence of EOC 
agency/organization representatives allowed for the sharing of information 
between groups.  A centralized location, regularly scheduled briefings, and 
detailed situation reports allowed for the coordination of resources between 
organizations to meet the needs of residents (NEMA, 2004a).     
 A line of communication between citizens to the national EOC was also 
established through an EOC phone number (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004a).  
The lines were manned and requests for assistance were coordinated from the 
national office to the local island administrator.  Strong lines of communication 
also existed between NEMA and the citizens through the media with regularly 
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scheduled briefings.  NEMA established a media briefing room and provided 
updates to the public four times a daily.  The media briefings were very 
successful in educating the public on the impact of Hurricane Frances and how 
most effectively to seek assistance if needed (NEMA, 2004a). (See Pictures 4.11 
and 4.12) 
 Based on the results displayed in Table 4.17, adequate processing of 
information did take place during response to Hurricane Frances in 2004. 
Evaluation of Hurricane Frances 
Information Processing 
Allow the adequate processing of 
information.. Yes/No 
Within every responding organization Yes  
Between organizations Yes 
From citizens to organizations Yes 
From organizations to citizens Yes 
Table 4.17 – Evaluation of Hurricane Frances Information Processing  
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Picture 4.11 – Hurricane Frances Regularly Scheduled Media Briefings, Mr. Carl 
Smith, Director of The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency.  
(Source: Erin Hughey) 
 
 
Picture 4.12 – Hurricane Frances Regularly Scheduled Media Briefings, 
Department of Meteorology and the Port Authority.  (Source: Erin Hughey) 
4.2.3.5 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion Three:  Allow the Adequate 
Processing of Information 
Data from official NEMA situation reports, interviews with NEMA staff 
members, and personal observations indicate that organizations were adequately 
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processing information internally. Communication between ministries and 
organizations responding to Jeanne and the National EOC were well functioning.  
Agency liaisons were present in the EOC and provided an avenue to share 
information (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b).  During shift changes and internal 
EOC briefings each organization provided reports on key shared information as it 
related to organizational operations.  Based on the response activities generated 
it appears that the organizations were able to adequately process information in 
an effort to meet immediate emergency needs (Hughey, 2004b). 
 A line of communication between citizens to the national EOC was also 
established through an EOC hotline (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA 2004c).  The lines 
were manned and requests for assistance were coordinated from the national 
office to the local Island Administrator.  Strong lines of communication also 
existed between NEMA and the citizens through the media with regularly 
scheduled briefings (NEMA, 2004b; NEMA 2004c).  Based on the results in 
Table 4.18 which display the results of the evaluation process as discussed in 
Chapter 3 of this document, it suggests that adequate processing of information 
did take place during response to Hurricane Jeanne 2004.   
Evaluation of Hurricane Jeanne 
Information Processing 
Allow the adequate processing of 
information.. Yes/No 
Within every responding organization Yes  
Between organizations Yes 
From citizens to organizations Yes 
From organizations to citizens Yes 
Table 4.18 – Evaluation of Hurricane Jeanne Information Processing 
 179
 
4.2.3.6 Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion Three:  Allow the Adequate 
Processing of Information 
 
Data from Hurricane Wilma situation reports issued by NEMA (2005) as 
well as data obtained through interviews with NEMA staff, showed that 
organizations adequately processed information internally.  A strong 
communication line was established between NEMA and support agencies 
through the national EOC (NEMA, 2005).  These lines were first established with 
the implementation of CEm and later tested during response to Hurricanes 
Frances and Jeanne.  NEMA also held regularly schedule briefings before and 
after shift changes as well as provided up-dated situation reports to facilitate 
information flow (NEMA, 2005).  Response agencies had EOC liaisons available 
to allow for information sharing.  Based on the response activities generated, 
organizations were able to adequately process information in an effort to meet 
immediate emergency needs.  
Evaluation of Hurricane Wilma 
Information Processing 
Allow the adequate processing of 
information.. Yes/No 
Within every responding organization Yes  
Between organizations Yes 
From citizens to organizations Yes 
From organizations to citizens Yes 
Table 4.19 – Evaluation of Hurricane Wilma Information Processing 
 A communication hotline for citizens was established at the national EOC 
(NEMA, 2005).  The phone line was manned by NEMA support staff and 
volunteers and allowed citizens the opportunity to both report and obtain critical 
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emergency information.  Strong lines of communication also existed between 
NEMA and the citizens through the media with regularly scheduled briefings.  As 
with response to Frances and Jeanne, NEMA established a media briefing room 
to provide information and updates to the public four times a day.  The media 
briefings were very successful in educating the public on the impact of Hurricane 
Wilma as well as provide critical information regarding how best to seek 
assistance if needed.  Based on the results displayed in Table 4.19, adequate 
processing of information took place in response to Hurricane Wilma 2005.   
4.2.3.7 Criterion Three Summary  
 Referring back to Table 4.13, a consistent pattern of improvement in the 
processing of information following the implementation of CEM is noted.  
Planning to develop clear lines of communication between citizens, the 
government, and response agencies allowed for faster and more accurate 
processing of information and improved response operations.  Experience and 
improved recording keeping may also be associated with the improvement in 
information flow and should not be discarded as a contributing factor to the 
improvement in the processing of information in all four categories. 
4.2.4 Criterion Four: Permit the Proper Exercise of Decision-Making 
 As outlined in chapter three, the problems associated with decision-
making are usually associated with four key areas: 
5. Loss of higher-echelon personnel because of overwork. 
6. Conflict over responsibility for new disaster tasks. 
7. Clashes over organizational domains between established and 
emergent groups. 
8. Surfacing of organizational jurisdictional differences. 
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Table 4.20 displays the research findings for criterion four as they apply to the six 
study hurricanes.  An improvement in exercising decision-making is noted in 
response to Hurricane Wilma.  A detailed description and supporting data for the 
responses in Table 4.20 can be found in sections 4.2.4.1 - 4.2.4.6.  
 
Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six 
Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Four 
 Pre-CEM Post-CEM 
 Andrew 
1992 
Floyd 
1999 
Michelle 
2001 
Frances 
2004 
Jeanne 
2004 
Wilma 
2005 
Permit the Properly 
Exercising Decision-
Making; 
No No No No No Yes 
Table 4.20 - Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to 
the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Four 
 
4.2.4.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Four:  Permit the Proper Exercise 
of Decision-Making 
 During Hurricane Andrew the usual chain-of-command and lines-of-
authority were in place and functioning.   Direct lines of communication to the 
Office of the Prime Minister existed between The RBDF and Government 
Ministers.  The problem with exercising proper decision-making resided not with 
the line of communication, but the format and timing of information with which 
high-echelon personnel could make decisions.  During the examination of 
criterion one generic functions, it was noted that Ministry specific damage 
assessment reports were conducted independently and utilized a variety of 
different criteria for classification.  This created confusion about the extent of 
damage and slowed the critical response and recovery decision-making process. 
Furthermore, regularly scheduled reporting was not required at the time of 
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Andrew preventing timely decision-making and delayed service delivery.  The 
Data do not suggest any conflicts over responsibility for new disaster tasks or 
clashes over organizational domains existed in response to Hurricane Andrew.  
The decentralized response did result in delays associated with information flow, 
slowing the decision-making process.   
4.2.4.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Four:  Permit the Proper Exercise of 
Decision-Making 
As with Andrew, during Floyd the usual chain-of-command and lines-of-
authority were in place and functioning.  The RBDF and the Government 
Ministers had direct lines of communication to the Office of the Prime Minister 
(Office of the Prime Minister, 1999).  The problem with exercising proper 
decision-making resided not with the line of communication but the format and 
timing of information on which high-echelon personnel could make decisions.  
Conflicting damage assessment reports that utilized different criteria prevented 
decision-makers from having a clear understanding of the situation on the ground 
(Bethel, 2006).  According to informal discussions with members of the police 
and Defence Force regularly scheduled reporting was not required and 
prevented timely decision making and delayed the delivery of response services.   
“We [RBDF] were in the field distributing supplies where needed.  At no 
time am I aware of reporting out to anyone other than our officer in 
charge.  As I mentioned earlier, there were many different central points 
of control, I was always trying to determine the line of authority” (Bethel, 
2006). 
 No formal records of conflict over response phase responsibilities were 
found during this research.  However, based on informal discussions with island 
administrators and officials from a variety of government agencies it appears that 
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uncertainty regarding fiscal responsibility was of major concern.  In an effort to 
preserve agency budgets many organizational leaders were hesitant to spend 
their scarce funds.  Uncertainty regarding potential reimbursement or fear of 
misusing government funds also caused delays.  Application of Quarantelli’s 
criteria indicates that at the very least proper decision-making was delayed by 
inadequate processing of information.   
4.2.4.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Four:  Permit the Proper Exercise 
of Decision-Making 
During Hurricane Michelle as in the previous two hurricanes examined the 
usual chain-of-command and lines-of-authority were in place and functioning.  
The RBDF and the Government Ministers had direct lines of communication to 
the Office of the Prime Minister (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001).  The problem 
with exercising proper decision-making resided not with the line of 
communication but the format and timing of information on which high-echelon 
personnel could make decisions (Smith, 2006).   
 The same challenges associated with Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd were 
identified in the response to Hurricane Michelle.  Conflicting damage assessment 
reports and changing criteria for evaluation prevented decision-makers from 
having a clear understanding of the situation on the ground (Office of the Prime 
Minister, 2001).  Additionally, regularly scheduled reporting did not take place 
preventing timely decision-making.  Also important to note is the impact Michelle 
had on the Island of New Providence and government offices.  Most businesses 
and government offices were closed for several days adding to delays and 
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difficulties in processing information.  Based on the data it appears that proper 
decision-making was prevented by inadequate processing of information.   
4.2.4.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Four:  Permit the Proper Exercise 
of Decision-Making 
During Hurricane Frances the usual chain-of-command and lines-of-
authority were in place and functioning as outlined in the national response plan.  
With the introduction of a national emergency management agency and a 
national disaster response plan, the direct lines of communication were clearly 
spelled out (NEMA 2002).  However, as pointed out by Quarantelli (1997a) the 
problems associated with decision-making are usually not because of a 
breakdown in communication but rather problems associated with the following 
four key areas: (1) loss of high-echelon personnel because of overwork; (2) 
conflict over responsibility for new disaster tasks; (3) clashes over organizational 
domains between established and emergent groups; (4) surfacing of 
organizational jurisdictional differences. 
 The response to Hurricane Frances experienced a significant level of high-
echelon personnel who were overworked and unable to make decisions 
(Hughey, 2004b).  Because Frances impacted the Bahamas for over 72 hours, 
EOC staff members worked around the clock with little or no breaks.  Due to 
limited staffing, shifts could not be established which lead to persons being over 
worked, leading to irritability, arguments, and poor decision making (NEMA, 
2004a). 
 Compounded by lack of sleep and a very stressful working environment, 
internal conflict over responsibilities did take place among EOC staff members 
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(Hughey, 2004b).  All conflicts were eventually resolved but did impact decision 
making for a period of time. In response to Hurricane Frances clashes over 
organizational domains between established and emergent groups did not occur.  
Due to the small population within the Bahamas and the remoteness of many of 
the islands, new emergent groups did not develop.  The surfacing of 
organizational jurisdictional differences also did not occur in response to 
Hurricane Frances (NEMA, 2004a).  The data suggests that proper decision-
making was impacted most significantly by the loss of high-echelon personnel 
because of overwork. 
4.2.4.5 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion Four:  Permit the Proper Exercise 
of Decision-Making 
During Hurricane Jeanne, as with the previous four hurricanes that have 
been evaluated, the usual chain-of-command and lines-of-authority were in place 
and functioning.  However, with two hurricanes impacting the nation within three 
weeks the response to Hurricane Jeanne experienced a significant level of high-
echelon personnel who were overworked and unable to make decisions 
(Hughey, 2004b).  Due to exhaustion and stress, both poor decision making 
occurred as well as conflicts over responsibilities took place.   
“You are exhausted and it makes it difficult to be effective, you need to go 
home and take break, that is what happened in 2004 with Frances and 
Jeanne” (Otten-Moncur, 2006b). 
 There were no reported clashes over organizational domains between 
established and emergent groups in response to Jeanne.  The surfacing of 
organizational jurisdictional differences also did not occur in response to 
Hurricane Jeanne (Hughey, 2004b).  Proper decision-making was impacted most 
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significantly by the loss of high-echelon personnel because of stress and 
exhaustion (Hughey, 2004b).  Quarantelli’s evaluation criteria suggest that proper 
decision making did not occur in response to Hurricane Jeanne.  The same or 
similar problems experienced during response to Hurricane Frances were also 
experienced during Jeanne.   
4.2.4.6 Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion Four:  Permit the Proper Exercise 
of Decision-Making 
During Hurricane Wilma the usual chain-of-command and lines-of-
authority were in place and functioning.  To avoid the same problems that had 
been experience during response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne, NEMA 
required 12-hour shifts to help reduce exhaustion and down or overworked 
personnel (NEMA, 2005).   
 The very stressful working environment, did create some internal conflicts 
but they were quickly resolved and according to NEMA staff did not impact their 
ability to make decision effectively (Glinton, 2006; Outten-Moncur, 2007a).  There 
were no clashes over organizational domains nor were there any jurisdiction 
disputes (Outten-Moncur, 2007a).  Thus, during response to Hurricane Wilma, 
the National EOC was able to effectively exercise proper decision-making.   
4.2.4.7 Criterion Four Summary 
 Referring back to Table 4.20, no pattern of improvement is noted following 
the implementation of CEM.  Response operations to Hurricanes Frances and 
Jeanne experienced the same problems that pre-CEM response experienced.  
Improvements in the proper exercising of decision-making noted in response to 
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Hurricane Wilma appear to be associated with experience rather then a change 
in the fundamental management strategy of disaster response.  
4.2.5 Criterion Five:  Focus on the Development of Overall Coordination 
 Criterion five focuses on the critical function of coordination.  Table 4.21 
displays the research findings for criterion five as they apply to the six study 
hurricanes.  A marked improvement in overall response coordination is seen after 
the implementation of CEM. A detailed description and supporting data for the 
responses in Table 4.21 can be found in sections 4.2.5.1 – 4.2.5.6.  
Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six 
Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Five 
 Pre-CEM Post-CEM 
 Andrew 
1992 
Floyd 
1999 
Michelle 
2001 
Frances 
2004 
Jeanne 
2004 
Wilma 
2005 
Focus on the 
Development of 
Overall Coordination 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Table 4.21 – Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to 
the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Five 
4.2.5.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Five: Focus on the Development 
of Overall Coordination 
A military response was generated to address Hurricane Andrew needs.  
With no official agency responsible for emergency management the RBDF 
established ‘command’ and provided assistance.  This structure produced a 
disjointed operation that did not allow for a coordinated civil / military response.  
An operation center was established by the Defence Force to coordinate the 
logistics of their response.  The operation center did not facilitate the coming 
together of all agencies and organizations active in disaster response.  As a 
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result the facilitation of information and the synchronization of critical functions 
did not occur.   
“2003 [in preparation for Hurricane Isabel] was the first time a national 
EOC was activated.  Prior to that the Police and Defence Force would 
coordination their own activities independent of one another” (Outten-
Moncur, 2006a). 
4.2.5.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Five:  Focus on the Development of 
Overall Coordination 
Official Hurricane Floyd disaster response operations were managed by 
the RBDF.  As with Andrew a ‘command and control’ style response was 
implemented which did not facilitate a cooperative or comprehensive 
arrangement for all agencies needed to respond to a major disaster such as 
Floyd.  A national emergency operations center was established at the Office of 
The Prime Minister led by Commander Steven Russell, however it lacked the 
contributions of other national and international organizations responding 
(Ingraham, 1999).  To compound this issue, no family island EOC’s were opened 
to facilitate the movement of emergency response information (Bethel, 2006).  
 The disjointed response operation prevented the synchronization of critical 
functions that required a variety of organizations.  For example, the movement of 
water required the RBDF ships to transport goods, but the port department and 
ministry of works also were needed to coordinate delivery to areas that could 
receive the ships due to damage to infrastructure.  Once the goods arrive the 
movement from the port to a distribution center again required coordination with 
the Bahamas Red Cross and the Ministry of Social Services in an effort to 
provide the goods to residents that were in need.  Without a clear avenue to 
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communicate with all of these agencies severe delays in the delivery of services 
occurred (Outten-Moncur, 2006b).   
“…the Police and Defence Force would coordination their own activities 
independent of one another” (Outten-Moncur, 2006a). 
The data as it was applied to Quaranteilli’s (1997a) methodology indicates that 
overall response coordination and the synchronization of critical functions did not 
occur 
4.2.5.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Five:  Focus on the Development 
of Overall Coordination 
As with Andrew and Floyd, Hurricane Michelle disaster response 
operations were ‘commanded’ by the RBDF.  Again the command and control 
structure did not facilitate a cooperative or comprehensive arrangement for all 
agencies responding.  An EOC was established at the Cabinet Office but was 
staffed by only Defence Force personnel (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001).  
The lack of interaction between all agencies required to respond prevented 
successful coordination and synchronization of critical functions that required a 
variety of organizations (Bethel, 2006, Outten-Moncur, 2006b).  Further 
preventing the development of overall coordination was a missing avenue of 
communication to share information or request assistance (Smith, 2007a).   
4.2.5.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Five:  Focus on the Development 
of Overall Coordination 
Hurricane Frances disaster response operations were managed by NEMA 
(NEMA, 2004a).  The national EOC was established in Nassau with Family 
Island EOC established in corresponding jurisdictions (NEMA, 2002).  This 
 190
cooperative and comprehensive arrangement allowed agencies and 
organizations to come together in a structured and coordinated way to provide 
necessary emergency response services.  
 As a result of the new coordination as outlined in the emergency response 
plan (2002), critical services such as the movement of food and water to 
impacted areas occurred effectively.  For example, the national EOC facilitated 
the coordination between ESF 11: Food and ESF 1: Transportation (NEMA, 
2004a).  This type of coordination did not occur in response to the other three 
hurricanes.  NEMA was able to locate national resources and coordinate with the 
necessary ministries ensuring the movement of assets to the affected Family 
Islands (NEMA, 2004).  Once assets arrived on the family islands, local EOC 
personal were prepared to coordinate the deliver of goods to those in need.  
NEMA was able to successfully ensure that immediate emergency needs were 
met through effective coordination of services (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA 2004a). 
4.2.5.5 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion Five: Focus on the Development 
of Overall Coordination 
Hurricane Jeanne response operations were also coordinated out of the 
National EOC, managed by NEMA and situated in Nassau (Hughey, 2004b; 
NEMA, 2004b; NEMA, 2004c).  Response operations to Jeanne benefited from 
Hurricane Frances with regards to coordination.  Despite depleted resources and 
tired staff, overall coordination was in place and functioning when the nation was 
impacted by Jeanne (Hughey, 2004b).   
 Coordination and response followed the guidelines as established in the 
national comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) (NEMA, 2002).  
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The established coordination system allowed for the coming together of response 
agencies to manage the deliver of services to residents.  As a result, critical 
service and immediate emergency needs were met.  Application of Quarantelli’s 
evaluation criteria indicate that overall coordination in response to Hurricane 
Jeanne was effective. 
4.2.5.6 Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion Five:  Focus on the Development 
of Overall Coordination 
Hurricane Wilma response operations were managed by NEMA through 
the national EOC (NEMA, 2005).  All agencies active in disaster were 
represented at the national EOC.  Family Island Administrators in the 
Northwestern Bahamas established corresponding jurisdictional EOC’s to 
coordinate response efforts.   
“The establishment of sub-NEMA’s on the Family Islands made it very 
easy to direct and coordinate the response” (Bethel, 2006). 
This cooperative and comprehensive arrangement between the national and 
island EOC’s facilitated the sharing of information and allowed for effective 
synchronization of response efforts (NEMA, 2005).  NEMA was able to 
successfully ensure that immediate emergency needs were met through planning 
and coordination of services. 
4.2.5.7 Criterion Five Summary 
Referring back to Table 4.21, a marked improvement in overall response 
coordination is seen after the implementation of CEM.  The key reason for this 
improvement is the development of a national response plan that required multi-
agency coordination over a two-year period prior to the impact of Frances.  This 
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coordination helped to facilitate a strong working relationship between ministries 
and established a successful environment for coordination when a disaster 
struck.   
4.2.6 Criterion Six:  Correctly Recognizing Differences Between Response and 
Agent-Generated Demands 
 
 Criterion six focuses on the importance of correctly recognizing the 
differences between response and agent-generated demands.   
Evaluation of Criterion Six: Correctly Recognizing Differences Between 
Response and Agent-Generated Demands 
 Pre-CEM Post-CEM 
 Andrew 
1992 
Floyd 
1999 
Michelle 
2001 
Frances 
2004 
Jeanne 
2004 
Wilma 
2005 
2. Effectively 
mobilizing 
personnel and 
resources; 
No No No No Yes Yes 
3. Adequately 
processing 
information; 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
4. Properly 
exercising 
decision-making; 
No No No No No Yes 
5. Developing 
overall 
coordination; 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
6. Correctly 
recognizing 
differences 
between 
response and 
agent-
generated 
demands; 
No No No No No Yes 
Table 4.22 - Evaluation of Criterion Six: Correctly Recognizing Differences 
Between Response and Agent-Generated Demands 
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Quarantelli (1997a) asserts, as outlined in chapter three that the correct 
recognition between agent- and response-generated demands can be 
determined if criteria two through five we answered in a positive way.  
Examination of Table 4.22, which summarizes criteria 2-5 indicates that only 
during response to Hurricane Wilma did emergency management officials 
correctly recognize the difference between response- and agent-generated 
demands. 
4.2.7 Criterion Seven:  Provide the Mass Communication System with 
Appropriate and Accurate Information 
 Criterion seven focuses on providing the mass communication system 
with appropriate and accurate information.  Table 4.23 shows the research 
findings as they apply to the six study hurricanes.  A clear pattern of 
improvement is shown during post-CEM response operations.  A detailed 
description and supporting data for the responses in Table 4.23 can be found in 
sections 4.2.7.1 – 4.2.7.6.  
 
Evaluation of Criterion Seven:  Provide the Mass Communication System with 
Appropriate and Accurate Information  
 Pre-CEM Post-CEM 
 Andrew 
1992 
Floyd 
1999 
Michelle 
2001 
Frances 
2004 
Jeanne 
2004 
Wilma 
2005 
Provide Appropriate 
and Accurate 
Reports for the 
News Media 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Table 4.23 - Evaluation of Criterion Seven:  Provide the Mass Communication 
System with Appropriate and Accurate Information 
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4.2.7.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Seven:  Provide Appropriate and 
Accurate Reports for the News Media 
A cooperative interaction between the Department of Meteorology and the 
media existed during response to Hurricane Andrew.  The Broadcasting 
Corporation of The Bahamas and the Department of Meteorology worked in 
close coordination to provided regular updates and warnings.  Meteorologist 
Basil Dean, remained on the air throughout the storm broadcasting over ZNS 
radio and television stations providing The Bahamas with hurricane updates 
(Dean and Rolle, 1992).  What was lacking was the interaction between all 
agencies active in disaster response and the media.  In 1992 there was no 
mechanism in place to facilitate regularly scheduled disaster briefings.  As a 
result limited information was being released to the public regarding response 
efforts.   
 The citizen’s belief and trust in the local media was not able to be 
determined by the available data.  The lack of information provided to the media 
for dissemination indicated that mass communication system were not provided 
with appropriate and accurate information.   
4.2.7.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Seven:  Provide Appropriate and 
Accurate Reports for the News Media 
A cooperative interaction between organizational and community officials 
and media, seems to have existed during response to Hurricane Floyd.  The 
Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas, in close coordination with The 
Department of Meteorology, provided regular updates and warnings regarding 
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Hurricane Floyd (Department of Meteorology, 1999).  As with Andrew, what were 
missing were regularly scheduled briefings by response organizations to the 
media.  There is no record of briefings being provided to the media through the 
emergency operation center or by the RBDF.   
 After reviewing newspaper archives there appears to be information from 
political representatives to the media regarding their support for recovery but little 
if any indication that response organizations were feeding the media critical 
response information.  The citizens’ belief and trust in the local media was not 
able to be determined with available data.  However, the lack of information 
being provided to the media for dissemination to the public indicates that mass 
communication system were not provided with the appropriate and accurate 
information related to the Hurricane Floyd response efforts.   
4.2.7.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Seven:  Provide Appropriate and 
Accurate Reports for the News Media 
A cooperative interaction between organizational and community officials 
and media, seems to have existed during response to Hurricane Michelle.  The 
Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas in close coordination with The 
Department of Meteorology (2001) provided regular updates and warnings 
regarding the status of Michelle.  As with the two previous response operations, 
there were no regularly scheduled briefings by response organizations to the 
media.  There is no record of briefings being provided to the media through the 
EOC or by the RBDF.   
 After reviewing newspaper archives there appears to be information 
directly related to the physical components of the storm as provided by the 
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Department of Meteorology (2001) but information on response information was 
lacking.  The citizen’s belief and trust in the local media was not able to be 
determined with available data.  However, the lack of information being provided 
to the media for dissemination to the public indicates that mass communication 
system were not provided with the appropriate and accurate information related 
to the Hurricane Michelle response efforts.   
4.2.7.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Seven:  Provide Appropriate and 
Accurate Reports for the News Media 
NEMA provided appropriate and accurate information to the news media 
using a structured and standardized approach(Hughey, 2004b).  ESF 5 Planning 
and Information, instituted regularly scheduled briefings as well as established 
the official position of public information officer (PIO) (NEMA, 2002; NEMA 
2004a).  The PIO was a skilled member of the Bahamas Information System 
trained to provide information to the media on the daily activities of government 
(Hughey; 2004b).  Working closely with the NEMA director, Mr. Carl Smith and 
top EOC management the PIO established briefings at 8:00am, 11:30am, 
5:00pm and 9:00pm (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA 2004a).  The briefings were held 
daily while the EOC was fully operational.  The times selected were just prior to 
the local news broadcasts allowing news agencies the opportunity to have the 
most updated information for residents.  The news media was notified by phone 
and fax of the scheduled briefings and were encouraged to attend.  The PIO 
additionally coordinated representatives from a variety of agencies to ensure 
accurate information was provided directly from the agencies to the news media 
(Hughey, 2004b).  This facilitated information flow from NEMA to the residents of 
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the Bahamas.  The PIO also addressed and provided information to international 
news outlets such as the BBC, NBC, CBS, and CNN upon request (Hughey, 
2004b; NEMA, 2004a).   
 The established briefings cemented NEMA as the national agency 
responsible for emergency management.  It was through cooperative interaction 
with media representatives that NEMA was able to ensure accurate information 
was being publicized.  Residents consistently received information on response 
and recovery efforts directly from NEMA (Hughey, 2004b).  As a result of this 
structured approach the mass communication systems were provided with the 
appropriate and accurate information related to the Hurricane Frances response 
efforts.   
4.2.7.5 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion Seven:  Provide Appropriate and 
Accurate Reports for the News Media 
 Response to Jeanne utilized the same approach employed during 
response to Frances.  Through the use of a PIO, ESF 5 Planning and 
Information, instituted regularly scheduled briefings.  Through close coordination 
with the NEMA director and support agency liaisons the PIO held open briefings 
for the media at 8:00am, 11:30am, 5:00pm and 9:00pm (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 
2002; NEMA, 2004b; NEMA, 2004c).  These daily briefings, which had been 
established during response to Hurricane Frances, provided the media with an 
opportunity to ask questions and provide the most updated information to 
residents.  As a result mass communication systems were provided with the 
appropriate and accurate information related to the Hurricane Jeanne response 
efforts (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004c).  Quarentelli’s evaluation criteria suggest 
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that the mass communication system was effectively provided with appropriate 
and accurate information with regards to Hurricane Jeanne.  Data was not 
available to determine the citizens trust in the local media. 
4.2.7.6 Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion Seven:  Provide Appropriate and 
Accurate Reports for the News Media 
 Through the use of a PIO, ESF 5 Planning and Information, instituted 
regularly scheduled briefings (NEMA, 2002; NEMA, 2005).  NEMA provided 
appropriate and accurate information to the media using a structured and 
standardized approach in response to Hurricane Wilma.  This same approach 
was used in response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne.  Through close 
coordination with the NEMA director and support agency liaisons the PIO held 
open briefings for the media at 8:00am, 11:30am, 5:00pm and 9:00pm.  These 
daily briefings, which had been established a year earlier during response to 
Hurricane Frances, provided the media with an opportunity to ask questions and 
provide the most updated information to residents (NEMA, 2005). 
4.2.7.7 Criterion Seven Summary 
Referring back to Table 4.23, a clear pattern of improvement is shown 
during post-CEM response operations.  The improvement can be associated with 
the implementation of the national response plan (2002), which outlined 
responsibilities and operating procedures to ensure accurate and timely 
information regarding disasters is delivered to the public.   
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4.2.8 Criterion Eight:  Have a Well-Functioning Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC) 
 Criterion eight examines the functioning of the EOC during each of the six 
study hurricanes.  Table 4.24 displays the results of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) 
methodology for evaluating the functioning of an EOC.  Evident is the fact that 
none of the six study hurricanes had a ‘well-functioning emergency operation 
center’. A detailed description and supporting data for the responses in Table 
4.24 can be found in sections 4.2.8.1 – 4.2.8.6 
 
Evaluation of Criterion Eight:  Having a well-functioning emergency operations 
center (EOC) 
 Pre-CEM Post-CEM 
 Andrew 
1992 
Floyd 
1999 
Michelle 
2001 
Frances 
2004 
Jeanne 
2004 
Wilma 
2005 
Have a Well-
Functioning 
Emergency 
Operations Center 
(EOC) 
No No No No No No 
Table 4.24 - Evaluation of Criterion Eight:  Having a well-functioning emergency 
operations center (EOC) 
 
4.2.8.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Eight:  Have a Well-Functioning 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
 An operation center was activated by the RBDF in response to Hurricane 
Andrew.  However no multi-agency national EOC was established.  The RBDF 
EOC was indented only to coordinate internal activities associated with response.  
The EOC did not facilitate the effective implementation of all required response 
activities for two key reasons.  First, the EOC did not house all agencies 
responding (only the RBDF were present in the EOC) limiting information flow 
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and preventing the coordination or assets.  Secondly, the EOC was housed in a 
conference room at the cabinet office, and did not meet the necessary physical 
requirements as outlined by Quarantelli (1997a).   
 Table 4.25 displays the physical requirements for the EOC as outlined by 
in the methodology chapter of this document.  It is clear to see that the physical 
requirements were not met.  The EOC was located close to the water without 
easy access to key transportation routes or key facilities.  The small conference 
room did not provide adequate work space for all agencies responding to 
Hurricane Andrew nor were there adequate sleeping and bathing facilities.  The 
EOC had telephone landlines but the northwestern islands, most significantly 
impacted by the storm lost telecommunication capabilities and communication 
between the islands did not exist (Office of The Prime Minister, 1992).  The lack 
of communication was further confirmed by Tellis Symonette, Vice President of 
The Bahamas Telecommunication Company during an informal conversation on 
January 26, 2007.  Computers were not available in the EOC and all reporting 
was done by hand resulting in information dissemination delays.  Additionally, 
detailed maps and comprehensive lists of available resources were not on hand.  
This was validated through personal observation of the EOC facility utilized in 
response to Andrew as well as informal discussion with RBDF personnel.  
Applying the data to Quarantelli’s criteria it appears that a well-functioning EOC 
did not exist in The Bahamas in response to Hurricane Andrew.   
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Evaluation of Hurricane Andrew 
EOC Physical Requirements 
The National EOC was/had… Yes/No 
1. Located in a safe area in close 
proximity to key transportation 
routes; 
No 
2. Sufficient work space; No 
3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities; No 
4. Adequate communication 
provisions; No 
5. Computers and necessary supplies; No 
6. Maps and equipment inventories No 
Table 4.25 – Evaluation of Hurricane Andrew EOC Physical Requirements  
4.2.8.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Eight:  Have a Well-Functioning 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
 An EOC was activated at the Office of The Prime Minister by the RBDF.  
However, to be identified as ‘well-functioning,’ an EOC must be more that just a 
common location.  An EOC is intended to facilitate the effective implementation 
of all required response activities and should be seen as a function not just a 
structure.  The EOC activated in response to Hurricane Floyd did not house all 
responding organization nor did it facilitate the coordination between public, 
private, local, regional, and international agencies.  Manned exclusively by the 
Defence Force, the EOC lacked knowledgeable liaison personnel.   
 Furthermore, as displayed in Table 4.26, the physical requirements for the 
EOC were not met.  The EOC was located within 100 yards of the water and only 
2.3 feet above sea level.  Additionally the location does not have easy access to 
transportation routes or key facilities such as the airport or disaster warehouse.  
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There would have been adequate work space for organizations and agencies 
responding to Floyd but only the Defence Force was present in the EOC.  There 
were no sleeping facilities located in the EOC and although there were 
bathrooms, they were not equipped with showers; hence they did not adequately 
accommodate for long term response operations with any shower facilities.   
Evaluation of Hurricane Floyd 
EOC Physical Requirements 
The National EOC was/had… Yes/No 
1. Located in a safe area in close 
proximity to key transportation 
routes; 
No 
2. Sufficient work space; Yes 
3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities; No 
4. Adequate communication 
provisions; No 
5. Computers and necessary supplies; No 
6. Maps and equipment inventories No 
Table 4.26 – Evaluation of Hurricane Floyd EOC Physical Requirements  
 The EOC, located in the cabinet office, had telephone landlines as well as 
satellite phones that were provided by the RBDF (Bethel, 2006).  However, 
following Floyd telecommunication lines were down throughout the islands 
(Bahamas Telecommunication Company, 1999).  The satellite phones were 
reliable but operator error resulted in a limited success in reaching 
representatives on the family islands (Rigby, 2006).  Computers and necessary 
supplies were not available.  Records and reports were written by hand resulting 
in delays in the dissemination of information.  Additionally, detailed maps of the 
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Family Islands were not available which limited response planning initiatives.  
Additionally comprehensive lists of available resources did not exist.  Based on 
all of this information it is clear that during the response operations to Hurricane 
Floyd the eighth criterion for good disaster management, A well-functioning 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was not achieved.  
4.2.8.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Eight:  Have a Well-Functioning 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
 As with Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd an EOC was activated by the RBDF 
(Office of The Prime Minister, 2001; RBDF, 2001).  However, to be identified as 
‘well-functioning,’ an EOC must be more that just a common location.  The EOC 
activated in response to Hurricane Michelle did not house all responding 
organization nor did it facilitate the coordination between public, private, local, 
regional, and international agencies (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001).  
Manned exclusively by the Defence Force, the EOC lacked knowledgeable 
liaison personnel.   
 The same location for the EOC was selected for Hurricane Michelle as 
was used for Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd.  Located within 100 yards of the 
water and only 2.3 feet above sea level the location was not adequate (Hughey, 
2004a).  Table 4.27 further examines the physical requirement of the EOC.   
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Evaluation of Hurricane Michelle 
EOC Physical Requirements 
The National EOC was/had… Yes/No 
1. Located in a safe area in close 
proximity to key transportation 
routes; 
No 
2. Sufficient work space; Yes 
3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities; No 
4. Adequate communication 
provisions; No 
5. Computers and necessary supplies; No 
6. Maps and equipment inventories No 
Table 4.27– Evaluation of Hurricane Michelle EOC Physical Requirements  
The location of the EOC was away from key transportation routes and facilities 
such as the airport or disaster warehouse.  The location did provide for large 
work spaces for all response agencies but there were no sleeping facilities 
located in the EOC and although there were bathrooms they did not have shower 
facilities, making them inadequate for long-term response operations.  The EOC 
had telephone landlines and the Defence Force was equipped with satellite 
phones (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001).  Damage to the telecommunication 
system (BTC, 2001) prevented the use of landlines.  Additionally, the satellite 
phones did not successfully meet the communication needs because only the 
RBDF personnel had access to them.  Computers and necessary supplies were 
not available and all records and reports were written by hand.  This resulted in 
delays in information dissemination.  Furthermore, detailed maps of the Family 
Islands were not available which limited response planning initiatives.  Also 
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notable, comprehensive lists of available resources did not exist.  Applying the 
data to Quarantelli’s evaluation criteria indicates that a well-functioning EOC was 
not achieved. 
4.2.8.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Eight:  Have a Well-Functioning 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
As with Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd and Michelle, an EOC was activated.  
In response to Hurricane Frances NEMA activated the national EOC in the 
Churchill Building at NEMA’s national headquarters.  This building is the same 
physical location that was used to respond to the three previous hurricanes.  As 
identified in prior response efforts, to be identified as ‘well-functioning,’ an EOC 
must be more that just a common location.   
 The EOC activated in response to Hurricane Frances housed a variety of 
response organization and effectively coordinated efforts between public, private, 
local, regional, and international agencies (NEMA 2004a).  The same physical 
location of the EOC as with Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and Michelle was 100 
yards from the water and only 2.3 feet above sea level (Hughey, 2004a; Hughey, 
2004b).  Part of the Churchill Building had also been condemned due to 
structural damage.  Table 4.28 further examines the physical requirement of the 
EOC.   
 The location was away from key transportation routes and facilities such 
as the airport or disaster warehouse (Hughey, 2004a; NEMA, 2004a).  The 
location did provide for large workspaces for all response agencies.  Hurricane 
Frances directly impacted the nation for over 72 hours, the lack of sleeping or 
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bathing facilities did not adequately accommodate the long term response 
operation that was required.   
Evaluation of Hurricane Frances 
EOC Physical Requirements 
The National EOC was/had… Yes/No 
1. Located in a safe area in close 
proximity to key transportation 
routes; 
No 
2. Sufficient work space; Yes 
3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities; No 
4. Adequate communication 
provisions; No 
5. Computers and necessary supplies; No 
6. Maps and equipment inventories No 
Table 4.28 – Evaluation of Hurricane Frances EOC Physical Requirements  
 The EOC was equipped with telephone landlines and satellite phone 
provided by the RBDF.  The Defence Force also provided satellite phones to 
Family Island Administrators.  Following Hurricane Frances many of the family 
islands experienced telecommunication problems (BTC, 2004a; Hughey, 2004b) 
NEMA, 2004a).  The pre-placed satellite phones were ineffective due to lack of 
training and operator error (Hughey 2004B).  Ham radios operated by many of 
the police forces were used to relay information back to NEMA and the national 
EOC (RBPF, 2004).  Computers and necessary supplies were not available 
during the response to Frances (Hughey, 2004b).  Initially, Records and reports 
were written by hand resulting in delays in the dissemination of information. Two 
laptop computers were ultimately located and used to track response activities 
(Hughey, 2004b).  Additionally, detailed maps of the family islands were not 
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available which limited response planning initiatives.  Based on all of this 
information it is clear that during the response operations to Hurricane Frances 
the eighth criterion for good disaster management, a well-functioning Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC), was not achieved.  (See Picture 4.13) 
 
 
Picture 4.13 – Hurricane Frances 2004 National EOC, Nassau Bahamas.  RBDF 
Personnel.  (Source: Erin Hughey) 
 
4.2.8.5 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion Eight:  Have a Well-Functioning 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
 The National EOC that had been activated in response to Hurricane 
Frances remained open to coordination activities related to Jeanne (Hughey, 
2004b; NEMA, 2004b).  The EOC continued to be located at the Churchill 
Building in downtown Nassau.  As identified in prior response efforts, to be 
identified as ‘well-functioning,’ an EOC must be more that just a common 
location.   
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 The EOC activated in response to Hurricane Jeanne housed a variety of 
response organizations and effectively coordinated efforts between public, 
private, local, regional, and international agencies.  However, it was the physical 
location and requirements that made the EOC ineffective.  The same EOC 
location that was used for the four previous hurricanes was also used in 
response to Hurricane Jeanne.   
 The EOC is located away from key transportation routes and facilities 
such as the airport and disaster warehouse.  Although the EOC provided for 
large work spaces for all response organizations, the lack of sleeping and 
bathing facilities made the location inadequate to handle long-term response 
operations.  The EOC was equipped with telephone landlines and satellite phone 
provided by the RBDF.  The Defence Force also provided satellite phones to 
Family Island Administrators.  During Hurricane Frances response operations, it 
became evident that many island administrators did not know how to utilize the 
satellite phones so in addition to providing the equipment instructions were was 
provided.  Computers and necessary supplies were not available during the 
response to Jeanne, and initial record and reporting was written by hand 
resulting in delays. Detailed maps of the family islands were not available at the 
EOC and hindered response planning initiatives. (See Table 4.29)  Thus, a well-
functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was not achieved during 
Hurricane Jeanne.  
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Evaluation of Hurricane Jeanne 
EOC Physical Requirements 
The National EOC was/had… Yes/No 
1. Located in a safe area in close 
proximity to key transportation 
routes; 
No 
2. Sufficient work space; Yes 
3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities; No 
4. Adequate communication 
provisions; No 
5. Computers and necessary supplies; No 
6. Maps and equipment inventories No 
Table 4.29 – Evaluation of Hurricane Jeanne EOC Physical Requirements  
4.2.8.6 Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion Eight:  Have a Well-Functioning 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
 The National EOC, located at the Churchill Building in downtown Nassau 
is not a well-functioning facility.  As displayed in Table 4.30 below, the minimum 
physical requirements as established by Quarantelli (1997a) were not met.  The 
EOC activated in response to Hurricane Wilma housed a variety of response 
organization and effectively coordinated efforts between the different levels of 
government.  However, it was the physical location and requirements that made 
the EOC ineffective.   
 Located 100 yards from the water and 2.3 feet above sea level the EOC 
was not well positioned.  Additionally, the EOC was located away from key 
transportation routs and facilities such as the airport and disaster warehouse.  
Although the EOC provided for large workspaces for all response organizations, 
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the lack of sleeping and bathing facilities made the location inadequate to handle 
long-term response operations. 
Evaluation of Hurricane Wilma 
EOC Physical Requirements 
The National EOC was/had… Yes/No 
1. Located in a safe area in close 
proximity to key transportation 
routes; 
No 
2. Sufficient work space; Yes 
3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities; No 
4. Adequate communication 
provisions; Yes 
5. Computers and necessary supplies; No 
6. Maps and equipment inventories No 
Table 4.30 – Evaluation of Hurricane Wilma EOC Physical Requirements  
 The EOC was well equipped with telephone landlines and satellite phone 
provided by Bahamas Telecommunication Company and the RBDF (BTC, 2005; 
RBDF, 2005; NEMA, 2005).  The Defence Force also provided satellite phones 
to Family Island Administrators (RBDF, 2005).  Computers and necessary 
supplies were not available during the response to Wilma, and initial record and 
reporting were again written by hand resulting in delays. Detailed maps of the 
Family Islands were also not available and hindered response planning 
initiatives.  Thus, a well-functioning EOC was not operational during response to 
Hurricane Wilma.   
4.2.8.7 Criterion Eight Summary 
Referring back to Table 4.24, shows that none of the six response 
operations had a ‘well-functioning emergency operations center’.  Table 4.31 
 211
further identifies the key physical requirements that need to be addressed to 
ensure a well-functioning EOC is operational to respond to the next disaster to 
impact The Bahamas.  
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Evaluation of EOC Physical Requirements  
 Pre-CEM Post-CEM 
The National EOC 
was/had… (Yes/No) 
Andrew  
1992 
Floyd  
1999 
Michelle 
2001 
Frances 
2004 
Jeanne 
2004 
Wilma  
2005 
1. Located in a safe 
area in close 
proximity to key 
transportation routes; 
No No No No No No 
2. Sufficient work 
space; No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3. Bathroom and 
sleeping facilities; No No No No No No 
4. Adequate 
communication 
provisions; 
No No No No No Yes 
5. Computers and 
necessary supplies; No No No No No No 
6. Maps and equipment 
inventories No No No No No No 
Table 4.31 – Evaluation of the EOC Physical Requirements for the Six Study Hurricanes 
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4.3  Chapter Summary and Discussion 
Chapter four examined Quarantelli’s (1997a) eight criteria for evaluating 
disaster response as they apply to the six study hurricanes to determine if:  
? Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of 
disaster response could be operationalized.  
? Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology was able to determine if the 
implementation of a CEM system improved disaster response 
operations in The Bahamas.  
Table 4.32 displays the eight evaluation criteria as they apply to the six study 
Hurricanes.  Criterion One, adequately carrying out generic functions, appears 
not to have been affected by the implementation of CEM.  However, upon closer 
examination what emerged was a clear improvement in the early recognition of 
each of the ten generic functions, which are encompassed within the first 
criterion.  The data displayed improvements that can be associated with the 
implementation of a CEM system in 2002 (see table 4.3) and the development of 
a national response plan that outlined responsibility and SOP’s for each of the 
functions.  This pre-planning allowed The Bahamas to more quickly identify 
critical functions and needs.   
 
? Criterion One of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology was able to be 
operationalized and applied to the six study hurricanes. 
 
? Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology identified improvements in 
response associated with the implementation of a CEM system. 
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Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Management of Disaster Response Operations 
to the Six Study Hurricanes 
 Pre-CEM Post-CEM 
 Andrew 
1992 
Floyd 
1999 
Michelle 
2001 
Frances 
2004 
Jeanne 
2004 
Wilma 
2005 
1. Adequately 
carrying out 
generic 
functions; 
No No No No No No 
2. Effectively 
mobilizing 
personnel and 
resources; 
No No No No Yes Yes 
3. Adequately 
processing 
information; 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
4. Properly 
exercising 
decision-making; 
No No No No No Yes 
5. Developing 
overall 
coordination; 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
6. Correctly 
recognizing 
differences 
between 
response and 
agent-generated 
demands; 
No No No No No Yes 
7. Providing 
appropriate and 
accurate reports 
for the news 
media; 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
8. Having a well-
functioning 
emergency 
operations 
center; 
No No No No No No 
Table 4.32 - Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Management of Disaster Response 
Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes 
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Criterion Two, effectively mobilizing personnel and resources, showed 
improvements following the implementation of the CEM system.  An association 
with the improvement in the function and the development of a national 
emergency response plan was noted.  It is critical to identify however that the 
improvements associated to the CEM system does not rule out and take away 
from the impact that experience may have played in improvements to response 
operations.  It is hypothesized that the implementation of the CEM and continued 
response experience both contributed to the improvement.  
 
 
? Criterion Two of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology was able to be 
operationalized and applied to the six study hurricanes. 
 
? Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology identified improvements in 
response associated with the implementation of a CEM system. 
 
? Experience was also noted as a contributing factor to the improvement 
of response. 
 
 
 Criterion Three, adequately processing information, displayed a pattern of 
improvement following the implementation of the CEM system.  The 
implementation of a national response plan helped to develop clear lines of 
communication between citizens, the government, and response agencies that 
allowed for more accurate processing of information and improved response 
operations.  Also associated with the improvement are experience and improved 
recording keeping. 
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? Criterion Three of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology was able to be 
operationalized and applied to the six study hurricanes. 
 
? Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology identified improvements in 
response associated with the implementation of a CEM system. 
 
? Experience and improved record keeping was identified as a potential 
contributing factor to the improvement in response post-CEM. 
 
  
 Criterion Four, the properly exercising decision-making, showed no 
pattern or association of improvement following the implementation of CEM.  
Response operations to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne experienced the same 
problems with decision-making as the pre-CEM response operations.  
Improvements were noted in response to Hurricane Wilma but the data indicate 
that the improvement is associated with experience rather then a change in the 
fundamental management strategy of disaster response. 
 
? Criterion Four of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology can be 
operationalized and was applied to the six study hurricanes. 
 
? Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology did not note any improvements to 
the exercising of decision-making as a result of the implementation of a 
CEM system.   
 
? Data indicated improvements in the proper exercising of decision-
making was associated with experience. 
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 Criterion Five, developing overall coordination, showed a marked 
improvement after the implementation of the CEM system.  Data indicates 
improvements are associated with the development of a nation response plan 
that required multi-agency coordination over a two-year period prior to the impact 
of Hurricane Frances.  The process of developing coordination helped to facilitate 
a strong working relationship between ministries and agencies active in response 
allowing for a successful environment for coordination. 
 
? Criterion Five of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology can be 
operationalized and was applied to the six study hurricanes. 
 
? Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology identified improvements in 
response associated with the implementation of a CEM system and the 
development of a national response plan that required multi-agency 
coordination. 
 
  
 Criterion Six, Correctly recognizing differences between response and 
agent-generated demands, was dependent of the success of criteria 2 through 5.  
The data did not identify an association between criterion six and the 
implementation of a CEM system.  
 
? Criterion Six of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology was dependent on 
the success of criteria 2-5.  As a result, criterion six was 
operationalized and was applied to the six study hurricanes. 
 
? Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology did not identified an association 
between the identification of response- and agent-generated demands 
following the implementation of a CEM system.   
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 Criterion Seven, providing appropriate and accurate reports for the news 
media, showed a clear pattern of improvement during the post-CEM response 
operations.  The data showed the improvement was associated with the 
implementation of the national response plan (2002). 
 
 
? Criterion Seven of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology was 
operationalized and applied to the six study hurricanes. 
 
? Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology identified an association between 
improved reporting to the news media and the implementation of a 
CEM system.   
 
 
 Criterion eight, a well-functioning emergency operations center, showed 
no improvement associated to the implementation of a CEM system.  Challenges 
to the physical requirements outlined by Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology 
indicated the EOC facilities utilized in response to each of the six study 
hurricanes were insufficient.      
 
? Criterion Eight of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology was 
operationalized and applied to the six study hurricanes. 
 
? Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology identified no association between 
the functioning of the EOC and the implementation of a CEM system.   
 
 
 Quarentelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of 
disaster response operations was able to be operationalized and applied to all six 
of the study hurricanes.  It is recommended however that the methodology be 
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refined for ease of application and to ensure consistency in use.  A more detailed 
and structured application guideline is also recommended to prevent subjective 
employment of the tool.  The use of benchmarks would also provide emergency 
managers with the necessary apparatus to establish response goals and provide 
a metric to rate the overall improvement to response within a jurisdiction.   
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Chapter Five 
Results: Surveys & Interviews 
 
 
“Emergency Management is the process of coordinating available 
resources to deal with emergencies effectively, thereby saving lives, 
avoiding injury, and minimizing economic loss” (FEMA, 2003b: ). 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 The following chapter provides the research findings associated with data 
collected from the structured surveys and the semi-structured interviews.  The 
results are presented in tabular form using numerical and percentage totals when 
appropriate.  The data in this chapter are formatted to answer the following 
research question.   
? Did the implementation of a CEM system improve disaster response?  
5.2 Survey Findings 
 As discussed in chapter three of this dissertation, the structured surveys 
were self administered and intended to gauge the Family Island Administrators 
perception of disaster response pre- and post-CEM. (See Appendix A)  There 
were a total of twenty (20) Family Island Administrators responsible for serving 
as the NEMA representative for each of their respective jurisdictions.  With a 
100% return rate on the surveys, the entire identified population data was 
obtained.   
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 Questions 1-3 on the survey gauged the respondents’ emergency 
management training background, as well as provided an opportunity for training 
recommendations.  It is important to understand the respondents training and 
experience because both will inform the respondents perception of response 
operations.  Questions 4 and 5 focused on planning and information.  These two 
question help to provide additional context to the respondents’ perceptions of the 
national response to the six study hurricanes.  If an Island Administrator had an 
emergency plan in place, and had open lines of communication with the national 
government they may have different response expectations then those who did 
not have a plan or were not in communication.  Questions 6-9 were focused on 
the response operation to the six study hurricanes.  It is important to note that 
although there were six study hurricanes respondents were asked to rate four 
response operations.  Family Island Administrators were not asked to rate 
response to Hurricane Michelle 2001, because the family islands were not 
significantly impacted by the storm.  Also noteworthy, is the fact that Hurricanes 
Frances and Jeanne 2004 were rated as one response operation.  Because the 
two storms occurred within three weeks of one another it was difficult to 
differentiate between response operations.  The remaining six questions on the 
survey provided additional contextual information on experience and challenges 
to effective emergency response. 
5.2.1 Emergency Management Training 
 Table 5.1 below displays the results of question one; has your island 
received disaster training from the NEMA office?  As the results show only 40% 
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of the Island Administrators report having received disaster training for their 
jurisdiction.   
Q1: Has your island received disaster training from the NEMA office? 
 Yes No No Response Total 
 # % # % # % # % 
Has your island 
received disaster 
training from the 
NEMA office? 
8 40% 12 60% 0 0% 20 100%
Table 5.1 – Survey Question One, Has your island received disaster training from 
the NEMA office. 
Of the 8 Family Island Administrators who reported that their island had received 
disaster training the following training courses were identified as being 
conducted.   
? Communications Training 
? SUMA Training – (Humanitarian Supply Management Training 
Course offered by the Pan American Health Organization 
(PAHO) in coordination with NEMA. SUMA is a tool for the 
management of humanitarian relief supplies, from the time 
pledges are made by donors, to their entry into the disaster area 
and their storage and distribution) 
? Damage Assessment Training 
? Shelter Management Training was reported by three island 
administrators 
? Community Response 
? General Disaster Management Training was reported by two 
island administrators 
 223
? Hurricane Management 
? Community Emergency Response Training (CERT) was 
reported by two island administrators. 
? Disaster Assessment 
? Annual Conference 
 Island Administrators were asked what type of emergency management 
training they would like to see offered by NEMA their responses are provided 
below.  The data illustrates the need for a comprehensive training curriculum.   
Q2 – What type of training would you like to see offered by NEMA? 
? “Shelter management & disaster communications” 
? “I.T. and disaster management” 
? “More shelter management, supplies management & distribution 
system implementation.” 
? “CERT” [community emergency response team] 
? “More First Aid and Emergency response training.  Also more 
information about shelter management” 
? “Mass-Casualty Incident Management” 
? “Additional training in shelter, community response and general 
disaster management as well as search and rescue and 
environmental and demographics. “ 
? “Shelter Management & Disaster Communications” 
? “Before, during and after a disaster” 
? “Proper damage assessment, first responders courses for 
persons to deal with medical emergencies, proper distribution 
after a disaster.”  
? “Disaster preparedness, operational procedures for command 
centre, search and rescue, training in first aid.” 
? “Working secessions with the disaster preparedness committee” 
? “Hurricane preparedness and disaster management” 
? “Shelter Management and Damage Assessment” 
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Six of the twenty Island Administrators chose not to provide training 
recommendations while the remaining fourteen respondents showed the need for 
a wide range of training.   
 Question three asked respondents if they or a representative from their 
agency attend any of the NEMA Conferences held in 2004, 2005, or 2006.  Table 
5.2, shows that 75% of the respondents attended or had a representative 
attended one or more of the NEMA Conferences.  What is alarming however, is 
that 25% of the administrators indicated that they had not participated.  
Q3: Did you or a representative from your agency attend any of the NEMA 
Conferences held in 2004, 2005, and 2006? 
 Yes No No Response Total 
 # % # % # % # % 
Did you or a 
representative 
from your agency 
attend any of the 
NEMA 
Conferences 
held in 2004, 
2005, and 2006? 
15 75% 5 25% 0 0% 20 100%
Table 5.2 – Survey Question Three, Did you or a representative from your 
agency attend any of the NEMA Conferences held in 2004, 2005, and 2006? 
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As a sub section to question three, respondents who responded yes to the 
question were asked if they found the conference to be useful; explain why or 
why not?  
? ”The Conference was very useful because it teaches how to 
prevent the possible loss of life but it does not follow up with the 
needs in order to survive afterwards.” 
? “It opened my eyes to a number of issues that have to do with 
disaster management” 
? “Very Useful” 
? “Yes – informative but very detailed therefore training should be 
held in Family Island.” 
? “Very Useful, good information” 
? “Provided Good Information” 
? “Very useful.  Final report from Conference would be helpful as 
reference material.” 
? “Yes, because as a result were able to make plans more 
practical and meaningful.” 
? “Interaction with other Island Representatives and Sharing of 
Information and Strategies for Preparation was useful” 
? “Yes, we learned about what does and does not belong in a 
shelter.  This was August 2005” 
? “It helped in Organizing N-G-O and other volunteers for 
disaster.” 
? “It was very helpful – should be extended to FI [Family Island] 
communities or invite more FI [Family Island] first responders.” 
? “Very useful” 
?  “Useful. Good Information, Good Networking.” 
? “Conferences were very useful” 
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5.2.2 Planning and Information 
 Question four, displayed in Table 5.3, intended to determine if Island 
Administrators had a disaster preparedness and response plan for their 
respective jurisdiction.  Eighty-five percent (85%) of respondents reported that 
they did have a disaster plan in place.  
 
Q4: Does your island have a disaster preparedness and response plan? 
 Yes No No Response Total 
 # % # % # % # % 
Does your island 
have a disaster 
preparedness 
and response 
plan? 
17 85% 3 15% 0 0% 20 100% 
Table 5.3 – Survey Question Four, Does your island have a disaster 
preparedness and response plan? 
 
 Of the 17 respondents who reported having an emergency response plan, 
over 64% stated that their plan had been updated within the last two years. (See 
Table 5.4)  Seventeen percent (17%) reported that their plan was updated in the 
last three years, while another seventeen percent (17%) did not respond.  This 
reveals that 11 of the 20 Island Administrators (or 55%) have a disaster plan in 
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place that has been reviewed within the last two years.  More importantly 45% of 
the Island Administrators do not have updated emergency response plan.  
 
 Q4a: When was the last time the disaster plan was reviewed and 
updated? 
 2006 2005 No Response Total 
 # % # % # % # % 
If yes, when was 
the last time it 
was reviewed 
and updated? 
11 64.7% 3 17.6% 3 17.6% 17 100% 
Table 5.4 – Survey Question Four(a), When was the last time the disaster plan 
was reviewed and updated? 
 
 Survey question five asked Family Island Administrators to rate on a scale 
of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) NEMA’s efforts to inform the 
public of its role in disaster planning and response?  Table 5.6 shows that the 
mean ranking was 3.45 with a standard deviation of 0.759.  This indicates that 
the majority of respondents felt that NEMA was doing a good job at informing the 
public of their role in disaster planning and response.  Fifty percent (50%) of the 
administrators rated the efforts by NEMA to inform the public of its role in disaster 
planning and response at a 4 or 5.   
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Q5 – How would you rate NEMA’s efforts to inform the public of its Role in 
Disaster Planning and Response? 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
How would you rate 
NEMA’s efforts to inform 
the public of their role in 
Disaster planning and 
Response? 
20 .00 5.00 3.4500 0.75915 
Valid N  20     
Table 5.5 – Survey Question Five, How would you rate NEMA’s efforts to inform 
the public of their role in disaster planning and response? 
5.2.3 Response Operation 
 Questions 6-9 on the survey focused on the national response to the six 
study hurricanes.  As stated previously, Island Administrators were asked to rate 
the national response to four operations: Andrew 1992, Floyd 1999, Frances and 
Jeanne 2004, and Wilma 2005.  Omitted from the survey was response to 
Hurricane Michelle 2001, because the Family Islands were not significantly 
impacted by the storm.  As discussed in detail in Appendix B of this dissertation, 
Michelle made landfall on the Island of New Providence impacting the capital city 
of Nassau.  Also important to note is the grouping of Hurricanes Frances and 
Jeanne.  Because the two storms occurred within three weeks of one another 
and due to overlap in response initiatives Island Administrators were asked to 
evaluate the response as one event.   
 A scale of 1-5 was utilized for this research, 1 being not successful and 5 
being fully successful.  
? 1 represented not successful,  
? 2 represented weak success,  
? 3 represented good success,  
? 4 represented very good success  
? 5 represented fully successful.   
Because the study population is so small (20 Island Administrators) it is important 
for this research to examine the number of respondents in each category as well 
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as the mean rating.  By utilizing the mean, a rating for each response was 
established allowing for comparative evaluation.   
 Question six, aimed to gauge the Island Administrators perception of the 
national response to Hurricane Andrew  Respondents were asked, to rate the 
response on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not successful and 5 being fully 
successful).  As shown in Table 5.6 the mean ranking was 2.25 with a standard 
deviation of 1.48.  Based on the mean, the national response to Hurricane 
Andrew was weak.   
 Table 5.7 provides the number of responses per ranking.  The table 
however represents only 85% of the total responses.  Not displayed in the table 
are the 3 responses (or 15%) that rated the national response to Hurricane 
Andrew at zero, displaying great dissatisfaction.  The mean as well as the raw 
numbers show that the Island Administrators did not perceive the national 
response to Hurricane Andrew to be fully successful.   
Q6- How would you rate the success of the national response to Hurricane 
Andrew (1992)? 
 
N Min Max Mean Median Mode 
Std. 
Deviation
Response to 
Hurricane Andrew 
1992 
20 .00 5.00 2.2500 3.0000 3.00 1.48235
Valid N  20       
Table 5.6 – Survey Question Six, How would you rate the National Governments 
Response to Hurricane Andrew? (Descriptive Statistics) 
Q6- On a scale of 1 to 5 how successful was the national response to 
Hurricane Andrew (1992)? 
 Not 
Successful
(1) 
Week 
Success
(2) 
Good 
Success
(3) 
Very Good 
Success 
(4) 
Fully 
Successful 
(5) 
Number of 
Respondents 5 0 9 2 1 
Percentage  25% 0% 45% 10% 5% 
Table 5.7 – Survey Question Six, How would you rate the National Governments 
Response to Hurricane Andrew? (Response Breakdown) 
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 Survey question seven, was intended to gauge the Island Administrators 
perception of the national response to Hurricane Floyd.  Table 5.8, displays the 
mean rating of 2.55 with a standard deviation of 0.933.  The mean ranking 
indicates the Island Administrators perceived the national response to Floyd to 
have weak to good success.  The mean score for Floyd was only slightly higher 
than that of Hurricane Andrew however the decrease in the standard deviation 
indicates greater agreement among the administrators.    
Q7 - How would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to 
Hurricane Floyd? 
 
N Min Max Mean Median Mode 
Std. 
Deviation
Response to 
Hurricane Floyd 
1999 
20 1.00 4.00 2.55 3.0000 3.00 0.93330
Valid N  20       
Table 5.8 – Survey Question Seven, How would you rate the success of the 
National Governments Response to Hurricane Floyd? (Descriptive Statistics) 
 
 Table 5.9 provides the number of responses per ranking.  The table 
represents 100% of the total responses and indicates that the majority of Island 
Administrators perceived the national response to Hurricane Floyd to have weak 
to good success.  Forty-five percent (45%) perceived the response to be good, 
this was also the case for Hurricane Andrew.   
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 Q7- How would you rate the National Governments Response to 
Hurricane Floyd? 
 Not 
Successful
(1) 
Week 
Success
(2) 
Good 
Success
(3) 
Very Good 
Success 
(4) 
Fully 
Successful 
(5) 
Number of 
Respondents 4 4 9 3 0 
Percentage  20% 20% 45% 15% 0% 
Table 5.9 – Survey Question Seven, How would you rate the success of the 
National Governments Response to Hurricane Floyd? (Response Breakdown) 
 Survey question eight, evaluated the national response to Hurricanes 
Frances and Jeanne.  Because the two hurricanes occurred within three weeks 
of one another and many of the response and recovery initiatives overlapped 
they were grouped together.  Respondents were again asked, to rate the 
success of the national response on a scale of 1 to 5.  As displayed in Table 
5.10, the mean score was 3.95 with a standard deviation of 0.686.  This score is 
a marked increase from that of Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd and show strong 
agreement among the Island Administrators.   
Q8 - How would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to 
Hurricanes Frances & Jeanne? 
 
N Min Max Mean Median Mode 
Std. 
Deviation
Response to 
Hurricanes Frances 
& Jeanne 2004 
20 .00 5.00 3.9500 4.0000 4.00 0.68633
Valid N  20       
Table 5.10 – Survey Question Eight, How would you rate the success of the 
National Governments Response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne? 
(Descriptive Statistics) 
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 Q8- How would you rate the success of the National 
Governments Response to Hurricane Frances & Jeanne? 
 Not 
Successful
(1) 
Week 
Success
(2) 
Good 
Success
(3) 
Very Good 
Success 
(4) 
Fully 
Successful 
(5) 
Number of 
Respondents 0 0 5 11 4 
Percentage  0% 0% 25% 55% 20% 
Table 5.11 – Survey Question Eight, How would you rate the success of the 
National Governments Response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne? 
(Response Breakdown) 
 Table 5.11 provides the number of responses per ranking for question 
eight of the survey.  The table represents 100% of the total responses and 
indicates that the majority of Island Administrators perceived the national 
response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne to have a very good success rate.  
Seventy-five percent (75%) of the respondents identified the national response to 
Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne to be very to fully successful.  
 As displayed in Table 5.12, the means score provided by the Family Island 
Administrators was 4.05 with a standard deviation of .604.  The success of the 
national response was perceived to be very successful.  The standard deviation 
again shows strong agreement among the island administrators.   
Q9 - How would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to 
Hurricane Wilma? 
 
N Min Max Mean Median Mode 
Std. 
Deviation
Response to 
Hurricane Wilma 
2005 
20 3.00 5.00 4.0500 4.0000 4.00 0.60481
Valid N  20       
Table 5.12 – Survey Question Nine, How would you rate the National 
Governments Response to Hurricane Wilma? (Descriptive Statistics) 
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 Table 5.13 provides the number of responses per ranking for question 
nine of the survey.  The table represents 100% of the total responses and 
indicates that the majority of Island Administrators perceived the national 
response to Hurricanes Wilma to have a very good success rate.  Eighty-five 
percent (85%) of the respondents identified the national response to Hurricane 
Wilma to be very to fully successful.  Displayed is a perceived improvement in 
the national governments response to Hurricane Wilma when compared to 
Andrew and Floyd.  What is not clearly revealed with this data is if the perceived 
improvements in the national response are due to the implementation of CEM or 
experience. 
 Q9- How would you rate the success of the National 
Governments Response to Hurricane Wilma? 
 Not 
Successful
(1) 
Week 
Success
(2) 
Good 
Success
(3) 
Very Good 
Success 
(4) 
Fully 
Successful 
(5) 
Number of 
Respondents 0 0 3 13 4 
Percentage  0% 0% 15% 65% 20% 
Table 5.13 – Survey Question Nine, How would you rate the success of the 
National Governments Response to Hurricane Wilma? (Response Breakdown) 
 
5.2.4 Experience and Challenges Associated with Effective Emergency 
Response  
 Table 5.14 displays the results of survey question ten, which asked the 
Island Administrators’ if they were aware that The Bahamas has been working 
since 2002 to develop a CEM structure in an effort to coordinate disaster 
planning and response activities.  An awareness of CEM and the national efforts 
exists among island administrators with 60% reporting yes.  
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Q10 – Were you aware that The Bahamas has been working since 2002 to 
develop a CEM structure in an effort to coordinate disaster planning and 
response activities? 
 Yes No No Response Total 
 # % # % # % # % 
Were you aware 
that The Bahamas 
has been working 
since 2002 to 
develop a CEM 
structure? 
12 60% 8 40% 0 0% 20 100% 
Table 5.14 – Survey Question Ten, Were you aware that The Bahamas has been 
working since 2002 to develop a CEM structure in an effort to coordinate disaster 
planning and response activities? 
 
 Survey question eleven asked Family Island Administrators to identify 
what they saw as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and response 
on their respective islands.  As outlined below, there were a variety of different 
challenges identified by each administrator.   
Q11:  What do you see as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and 
response on your island? 
? “Hurricane Shelters” 
? “Finances and Informing the Public; Emergency 
Communications; Management of Personnel and Equipment.” 
? “Geographical layout.  Communication in and between local 
government, districts and their cays.” 
? “Evacuation efforts.  People taking the hurricane seriously and 
also them listening to the warnings and orders from officials and 
responding to them appropriately.” 
? “Geography” 
? “Lack of interest.  Where interest exists, it is personal & Selfish.” 
? “The harmonizing of the various administrative districts.  
Response plans in the absence of a line of authority among the 
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administrators, and an approved NEMA representative on the 
island.” 
? “Shelters” 
? “(1) Establishing good communication (inter-island & 
international).  (2) Shelter management & support personnel. (3) 
Identifying adequate shelters. (4) Maintaining inventory of 
emergency supplies. (5) Establishing a budget for NEMA’s 
operations on the islands. 
? “The potential for a major hurricane to hit New Providence.” 
? “Better cooperation by The Public” 
? “Suitable Shelters and Supplies.” 
? “To have in place up to date worth while hurricane shelters with 
good communication and other supplies in place.” 
? “Lack of training” 
? “Insufficient hurricane shelters and the need for more training in 
disaster preparedness management.” 
? “Lack of funding to prepared for and in the aftermath of disaster 
mobilization of human and technical resources.”  
? “Geography of The Bahamas” 
 
 Family Island Administrators were asked in survey question twelve to 
identify what they saw as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and 
response for The Commonwealth of The Bahamas.  
Q 12 – What do you see as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and 
response for The Bahamas 
? “Geographical layout” 
? “To much red tape and not enough action.  People not realizing 
the dangers of a hurricane and not knowing how serious this 
matter is.” 
? “The scattered nature of the geography of The Bahamas makes 
it difficult to mobilize resources and the urgency in Eleuthera the 
lack of one central hurricane stretches limited and [illegible] 
resources.” 
? “The absence of an appointed NEMA representative on multi-
administrative districts causes coordination problems because 
each administrator is responsible.” 
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? “Distribution of Resources, Planning & co-ordinating community 
preparedness efforts, communications.” 
?  “Developing and maintaining a satisfactory communication 
network for all Islands and inhabited cays.” 
? “Hurricane Shelters and Communication.” 
? “Geographical make-up of the country and scarce resources” 
? “Finances & manpower, emergency communication, and 
medical personnel and equipment.” 
? “The biggest challenge as it relates to disaster preparedness 
and response would be inadequate hurricane shelters, and 
persons who are reluctant to evacuate when asked to do so.  
Proper vehicles to be used in severe cases of flooding and 
voluntary manpower.” 
? “Training & educating the general public.  Institutionalizing a 
national awareness campaign.” 
? “Providing suitable shelters and equipment.” 
? “Better cooperation by the public.” 
? “If New Providence is hit by a hurricane” 
 Survey question thirteen asked Family Island Administrators to identify 
ways national disaster preparedness and response can be improved.  Continued 
coordination between the islands and NEMA is a main theme throughout.  Also 
identified was the strengthening of institutional resources to ensure emergency 
needs are effectively met.  This question identifies support for government action 
as well as pinpoints areas for enhancement that the Island Administrators feel 
will improve response within the nation. 
Q13:  How do you think national disaster preparedness and response can be 
improved? 
? “By visiting each island and having neighboring islands 
equipped rather than waiting on New Providence (e.g. Southern 
Islands).” 
? “Cutting through the red tape and responding to the peoples 
needs as soon as possible.” 
 237
? “See #12” [“Training & Education General Public.  Instituting a 
national awareness campaign.”] 
? “By supplying No 12” [“Providing suitable shelters and 
equipment”] 
? “By better equipping family islands.” 
? “National disaster preparedness response can be improved by 
frequently upgrading the level of training in New Providence and 
specifically the family islands.” 
? “Government should provide more funds and employ more 
persons to be trained and work full time with that particular 
area.” 
? “More input and pooling of resources from private sector.” 
? “Put proper shelters in place, upgrade the telecommunication 
system, train personnel that are serious about disaster.”     
? “It can be improved by utilizing the Defence Force rather than 
volunteer personnel for disaster preparedness in most areas 
volunteers exist only on paper in event of crises attendance of 
volunteers is not guaranteed.” 
? “The National Disaster Team needs to visit each district for on-
the-ground evaluation and training.” 
 
 
 Table 5.15 below displays the results for survey question fourteen.  Island 
Administrators were asked if they thought that the passage of the National 
Disaster Preparedness and Response Act would improve disaster response 
within The Bahamas.  (Why or why not)  As the results show 100% of the Island 
Administrators believe that the legislation will improve disaster response.  This is 
an overwhelming response that indicates there is awareness among the 
respondents that the government needs the legal authority to act in response to a 
national disaster. 
 
 
 238
Q14 – Do you think the passage of the National Disaster Preparedness and 
Response Act will improve disaster response within The Bahamas? 
 Yes No No Response Total 
 # % # % # % # % 
Do you think the 
passage of the 
National Disaster 
Preparedness and 
Response Act will 
improve disaster 
response within 
The Bahamas? 
20 100% 0 0% 0 0% 20 100% 
Table 5.15 – Survey Question Fourteen, Do you think the passage of the 
National Disaster Preparedness and Response Act will improve disaster 
response within The Bahamas? 
 
 Respondents were also asked to provide additional information on why 
they felt the legislation would improve disaster response within The Bahamas.  
The majority of island administrators identified the legislation as providing the 
legal authority for the government to act.   
 
Q.14a:  Do you think the passage of the National Disaster Preparedness and 
Response Act will improve disaster response within The Bahamas?  Why or Why 
not.  
? “Because it establishes the scope of authority for the 
government and its representatives.” 
? “Yes, however an act in and of itself will not improve or mitigate 
disasters - implementation does which includes resources.” 
? “Because more persons would be educated to act in case of 
emergency or disaster, because of the training received.” 
? “Equipment will be available.” 
?  “Efforts will be more co-ordinated within a legal framework.” 
? “Bring about greater awareness of rules and responsibilities to 
all stakeholders and the general community.” 
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? “It will allow authorities to make mandatory evacuations thus 
saving the lives of some people who did not want to leave their 
houses.”   
? “Provides a legal framework” 
? “To a certain extent. There is not sufficient teeth in the act.” 
? “Provided it is presented and discussed in an island to island 
campaign.” 
? “Yes, because people tend to obey the laws.” 
? “It would be officially law and we would have to place more 
focus and attention towards this situation.” 
? “Once the policies and procedures are implemented there 
should be an improvement.” 
? “Because all the right agencies will be involved.” 
? “Everyone would know their roles.  Funding and equipment will 
be made available.” 
 
 Survey question fifteen asked Family Island Administrators what they 
thought other island nations in the Caribbean could learn from The Bahamas with 
regards to disaster preparedness and response.  A theme of coordination and 
self-reliance comes through in the comments provided.  
Q15 - What do you think other island nations in the Caribbean can learn from 
The Bahamas with regards to disaster preparedness and response. 
? “That we have a dynamic plan that is consultive based with local 
residents and districts.” 
? “Multi-island strategies.”  
? “Making all houses strong enough to withstand hurricane force 
winds.” 
? “Excellent weather and communication reporting via ZNS 
network.  ZNS and the met department are models for the 
region.” 
? “How to effectively coordinate mitigation measures, from many 
areas.” 
? “Multi-island planning strategies, communications & 
transportation strategies.” 
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? “Not to depend on churches and lodges for hurricane shelters.” 
? “Do not procrastinate or react, be proactive.” 
? “That in order for it to be a success, we must all join together 
and help our neighbors.” 
? “By educating the public to act quickly in case of disaster.” 
? “A coordinated effort to meet and share ideas.” 
? “That good management can result in minimum property 
damage and loss of lives.” 
? “Good planning can reduce losses.” 
? “The Bahamas ability to garner international support and to 
guide and direct its people during the disaster and respond 
quickly to their needs after the disaster.” 
 
 Respondents were also provided with the opportunity to offer any general 
comments related to emergency management within the Bahamas.  The 
responses provided as well as the answers to questions 10-15 illustrate 
understanding among the Family Island Administrators of the importance of 
disaster planning and coordination as a means for improving disaster response 
and reducing losses.   
Family Island Administrators General Comments 
? “The concept of Hurricane Preparedness must be taken 
seriously and the after actions must be declassified out of 
Nassau thus bringing the administrators more authority and 
flexibility to act speedily when required.”   
? “More attention should be given before a disaster strikes.  
Teams should be sent to each island to verify if the island was 
prepared for the pending disaster.” 
? “Arrangements for travel to affected Islands need to be 
coordinated - i.e. - separate flights for politicians and 
assessment teams.” 
? “Funding ought to be provided in an effort to be properly 
prepared.” 
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? “NEMA is doing an excellent job in helping to educate 
Bahamians and the persons living in this country about the 
importance of disaster preparedness and how to deal with 
National disasters.” 
? “More resources needed to put theory into practice.” 
? “Disaster preparedness should be an on going process.” 
? “NEMA is to be congratulated for its proactive approach to 
mitigate disasters, however, visits to every family island is 
encouraged.  The technical and human resources of Mr. Luke 
Bethel is user friendly.” 
? “Disaster Preparedness requires resource to plan properly.  A 
designated head & item amount should be budgeted to assist 
with Disaster Preparations.  At the end of the Season, if funds 
are not utilized they could be diverted to other national events, 
e.g. Independence, etc.  Proper coastal mapping for potential 
flooding areas are essential.  Islands in the Southern & Central 
Bahamas needs to be given more attention for Disaster 
Training.  A co-ordinated effort is needed to construct at leas 
one multi-purpose building in each District that can be used as a 
Shelter and as a Youth Development Center.”  
? “Generally pleased with efforts of NEMA.  Keep up the good 
work.” 
? “The appointment of a NEMA representative and the 
establishment of a clear line of authority island wide among the 
administrators.” 
 Eleven (11) of the 20 Island Administrators chose to provide 
general comments.  A clear desire for better communication, planning and 
coordination to ensure that they [Island Administrators] are an active part 
of emergency management was expressed.  Increases in available 
funding and improvements in asset coordination were also articulated.  
NEMA was given praise for its proactive approach to emergency 
management within the nation.  It is through the implementation of a CEM 
system that NEMA was established and the Island Administrators took an 
active role in the emergency management process.  As stated in the 
 242
literature (Quarantelli, 1997a, FEMA 2003a) coordination and planning 
prior to a disaster helps to facilitate more effective emergency response.  
 The structured survey concluded by obtaining data on experience 
by asking respondents the number of years they had served as an Island 
Administrator.  Table 5.16 shows the average years served was 9.45 
years with a standard deviation of 8.1.  This identifies variability in 
experience levels of the island administrators.  It is this difference in 
experience and years in office that may account for differences in 
responses.  Despite the fact that some Island Administrators may not have 
been in office at the time of each response operations, they were all 
impacted by the study hurricanes. 
Q - How many years have you served as an Island Administrator? 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Years Served  20 1 33 9.45 8.121 
Valid N (listwise) 20     
Table 5.16 – Number of years served as an Island Administrator. 
 To examine more closely the relationship between years of experience 
and hurricane response rankings Figures 5.1 – 5.4 illustrate the value response 
of Island Administrators by number of years served.  Figure 5.1 shows that Island 
Administers who have served 5-8 years rated response to Hurricane Andrew 
(’92) lower then Administrators who served less then 5 years or more then 8 
years.  A very similar result is also noted in Figure 5.2 in response to Hurricane 
Floyd (’99).  
 243
 
Figure 5.1 – Hurricane Andrew Value Response of Island Administrators by 
Number of Years Served.  
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Figure 5.2 – Hurricane Floyd Value Response of Island Administrators by 
Number of Years Served.  
  
 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show little difference in response rating to Hurricanes 
Frances, Jeanne and Wilma with regards to numbers of years served.  An overall 
improvement in the administrators perception of response is noted. 
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Figure 5.4 – Hurricane Frances and Jeanne Value Response of Island 
Administrators by Number of Years Served.  
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Figure 5.4 – Hurricane Wilma Value Response of Island Administrators by 
Number of Years Served.  
 
5.2.5 Summary: Survey Results 
 The structured surveys were distributed to the Family Island 
Administrators to gauge their perception of emergency management at the 
national level.  The survey was divided into three sections: Planning and 
Information, Response Operations, and Experience and Challenges.  The data 
revealed the following key findings: 
? Sixty percent (60%) of the Island Administrators reported that their 
respective jurisdiction had not received disaster management training 
from NEMA. 
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? Seventy-five percent (75%) of Island Administrators reported that they 
or a representative had attended a NEMA conference. 
? Just over half (55% or 11 respondents) reported that their island had a 
disaster plan in place that had been reviewed within the last two years. 
This data reveal that although NEMA has been working to provide training 
throughout the nation a more targeted approach needs to take place.  Having 
40% of your island administrators without proper training and 45% without an 
updated emergency response plan is cause for concern.  If these issues are not 
addressed effective emergency response will be difficult to achieve.   
 The structured surveys were also intended to provide data to determine if 
the CEM system improved disaster response.  Based on the data displayed in 
Tables 5.17 and 5.18 it is apparent that improved ratings exist for response 
operations to post-CEM events.  The data indicate a noticeable jump in the mean 
between Hurricane Floyd (1999) and Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne (2004).  
Keeping in mind that the CEM system was first implemented in 2002, can the 
improved rating be attributed to CEM?  The answer is no.  Although the Island 
Administrators rated the post-CEM response operations higher than the pre-CEM 
response, experience can not be ruled out as the trigger for the improved score.  
It is hypothesized, based on the literature (Quarantelli, 1997a; FEMA 2003a; and 
Hughey 2003) that the improvement in the mean score is a combination of the 
implementation of CEM and experience.  This question is further examined in 
section 5.3 as well as Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
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Hurricane 
Island 
Administrators 
Mean Ranking 
Andrew 2.25 
Floyd 2.55 Pre-CEM 
Michelle --- 
Frances & 
Jeanne 3.95 
Post-CEM 
Wilma 4.05 
Table 5.17 – Summary Table, the success of the National Governments 
Response to the study hurricanes as determined by the Island Administrators 
rankings. 
 
Summary Table:  Survey Questions 6-9,  
 Not 
Successful
(1) 
Week 
Success
(2) 
Good 
Success
(3) 
Very Good 
Success 
(4) 
Fully 
Successful 
(5) 
Andrew 1992 25% 0% 45% 10% 5% 
Floyd 1999 20% 20% 45% 15% 0% 
Frances & Jeanne 
2004 0% 0% 25% 55% 20% 
Wilma 2005 0% 0% 15% 65% 20% 
Table 5.18 – Summary Table: Survey Questions 6-9.  The table represents the 
percent of Island Administrators that rated each storm by category.  (Response 
Breakdown) 
5.3 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 Semi-structured interviews were conducted with all staff members of The 
Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).  This semi-
structured approach to interviewing allowed flexibility in questioning and 
facilitated the gathering of information that may not have come through in a more 
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controlled survey or interview.  Interview results are provided below in section 
5.3.1, as well as applied to section 5.4 of this document, ‘Evaluating the 
Management of Disaster Response to the Six Study Hurricanes’. 
 All NEMA staff members were active participants in the national response 
to Hurricanes Frances (2004), Jeanne (2004), and Wilma (2005).  Since the 
development of NEMA is a direct result of the implementation of a CEM system 
not all staff members actively participated in a formal capacity to the national 
response to Hurricanes Andrew (1992), Floyd (1999), and Michelle (2001).  All 
interviewees however were directly or indirectly impacted by all six hurricanes 
and were well versed on strategies and techniques utilized by the national 
government prior to 2002.   
5.3.1 Semi-Structure Interview Results 
 During my interviews NEMA staff was asked to evaluate the response 
efforts of each of the six study hurricanes.  Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne were 
grouped together because the two storms occurred within three weeks of one 
another.  Difficulty separating the two response operations required that they be 
evaluated as one event.  A scale of 1-5 was utilized for this research, 1 being not 
successful and 5 being fully successful.  A half (½) point scale was not provided 
as an option to interviewees yet some of the respondents independently chose to 
select a rating that utilized the scale.  This was an independent decision of the 
part of the participants and is noted in the evaluation tables below. 
? 1 represented not successful,  
? 2 represented weak success,  
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? 3 represented good success,  
? 4 represented very good success  
? 5 represented fully successful.   
Because the study population is so small (6 NEMA Staff Members) it is important 
for this research to examine the number of respondents in each category as well 
as the mean rating.  By utilizing the mean, a rating for each response was 
established allowing for comparative evaluation.   
 As shown in Table 5.19, staff members were asked to rate the success of 
the national governments response to Hurricane Andrew.  The mean score for 
response to Hurricane Andrew was 2.58 with a standard deviation of 0.376.  This 
shows strong agreement among NEMA staff members that the national response 
effort to Hurricane Andrew had weak to good success.  Additionally, Table 5.20 
displays the number and percentage of responses in each category.  Fifty 
percent (50% or 3 respondents) rated the success of Hurricane Andrew at 2.5.   
 
NEMA Interviews:  How would you rate the success of the national governments 
response to Hurricane Andrew? 
 
N Min Max Mean Median Mode 
Std. 
Deviation
Response to 
Hurricane Andrew 
1992 
6 2.0 3.0 2.5833 2.500 2.5 0.37639
Valid N  6       
Table 5.19 – NEMA Representatives, How would you rate the National 
Governments Response to Hurricane Andrew? (Descriptive Statistics) 
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NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments 
response to Hurricane Andrew? 
 Not 
Successful
(1) 
Week 
Success 
(2) 
2.5 
Good 
Success
(3) 
Very Good 
Success 
(4) 
Fully 
Successful 
(5) 
Number of 
Respondents 0 1 3 2 0 0 
Percentage  0% 16.6% 50% 33.3% 0% 0% 
Table 5.20 – NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the National Governments 
Response to Hurricane Andrew? (Response Breakdown) 
 
 NEMA staff was asked to score the success of the national response 
efforts to Hurricane Floyd.  Table 5.21 shows a slight improvement over the 
response to Andrew with a mean score of 2.83 and a standard deviation of 
0.258.  The extremely low standard deviation indicates strong agreement among 
NEMA staff that the national response effort to Hurricane Floyd had weak to 
good success.  Table 5.22 shows 66.6% (or 4 respondents) believe the national 
governments response to Hurricane Floyd had good success.   
 
NEMA Interviews:  How would you rate the success of the national governments 
response to Hurricane Floyd? 
 
N Min Max Mean Median Mode 
Std. 
Deviation
Response to 
Hurricane Floyd 
1999 
6 2.5 3.0 2.8333 3.0000 3.0 0.25820
Valid N  6       
Table 5.21 – NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national 
governments response to Hurricane Floyd? (Descriptive Statistics) 
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 NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national 
governments response to Hurricane Floyd? 
 Not 
Successful
(1) 
Week 
Success 
(2) 
2.5 
Good 
Success
(3) 
Very Good 
Success 
(4) 
Fully 
Successful 
(5) 
Number of 
Respondents 0 0 2 4 0 0 
Percentage  0% 0% 33.3% 66.6% 0% 0% 
Table 5.22 – NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national 
governments response to Hurricane Floyd? (Response Breakdown) 
 Hurricane Michelle was the last storm to impact the nation in the pre-CEM 
phase.  Respondents’ were asked to rate the success of the national 
governments response to Hurricane Michelle.  It is important to note that Michelle 
was the only study hurricane to make landfall on the Island of New Providence 
and the capital city of Nassau.  Table 5.23 shows the mean rating at 2.66 with a 
standard deviation of 0.408.  The mean is lower than that of Hurricane Floyd and 
also showed slightly less agreement among respondents with an increase in the 
standard deviation.  The lower mean score could be attributed to the impact 
Michelle had on the national government.  As discussed in Appendix B Hurricane 
Michelle prevented the daily functioning of government business.  Banks and 
national government offices remained closed days after landfall bringing the 
nation to a halt.  The impact of Michelle on the national government caused 
delays in emergency services and may have contributed to respondents’ lower 
rating.  Table 5.24 indicates that 50% of respondents’ rated the national 
response to be good.  However due to the small number of respondents’ this can 
be misleading and should be cautiously applied. 
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NEMA Interviews:  How would you rate the success of the national governments 
response to Hurricane Michelle? 
 
N Min Max Mean Median Mode 
Std. 
Deviation
Response to 
Hurricane Michelle 
2001 
6 2.0 3.0 2.66 2.7500 3.0 0.40825
Valid N  6       
Table 5.23 – NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national 
governments response to Hurricane Michelle? (Descriptive Statistics) 
 NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national 
governments response to Hurricane Michelle? 
 Not 
Successful
(1) 
Week 
Success 
(2) 
2.5 
Good 
Success
(3) 
Very Good 
Success 
(4) 
Fully 
Successful 
(5) 
Number of 
Respondents 0 1 2 3 0 0 
Percentage  0% 16.6% 33.6% 50% 0% 0% 
Table 5.24 – NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national 
governments response to Hurricane Michelle? (Response Breakdown) 
 
 The year 2002 marked the birth of CEM in The Bahamas and the early 
establishment of NEMA.  Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne were the first response 
operations coordinated under the CEM system and occurred within three weeks 
of one another in the fall of 2004.  Respondents were asked to score the success 
of the national response on the 1 to 5 scale.  Table 5.25 displays a marked 
improvement over previous response operations with a mean score of 3.5 and a 
standard deviation of 0.447.  NEMA staff rated the national response to have had 
good to very good success.  Table 5.26 shows that responses were evenly 
distributed between the following ratings:  (3) good success, (3.5) good to very 
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good success, and (4) very good success.   The improvement in the mean score 
suggests that the national response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne were 
managed better then those that were previously evaluated.  However, what is not 
clear is if the perceived improvement is due to CEM, personal involvement, or 
perhaps experience.    
NEMA Interviews:  How would you rate the success of the national governments 
response to Hurricane Frances & Jeanne? 
 
N Min Max Mean Median Mode 
Std. 
Deviation
Response to 
Hurricane Frances 
& Jeanne 2004 
6 3.0 4.0 3.500 3.500 3.5 0.44721
Valid N  6       
Table 5.25 – NEMA Representatives, How would you rate the success of the 
national governments response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne? (Descriptive 
Statistics) 
 
 NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national 
governments response to Hurricanes Frances & Jeanne? 
 Not 
Successful
(1) 
Week 
Success 
(2) 
Good 
Success
(3) 
3.5 
Very Good 
Success 
(4) 
Fully 
Successful 
(5) 
Number of 
Respondents 0 0 2 2 2 0 
Percentage  0% 0% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 0% 
Table 5.26 – NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national 
governments response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne? (Response 
Breakdown) 
  Hurricane Wilma, the final study hurricane, occurred in the fall of 2005, a 
year following Frances and Jeanne.  As shown in Table 5.27, respondents again 
scored the national response high with a mean score of 3.66 and a standard 
deviation of 0.408.  Responses were again tightly grouped with 3 of the six 
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respondents indicating that the national response to Hurricane Wilma was very 
successful.  (Table 5.28)  Although there continues to be an improved mean 
rating of the national response, it can not be determined with current data if the 
improvement in is due to the implementation of CEM, personal involvement, or 
perhaps experience. 
NEMA Interviews:  How would you rate the success of the national governments 
response to Hurricane Wilma? 
 
N Min Max Mean Median Mode 
Std. 
Deviation
Response to 
Hurricane Wilma 
2005 
6 3.0 4.0 3.66 3.7500 4.0 0.40825
Valid N  6       
Table 5.27 – NEMA Representatives, How would you rate the success of the 
national governments response to Hurricane Wilma? (Descriptive Statistics)  
 NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national 
governments response to Hurricane Wilma? 
 Not 
Successful
(1) 
Week 
Success 
(2) 
Good 
Success
(3) 
3.5 
Very Good 
Success 
(4) 
Fully 
Successful 
(5) 
Number of 
Respondents 0 0 1 2 3 0 
Percentage  0% 0% 16.6% 33.3% 50% 0% 
Table 5.28 – NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national 
governments response to Hurricane Wilma? (Response Breakdown) 
How would you rate the national governments response to the 
following study hurricanes? 
 
Andrew Floyd Michelle
Frances & 
Jeanne 
Wilma 
Mean score  2.58 2.83 2.66 3.5 3.66 
Valid N  6 6 6 6 6 
Table 5.29 – NEMA Representatives, How would you rate the National 
Governments Response to Hurricane Wilma? (Mean) 
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 In addition to interviewing NEMA respondents about the effectiveness of 
response operations to the six study hurricanes, they were also asked to identify 
the biggest challenges to response within The Bahamas and their opinions on 
what needed to be done to ensure successful response and recovery in the 
future.  Outlined below are the biggest challenges to emergency response, as 
identified by respondents.   
NEMA Interviews: What do you see as the biggest challenges to 
successful emergency response? 
? “Logistics! As well as accountability through documentation, 
there needs to be accurate relaying of information to confirm the 
movement of assets.”   
? “Coordination between NEMA and the island sub-NEMAs.” 
? “Coordination between all the ministries.  Holding of information 
can not occur, successful emergency management requires 
information is coordinated through NEMA to ensure proper 
decision making.” 
? “Training and communication at all levels.” 
? “Lack of funding for critical assets.” 
? “Training!  Not everyone on the Family Islands has received 
emergency management training.” 
Training and coordination are two issues that were recognized as challenges to 
effective emergency response by the NEMA staff; these two key items were also 
identified by the Family Island Administrators.  
 NEMA staff members were asked to identify what needed to be 
accomplished to ensure successful response and recovery in the future.  The 
responses are outlined below; training and coordination were identified as key 
issues.  
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NEMA Interviews:  What needs to be done to ensure successful response 
and recovery to future disasters? 
?  “Coordination from NEMA with the island sub-NEMAs is 
required.  Inter-Island coordination is needed and we are going 
to be establishing sub-NEMA’s throughout the Family Islands.  
Since 2003 we have had the Family Island Administrators 
working as the NEMA representatives.  We hope to be able to 
have a full-time NEMA representative that works as the disaster 
coordinator on the islands.” 
? “National EOC.  With the construction of the new EOC we will 
be better equipped to manage response operations.” 
? “All information needs to come through the central NEMA 
office.” 
? “Training! Training!  Training!  All ministries should be well 
trained in emergency management procedures.  Through our 
annual Emergency Management conference we are providing 
training to Family Island Representatives.  We have also been 
able to provide CERT and shelter training on many of the family 
islands.” 
? “NEMA needs to be able to better coordinate the ESFs and 
more people need to become involved in the emergency 
management process.” 
? “Funding for emergency management within the Bahamas 
needs to be addressed.  Limited assets and resources make it 
difficult to meet needs.” 
5.3.2 Summary: Semi-Structured Interview Results 
 The semi-structured interviews were conducted with NEMA staff to gauge 
their perception of emergency management and response at the national level.  
The interviews as detailed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, took place on several 
occasions.  The data discussed in this section focused on the response to the six 
study hurricanes and intended to provide data to determine if the CEM system 
improved disaster response.   
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 Table 5.29 provides a summary of mean scores for the study hurricanes 
and Table 5.30 provides a summary of the percentage of NEMA staff that rated 
each storm by category.  An increase in mean score is evident between the pre-
CEM and post-CEM response.  However, there are not enough data to support 
CEM being the impetus for the improvement in response.  Although the data 
indicates a noticeable jump in the mean rating between Hurricane Michelle 
(2001) and Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne (2004) suggesting that post-CEM 
response operations were handled more successfully than those that occurred 
pre-CEM experience can not be ruled out as a contributing factor. 
 
 
Hurricane NEMA Staff Mean Ranking 
Andrew 2.58 
Floyd 2.83 Pre-CEM 
Michelle 2.66 
Frances & 
Jeanne 3.5 
Post-CEM 
Wilma 3.66 
Table 5.30 – Summary Table, the success of the national governments response 
to the study hurricanes as determined by the NEMA staff rankings. 
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Summary Table: The Percent of NEMA staff that rated each storm by category. 
 Not 
Successful 
(1) 
Week 
Success
(2) 
2.5 
Good 
Success
(3) 
3.5 
Very 
Good 
Success 
(4) 
Fully 
Successful
(5) 
Andrew 1992 0% 16.6% 50% 33.3% 0% 0% 0% 
Floyd 1999 0% 0% 33.3% 66.6% 0% 0% 0% 
Michelle 2001 0% 16.6% 33.6% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
Frances & 
Jeanne 2004 0% 0% 0% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 0% 
Wilma 2005 0% 0% 0% 16.6% 33.3% 50% 0% 
Table 5.31 – Summary Table: The percent of NEMA staff that rated each storm 
by category.   
 5.4 Summary:  Survey & Interview Results 
 The data in this chapter were formulated to determine if the respondents 
perceived an improvement in response as a result of the implementation of a 
CEM system.  The structured surveys identified that although the Island 
Administrators rated the post-CEM response operations higher than the pre-CEM 
response, experience cannot be ruled out as the trigger for the improved score.  
The semi-structured interviews with NEMA staff members also examined 
response to the six study hurricanes.  As with the survey results, NEMA staff 
rated the post-CEM response operations higher.  Table 5.31 provides a 
comparison between the success ratings provided by the Island Administrators 
and NEMA Staff.  An increase in the mean is evident throughout with the 
exception of Michelle.  However, a larger increase in the mean is noted after the 
implementation of CEM.  Despite this, there are still not enough data to support 
CEM as the impetus for the improvement in response.  Experience could not be 
ruled out as a variable responsible for the improvement in national response.  It 
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is hypothesized, based on the literature (Quarantelli, 1997a; FEMA 2003a; and 
Hughey 2003) that the improvement in the mean score is a combination of the 
implementation of CEM and experience.   
 
Hurricane Island Administrators NEMA 
Andrew 2.27 2.58 
Floyd 2.44 2.83 Pre-CEM 
Michelle --- 2.66 
Frances & 
Jeanne 3.66 3.5 
Post-CEM 
Wilma 4.05 3.66 
Table 5.32 – Summary Table: The success of the national governments 
response to six study hurricanes as determined by the structured surveys and 
semi-structured interviews.  (Mean Rating) 
 Additionally provided in this chapter is an understanding of the status of 
the CEM program as it relates to disaster training and planning.  According to the 
structured surveys with the Island Administrators, since the implementation of the 
CEM system, 60% reported that their respective jurisdiction had not received 
disaster management training from NEMA.  Furthermore, 45% of the Island 
Administrators reported that their island did not have a disaster plan in place that 
had been reviewed within the last two years.  An outdated or non-existent 
response plan, combined with a lack of training indicates that there are gaps 
within the emergency management structure that need to be addressed.   
 261
 The interview with Prime Minister Perry G. Christie demonstrated 
awareness by the national government to the importance of a well structured 
emergency management system.  A strong commitment to improving emergency 
response within the nation and protect and maintain the economic, political and 
social structure was evident.  Through financial and legislative measures the 
national government has established a strong position in support of a well 
coordinated national emergency management structure. 
 The scoring of each of the six national response operations provides us 
with an understanding of NEMA’s perception as compared those of the Family 
Island Administrators.  Data discussed in this chapter helped to identify areas 
where new initiatives should be developed in an effort to better prepare for and 
respond to disasters.  Additionally, the data provide the necessary foundation 
and direction for further analysis as this longitudinal research moves forward.  
Although the improvement in response could not be directly tied to CEM the data 
provides a baseline for continued examination. 
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Chapter Six:   
Results:  Application of the Theoretical Model 
6.1 Introduction 
 This chapter addresses the application of the theoretical model discussed 
in chapter three of this dissertation and depicted below in Figure 6.1.  The model 
was applied in two phases, (1) the pre-CEM phase, which provides the 
contextual framework necessary to understand Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and 
Michelle, and (2) the post-CEM phase, that frames Hurricanes Frances, Jeanne, 
and Wilma.  By exploring emergency response in these two periods, it allows for 
the exploration of the wider political, economic and cultural forces affecting 
response to the six study hurricanes.  Application of this model places each 
response operations into the larger comprehensive setting and provided a more 
complete understanding of the mechanisms that improved or hindered response.  
6.2 Pre-CEM Model Application 
 The Model of Community Response to Disasters was applied to the pre-
CEM period of this research.  A review of each of the key components as 
outlined below is discussed in detail.   
? Good leadership by professionally trained officials 
? A foundation of supportive values for government action 
? Legal authority to act 
? An advocacy supporting action 
? Necessary institutional resources 
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6.2.1  Good Leadership by Professionally Trained Officials 
 The keystone to the theoretical model as illustrated in Figure 6.1 is ‘good 
leadership by professionally trained officials’.  During the Pre-CEM phase, 
leadership and direction came from the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) 
(Office of The Prime Minister, 1992; Ingraham, 1999).  The command and control 
response style provided by the RBDF was efficient at executing military type 
tasks but lacked the ability to manage emergency response that required civil-
military coordination.  Additionally problematic was the lack of training received 
by RBDF Personnel.  No formal emergency management training program 
existed or was made available (Bethel, 2006).    
  A Foundation of Supportive Values for Government Action 
 A foundation of supportive values for local government action enables 
concepts to be developed into policies and provides government leaders the 
backing to spend monies in an effort to build resources (Wolensky and 
Wolensky, 1990).  During the Pre-CEM period there was no foundation of 
support within The Bahamas to encourage or require the development of 
emergency response policy.  The Bahamas, a small nation with a limited 
economic base, faced a variety of complex issues during this time.  Despite the 
impacts of Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd, both category four storms, it took 
Hurricane Michelle impacting the nation’s capital and interrupting government 
activity to spark support.    
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Figure 6.1 – Model of Community Response to Disasters (Source: Amended 
Hughey, 2003) 
 
6.2.3  Legal Authority to Act 
 The legal framework within which disaster operations occur can have a 
significant impact on all four phases of disaster management.  During the Pre-
CEM phase there was no local or national emergency management policy in 
place.  As a direct result of Hurricane Floyd, the Emergency Relief Guarantee 
Fund Act, 1999 (Act No. 44 of 1999) was enacted to address financial support for 
recovery.   
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 Following Hurricane Floyd there was no formal way for the Government of 
The Bahamas to release funds to assist communities in the rebuilding process or 
to manage and distribute monetary relief aid received.  Act No. 44 of 1999 
established an Emergency Relief Guarantee Fund that allowed the Government 
to “guarantee loans for the relief of persons who have suffered hardship and loss 
as a result of a disaster and for purposes connected thereto” (Government of The 
Bahamas Act No. 44, 1999: Chapter 35).     
 Under this act, persons over the age of eighteen (18) were able to borrow 
funding to repair or replace occupied residential property, furnishings and 
appliances damaged or destroyed by the Hurricane or to replace or repair 
businesses damaged by it.  This included rental accommodations, fishing boats, 
engines, farm buildings, farm equipment, citrus or fruit trees, vegetable crop, 
livestock, restaurant, processing plants and other commercial enterprises.  All 
money provided to individuals through this act required that the money borrowed 
be repaid.     
 The Emergency Relief Guarantee Fund formally established a role for the 
Government of The Bahamas in disaster management.  It also identified the 
Prime Minister as having the formal role of appointing The Minister responsible 
for disaster preparedness.  Although the act placed the Government of The 
Bahamas in a reactive role and one of financial backer, the act triggered the 
development of a loosely coordinated group of representatives from various 
government ministries that slowly began the process of planning for hurricanes.  
This informal group was known as ‘The Bahamas National Disaster 
 266
Preparedness Committee’.  Four years following the impact of Floyd, this group 
became a formalized committee under the coordination of the National 
Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) at the direction of Prime Minister Perry 
Christie.       
6.2.4  An Advocacy Supporting Action 
 The backing of political leaders is not always enough to ensure that 
hazard polices come to fruition; strong community support is also required. 
Hazards research has shown (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1976) that following an 
event, community support for action is high.  This was the case in The Bahamas 
following response to The Bay Street Fire (2001) and Hurricane Michelle (2001).  
 Despite clear problems with disaster response in 1970’s, 1980’s and 
1990’s an advocacy supporting action did not exist until a fire broke out in the 
port area of Nassau destroying two city blocks and adversely affected the tourism 
industry.  The ‘Bay Street Straw Market Fire’ was not included in the research 
study because it only required the response of two national agencies and was 
confined to a very small area.  However, the impact of the fire in combination with 
the shock of Hurricane Michelle triggered a national policy change and created 
the necessary advocacy seeking action.   
 The impact of these two events on the island of New Providence 
highlighted the critical need for a coordinated and centralized response.  Strong 
citizen support was energized by the local media, which documented both 
disaster events, making sure to identify the negative impacts to the nation.  It was 
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the support generated as a result that helped to push forward the implementation 
of a comprehensive emergency management structure within the nation.  A 
strong advocacy seeking action did not exist following Andrew or Floyd.  It was 
this lack of support that allowed previous attempts at hazard policies to fail.      
  Necessary Institutional Resources 
 When evaluating the institutional resources component of the Model of 
Community Response to Disaster (Figure 8.1) it is important to view this in two 
parts. First, does an accurate assessment of available resources exist within the 
Bahamas and second, are the necessary institutional resources accessible.  
During the pre-CEM phase response resources such as necessary 
communication equipment and supplies of fresh water existed within The 
Bahamas.  However, the assets were distributed between a variety of different 
agencies and organizations.  The lack of coordination during this time prevented 
the mobilization of available assets.  It was this lack of coordination that lead to 
decentralized responses during the pre-CEM phase resulting in unmet disaster 
needs.   
  Discussion of the Pre-CEM Application of the Model  
 The application of the model to the Pre-CEM phase of this research 
identifies gaps in emergency management capabilities.  Lacking were good 
professionally trained officials, as RBDF were not trained emergency managers 
(Office of The Prime Minister, 1992).  Not having the leadership and skills to 
effectively coordinate the necessary activities associated with a national disaster, 
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in combination with no legal authority to act, or advocacy seeking action may 
have contributed to the decentralized and ineffective emergency management 
structure identified with the application of Quarantelli’s (1997a).   
 Post-CEM Model Application 
 For research and discussion purposes activities within The Bahamas have 
been delineated as pre- and post-CEM.  However, in practice the line in the sand 
is not as clear.  As discussed previously, it was the impact of the Bay Street Fire 
and Hurricane Michelle on the City of Nassau and the Island of New Providence 
that triggered hazard awareness and action among policy makers and residents. 
This change in attitude and development of support for action began in 2001 and 
is still working today in hopes of fully achieving a nationally coordinated 
emergency management structure.   
6.3.1  Good Leadership by Professionally Trained Officials 
 Emergency management training for NEMA staff members and 
Government Ministries began in March 2002 with the introduction of three 
training courses:  Emergency Management 101, Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC) Training, and Emergency Manager: An Orientation to The Position.  
These three courses, provided by the Global Center for Disaster Management 
and Humanitarian Action at the University of South Florida, provided the basics in 
CEM (Hughey, 2004a).   
 In combination with training NEMA staff, under the leadership of Carl F. 
Smith, began the process of developing a comprehensive emergency 
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management plan (CEMP) (Hughey, 2004a).  As identified by Quarantelli (1998) 
the ‘process’ of developing a national disaster plan is more important then the 
actual written document.  The ‘process’ is considered by many emergency 
management professionals as more important than the finished document 
because the process requires the coordination of information between many 
different ministries and organizations.  It is through this process that personal and 
agency relationships are developed.  It is believed that the interaction between 
ministries in a low stress environment allows for better coordination when a 
disaster does occur.   
 The CEMP utilized an Emergency Support Function (ESF) format.  The 
ESF format details the missions, policies, structures, and responsibilities of each 
government ministry for coordinating resources and programmatic support to 
NEMA and Family Island Administrators during incidents of national significance.  
Furthermore, the ESF structure identified primary and support agencies clearly 
for each core function, preventing confusion over responsibilities during response 
and recovery.  The Bahamas National CEMP has thirteen (13) ESF listed below 
in Table 6.1 (Hughey, 2004a).   
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ESF 1  Transportation 
ESF 2  Communication 
ESF 3  Public Works & Engineering 
ESF 4  International Assistance 
ESF 5  Planning and Information 
ESF 6  Shelter Services 
ESF 7  Relief Supplies & Distribution 
ESF 8  Health & Medical Services 
ESF 9a Urban Search & Rescue 
ESF 9b Marine Search & Rescue 
ESF 10a Hazardous Material Land 
ESF 10b Hazardous Material Marine 
ESF 11 Food 
ESF 12 Tourism 
ESF 13 Volunteers 
Table 6.1 - Commonwealth of The Bahamas National Emergency Support 
Functions (Data Source: NEMA) 
 
 The implementation of national disaster management training and the 
writing of the CEMP provided a solid foundation on which to build a CEM system.  
These activities illustrate the leadership and training provided within the 
Bahamas during the post-CEM phase.   
6.3.2 A Foundation of Supportive Values for Government Action 
 A foundation of supportive values for local government action enables 
concepts to be developed into policies and provides government leaders the 
backing to spend money in an effort to build resources.  During this Post-CEM 
phase of the research a strong foundation of support exists within The Bahamas.  
For example despite a limited economic base, with strong support from residents, 
The Bahamas Government has matched a $650,000 donation from the United 
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States Southern Command to build a new national EOC.   To date the EOC has 
not been constructed but the money has been earmarked, architectural drawings 
have been developed and the land on which it is to be built has been acquired.  
The support from residents is high and the local media is hopeful that the EOC 
will be functioning before the next hurricane season. 
 Another example of the strong support that exists within the Bahamas are 
the numerous volunteer organizations, many of which are associated with local 
churches, that have become certified as ESF 13 support agencies.  This active 
participation by residents in the emergency management process provides for a 
united and well coordinated environment.   
6.3.3 Legal Authority to Act 
 The legal framework within which disaster operations occur can have a 
significant impact on all four phases of disaster management.  During the Post-
CEM phase and in response to the three study hurricanes examined no strong 
legal or regulatory framework existed.  As discussed previously The Emergency 
Relief Guarantee Fund Act, 1999 (Act No. 44 of 1999) addressed issues 
associated with the availability of financial support for recovery activities.  
However, no policies were in place to address the management responsibilities 
associated with national disasters examined in this study.   
 Following the impact of Hurricane Wilma in 2005 legislation addressing 
emergency management within the nation was passed.  The ‘Act To Provide For 
a More Effective Organization of The Mitigation of, Preparedness For, Response 
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To and Recovery From Emergencies and Disasters’ also known as the ‘Disaster 
Preparedness and Response Act of February, 2006’ stipulated the elements of a 
National Disaster Organization which includes NEMA as the driver for disaster 
risk management in The Bahamas.  Arranged into eight sections this new legal 
authority to act provides the necessary foundation for the full implementation of 
CEM within the nation.  Outlined below are the eight section of the legislation. 
 Part I deals with definitions while Part II speaks to the establishment of a 
National Emergency management Agency (NEMA) as a Department of 
Government charged with responsibility for relief management, as well as 
coordination and implementation of government policies for disaster risk 
management.  NEMA is to be headed by a Director, and the Act addresses the 
role and function of the Director, appointment of public officers to relevant posts, 
and to the establishment of NEMA representation on the Family Islands.  A 
Disaster Consultative Committee is to be appointed by each Family Island, and 
the Committee will be responsible for assisting the Director to discharge the 
functions of NEMA as appropriate. 
 Part III deals with the National Emergency Management Advisory 
Committee, (NEMAC) review of the Disaster Preparedness and Response 
Policy, and the National Disaster Response Plan.  Part IV addresses the 
requirements and functioning of emergency operation centers and physical and 
social requirements for shelter operations.  Address in Part V of the Act are the 
obligations of other Public Officers, including liaison functions, environmental 
Impact Assessments and annual reports to and consultations with the NEMA 
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Director.  Part VI outlines procedures with respect to especially vulnerable areas 
and precautionary and/or mitigation plans.   
 Disaster Alerts and Emergencies are addressed in Part VII of the Act.  
Part VIII, entitled Miscellaneous, addresses disaster management items not dealt 
with in the preceding sections of the Act. 
 Subsidiary legislation is currently being considered to support the Disaster 
Preparedness and Response Act.  The Attorney General’s Office is examining 
the following priority components not addressed by previous legislation: 
? Forecasting and the Meteorological Services 
? Evacuations 
? Emergency Communications 
? Agency/Ministry Disaster Plans 
? Disaster Management and Planning for ‘Specially Vulnerable Areas’ 
 
6.3.4 An Advocacy Supporting Action 
 The backing of political leaders is not always enough to ensure that 
hazard polices come to fruition, strong community support is also required. 
Surveys of Family Island Administrators, informal discussion with residents, and 
interviews with NEMA staff revealed a strong support from residents for 
Government action.  Of particular interest was the legalization of mandatory 
evacuation orders that would require residents to leave their homes.  This issue 
is currently being debated and requires careful consideration of the balance 
between individual and government rights.  
 Mandatory evacuation orders are but one example of the dynamic issues 
surrounding CEM within The Bahamas.  The impact of two very active hurricane 
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seasons may have triggered an advocacy supporting action but it has been 
through strong community education that NEMA has been able to keep and 
strengthen support.      
6.3.5 Necessary Institutional Resources 
 As with the evaluation of the pre-CEM phase, institutional resources are 
examined in two parts.  First, does an accurate assessment of available 
resources exist within the Bahamas and second, are the necessary institutional 
resources accessible.  During the post-CEM phase, a comprehensive inventory 
of NEMA assets housed at the disaster warehouse in New Providence, was 
assembled.  Utilizing the SUpply MAnagement (SUMA) System established by 
the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), NEMA assets were well 
documented.  The SUMA system provided a central logistics data system to 
manage disaster response assets.   
 Lacking were detailed assessments of available resources provided by all 
ministries active in disaster response.  During the response phase of a disaster it 
is critical to match emergency needs and assets accordingly.  If resources are 
not accessible emergency needs can go unmet or at the very least delay the 
delivery of services.  The lack of multiple agencies inventories means that 
resources that may be available can not effectively be utilized or coordinated.   
6.3.6 Discussion of the Post-CEM Application of the Model  
 The application of the model to the post-CEM phase of this research 
identified both strengths and weaknesses within the emergency management 
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structure of The Bahamas.  Leadership as compared to the pre-CEM phase was 
good.  NEMA staff and members of government ministries were provided with 
training to help establish an emergency management system.  A response plan 
was also written to provide guidance during response to a national disaster.   
 A foundation for supportive values for government action was and 
continues to be strong in the post-CEM phase.  Individual Bahamians as well as 
established organizations are lending support to the Government in an effort to 
build a well coordinated emergency management structure.   
 During the time of response to all three post-CEM events, no legal 
authority to act existed.  Since that time however, ‘The Disaster Preparedness 
and Response Act, 2006’ was established.  Additional regulatory legislation is 
also being considered at this time with strong support from the Bahamian people.  
 Surveys of Family Island Administrators, informal discussion with 
residents, and interviews with NEMA staff revealed strong support from residents 
for Government action.  Community education programs implemented by NEMA 
have helped to sustain support and increase awareness of the hazards in The 
Bahamas.  Institutional resources during the post-CEM phase show improvement 
when compared to pre-CEM.  However, the lack of multiple agency inventories 
limited NEMA’s ability to coordinate assets.   
6.4 Summary 
 The structured surveys, semi-structured interviews, as well the application 
of Quarantelli’s (1997a) criteria for evaluating the management of response 
operations provide a foundation for evaluating CEM.  What is missing however is 
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a full understanding of the dynamic political, social, and economic environment 
within The Bahamas before and after the implementation of CEM.  The 
application of The Model of Community Response to Disasters (Figure 8.1) 
allows for an expanded understanding of emergency response within The 
Bahamas during both periods.   
 The application of the amended Model of Community Response to 
Disasters (Figure 6.1) was easily and effectively applied to the Bahamas.  The 
model helped to identify strengths and weaknesses in the emergency 
management structure in both the pre- and post-CEM phase.  Furthermore, it 
placed the response to the six study hurricanes in the large comprehensive 
setting allowing for a more complete understanding of the mechanisms impacting 
disaster response.   
 
 277
 
 
 
Chapter Seven 
Summary, Conclusions, And Contributions 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This research sought to answer the following three research questions: 
1. Can Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of 
disaster response be operationalized?  
2. Can CEM, a United States emergency management strategy, be an 
effective strategy for The Bahamas, an archipelagic nation?  
3. Did the implementation of a CEM system improve disaster response within 
The Bahamas?  
 This final chapter provides a summary and discussion of results 
associated with each of the research questions and places the findings within the 
current literature on hazards.  A set of general conclusions and suggestions for 
future research are also provided.   
7.2  Study Summary 
 Global trends show increasing losses from disasters as the number of 
people at risk grows by 70 to 80 million per year (United Nations, 2004).  
Although the frequency of natural disasters may be constant the human 
interaction with the given hazard has shifted through changes in development 
practices, environmental protection as well as the distribution of population and 
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wealth.  In an effort to combat the negative social, economic, and environmental 
impacts of hazards, strategies for identifying vulnerable populations and 
implementing mitigation measures is a high priority in hazards research.  
However despite our best efforts disasters have and will continue to negatively 
impact communities resulting in loss of life and property.  To that end nations 
must establish effective emergency response capabilities to meet the needs of all 
residents potentially at harm. 
 This study examined the establishment of a comprehensive emergency 
management (CEM) system in the nation of The Bahamas.  This exploratory 
research utilized a longitudinal study design to examine the six study hurricanes 
(Andrew ‘92, Floyd ‘99, Michelle ‘01, Frances ‘04, Jeanne ‘04, and Wilma ’05).  
The goal of this research was two fold; first, to document the development of a 
comprehensive emergency management system within The Bahamas and 
second, to compare response operations under CEM with response operations 
prior to its implementation.   
7.3 Overview of Methods 
 This study was designed to determine the impact of CEM on emergency 
response in The Bahamas.  Being a relatively uncharted area of hazards 
research, this study took an exploratory approach that utilized a longitudinal 
study design, that allowed for the repeated observation of national response 
operations.  Mixed methods were used to collect and analyze data.  Data for the 
study were collected over a six year period from 2001-2007.  The following data 
collection techniques were employed for this study:  (1) archival research, (2) 
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structured surveys, (3) semi-structured interviews, and (4) participant 
observation.   
 Data collected through the above mentioned four methods were analyzed 
in several ways.  First, the surveys and closed-ended questions associated with 
the interviews were analyzed using standard statistical techniques.  The data 
was then applied to 8 of the 10 criteria for measuring the management of national 
disaster response operations as outlined by Quarantelli (1997a).  Finally, data 
were applied to the Model of Community Response to Disaster (Hughey, 2003).  
7.4 Key Research Findings 
 Research Question One: Can Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for 
evaluating the management of disaster response be operationalized? 
Quarentelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of disaster 
response operations was successfully operationalized and applied to the six 
study hurricanes.  Each of the eight research criteria were well applied and the 
results are outlined below. 
? Criterion One, adequately carrying out generic functions, appears not 
to have been impacted by the implementation of CEM.  However, upon 
closer examination what emerged was a clear improvement in the 
early recognition of each of the ten generic functions, which are 
encompassed within the first criterion.  The data displayed 
improvements that can be associated with the implementation of a 
CEM system in 2002 (see table 4.3) and the development of a national 
response plan that outlined responsibility and SOP’s for each of the 
functions. 
? Criterion Two, effectively mobilizing personnel and resources, showed 
improvements following the implementation of the CEM system.  An 
association with the improvement in the function and the development 
of a national emergency response plan was noted.  It is critical to 
identify however that the improvements associated to the CEM system 
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did not rule out or take away from the impact that experience may have 
played in improvements to response operations. 
? Criterion Three, adequately processing information, displayed a pattern 
of improvement following the implementation of the CEM system.  The 
implementation of a national response plan helped to develop clear 
lines of communication between citizens, the government, and 
response agencies that allowed for more accurate processing of 
information and improved response operations.  Also associated with 
the improvement are experience and improved recording keeping. 
? Criterion Four, the properly exercising decision-making, showed no 
pattern or association of improvement following the implementation of 
CEM.  Response operations to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne 
experienced the same problems with decision-making as the pre-CEM 
response operations. 
? Criterion Five, developing overall coordination, showed a marked 
improvement after the implementation of the CEM system.  Data 
indicates improvements are associated with the development of a 
nation response plan that required multi-agency coordination over a 
two-year period prior to the impact of Hurricane Frances. 
? Criterion Six, Correctly recognizing differences between response and 
agent-generated demands, was dependent of the success of criteria 2 
through 5.  The data did not identify an association between criterion 
six and the implementation of a CEM system. 
? Criterion Seven, providing appropriate and accurate reports for the 
news media, showed a clear pattern of improvement during the post-
CEM response operations.  The data showed the improvement was 
associated with the implementation of the national response plan 
(2002). 
? Criterion eight, a well-functioning emergency operations center, 
showed no improvement associated to the implementation of a CEM 
system.  Challenges to the physical requirements outlined by 
Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology indicated the EOC facilities utilized 
in response to each of the six study hurricanes were insufficient. 
 Although Quarantelli’s methodology was operationalized some application 
difficulties do existed. The subjective nature of Quarantelli’s criteria for evaluating 
the management of emergency response operations, limits its utility as a 
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practical tool.  It is recommended that the methodology be refined for ease of 
application and to ensure consistency in use.  A more detailed and structured 
application guideline is succesged to prevent subjective employment of the tool.  
The use of benchmarks would also provide emergency managers with the 
necessary apparatus to establish response goals and provide a metric to rate the 
overall improvement to response within a jurisdiction. 
 Research Question Two: Can CEM, a United States emergency 
management strategy, be an effective strategy for The Bahamas, an archipelagic 
nation?  Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology was able to identify areas where the 
implementation of a CEM system improved disaster response operations in The 
Bahamas.   
? Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the 
management of disaster response was able to identify area 
where the implementation of CEM improved the national 
management of disaster response.  The research data indicated 
improvements associated with the implementation of a CEM 
system, in the following five criteria.  
o Adequately carrying out generic functions; 
o Effectively mobilizing personnel and resources; 
o Adequately processing information; 
o Developing overall coordination; 
o Providing appropriate and accurate reports for the news 
media; 
? The amended Model of Community Response to Disasters was 
easily and effectively applied to the Bahamas, identifying 
strengths and weaknesses in the emergency management 
structure in both the pre- and post-CEM phases. 
 This research hypothesized that the implementation of CEM would 
improve all areas of disaster response within the nation of the Bahamas.  Based 
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on Quarantelli’s (1997a) eight criteria for evaluation improvements were noted in 
the following six areas following the implementation of CEM.   
? Adequately carrying out generic functions; 
? Effectively mobilizing personnel and resources; 
? Adequately processing information; 
? Properly exercising decision making; 
? Developing Overall Coordination; 
? Providing appropriate and accurate reports for the news media 
Despite the improvement in these areas, there was not enough evidence to 
support the claim that the impetus for improvement in The Bahamas emergency 
response was the implementation of CEM.  Furthermore, the subjective nature of 
the evaluation criteria limits its utility as a practical tool.   
 It was further hypothesized that CEM would be an effective and successful 
emergency management strategy for The Commonwealth of The Bahamas.  To 
that end, based on anecdotal evidence from observation and interviews with 
NEMA staff CEM is a successful strategy for the management of disasters but 
continues to need work. 
“To continue to improve we need to improve overall coordination as well 
as inter-island coordination.  The island administrators are too be 
working in the capacity of disaster coordinator at the local level  (Sub-
NEMA) and there plans need to be in position and taken to operational 
mode, then it can come to the national level that is where it can be 
confusing.  We have come along way but we still have a ways to go but it 
is going to workout…workout in time” (Bethel, 2006) 
 
“Comprehensive emergency management provides a connection between 
all the components of disaster management.  The training has really 
helped.  We all know who to call and who has what job.  Information 
comes through the national EOC and it allows for better coordination.  
We still have glitches and we are continuing to work on them, but the new 
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system and the passage of the disaster legislation has legitimized NEMA 
and provided us with recognition” (Outten-Moncur, 2006b) 
 
Additionally, the data indicated an increase in mean score when asked to 
evaluate response operations on a 1 to 5 scale.  An increasing mean score is 
identified between the pre-CEM and post-CEM response phases by both the 
Island Administrators and NEMA staff. (See Table 7.1)  This further supports the 
the anecdotal evidence that CEM has improved response operations within The 
Bahamas.  However, the data are not strong enough to identify CEM as the 
exclusive reason for improvement.  Variables such as experience cannot be 
ruled out as the trigger for improvement in national response operations.   
 
Hurricane Island Administrators NEMA 
Andrew 2.27 2.58 
Floyd 2.44 2.83 Pre-CEM 
Michelle --- 2.66 
Frances & 
Jeanne 3.66 3.5 
Post-CEM 
Wilma 4.05 3.66 
Table 7.1 – Comparison between the perceptions of Island Administrators and 
NEMA Staff with regards to the national response to the six study hurricanes.   
 
 The amended Model of Community Response to Disasters (Figure 7.1) 
was easily and effectively applied to this research study.  The model was able to 
identify strengths and weaknesses in the emergency management structure in 
 284
both the pre- and post-CEM phases.  The application of the model assisted in 
placing each of the six response operation in the appropriate context. 
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Figure 7.1 – Model of Community Response to Disasters (Source: Amended 
Hughey, 2003) 
 
7.5  Contributions to Geography 
 This study provides one of the first longitudinal hazards research studies 
conducted by a Geographer.  A criticism of the hazards literature has been that 
many researchers take only a snapshot of disaster events omitting the temporal 
component in turn preventing the necessary examination of the dynamic and 
intertwined relationships that impact all four phases of the emergency 
management cycle.  Furthermore, this research provides the hazards literature 
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with an application and test of Quarantelli’s criteria for evaluating the 
management of emergency response operations.  The application of this 
methodology identified a need for a more concrete metric that does not allow for 
subjectivity in application.   
 This research additionally provides to the hazards research a theoretical 
model for evaluating community response to disasters.  This model was 
previously tested at the local level in Falmouth, Kentucky and has now been 
successfully tested at the national level in The Bahamas.  This model provides 
emergency managers and hazards researchers with a tool for exploring 
questions surrounding the four phases of emergency management.   
7.6 Recommendations & Future Research 
7.6.1 Recommendations 
 It is recommended that a metric be developed based on a time scale for 
key emergency response functions.  For example, if general functions are carried 
out effectively all preliminary damage assessment report should be completed 
within forty-eight (48) hours of the impact area being designated safe for 
response personnel.  Well established criteria would allow for the evaluation and 
comparison of response operations.  This type of metric would also help to 
establish a concrete timeline of events which could be used to improve response 
operations within a jurisdiction.   
 It is also recommend that more longitudinal research studies be conducted 
in an effort to more thoroughly understand the dynamic nature of emergency 
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response.  Necessary evaluation of the dynamic and intertwined relationships 
that exist.  This study needs to be developed which does not allow for the 
7.6.2 Future Research 
 This research, which began in 2001, continues today documenting and 
evaluating the development of the CEM system for the Commonwealth of The 
Bahamas.  In June of 2008, at the annual NEMA conference in Nassau, 
additional surveys will be conducted with Family Island Administrators to gauge 
the effectiveness of the national response to Tropical Storm Noel.  Noel 
significantly impacted the southeastern and central islands of The Bahamas in 
November of 2007 causing extensive flooding and requiring a full activation of 
the nation EOC.  Mechanisms for evaluation and coordination with NEMA and 
the Government of The Bahamas continues to ensure future response operations 
can be evaluated and more data obtained in an effort to improve emergency 
response.   
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Glossary Of Acronyms 
 
BEC Bahamas Electric Corporation 
BTC Bahamas Telecommunication Company 
CDERA Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency 
CDM Comprehensive Disaster Management 
CEM Comprehensive Emergency Management 
CEMP Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 
CERT Community Emergency Response Team 
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency 
EOC Emergency Operations Center 
ICS Incident Command System 
NGA National Governors’ Association 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
ODPEM Office for Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management 
OFDA Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance 
PAHO Pan American Health Organization 
PDA Preliminary Damage Assessment 
RBDF Royal Bahamas Defence Force 
SUMA SUpply MAnagement System 
W&SC Water and Sewerage Corporation 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command 
ZNS The Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas 
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Appendix A: Family Island Administrators Structured Survey 
 
Family Island Administrator 
Disaster Management Survey 
 
The following questions focus on Disaster Training, Planning and Response 
efforts within The Bahamas.  Family Island Administrators are asked to please 
complete the following survey and fax or e-mail responses back to the National 
Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) Office at (242) 326-5456 or at 
NEMA@Bahamas.gov.bs by Wednesday, January 31, 2007.  Thank you in 
advance for you assistance in this matter. 
DISASTER TRAINING: 
1. Has your island received disaster training from the NEMA office?  
  Yes___ No____ 
a. If yes, what type of training?  ______________________________ 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
2. What type of training would you like to see offered by NEMA?  _________ 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
3. Did you or a representative from your office attend any of the NEMA 
Conferences held in 2004, 2005, and 2006? Yes ___ No ___ 
a. If yes, did you find the conference useful; why or why not? ______ 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
DISASTER PLANNING & INFORMATION 
4. Does your island have a disaster preparedness and response plan? 
  Yes___ No___ 
a. If yes, when was the last time it was reviewed and updated?  _____ 
5. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) how would 
you rate NEMA’s efforts to inform the public of their role in disaster 
planning and response?  1 2 3 4 5 
 
DISASTER RESPONSE:   
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6. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) how 
successful do you think the national response to 1992’s Hurricane Andrew 
was? 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) how 
successful do you think the national response to 1999’s Hurricane Floyd 
was? 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) how 
successful do you think the national response to 2004’s Hurricanes 
Frances and Jeanne was? 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) how 
successful do you think the national response to 2005’s Hurricane Wilma 
was? 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Were you aware that The Bahamas has been working since 2002 to 
develop a comprehensive emergency management structure in an effort 
to coordinate disaster planning and response activities?   Yes___ No___ 
11. What do you see as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and 
response on your island?_______________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
12. What do you see as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and 
response for The Bahamas?____________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
13. How do you think national disaster preparedness and response can be 
improved?__________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Do you think the passage of the National Disaster Preparedness and 
Response Act will improve disaster response within The Bahamas.   
Yes ___   No ___ 
a. Why or why not:  _____________________________________ 
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________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
  
15. What do you think other island nations in the Caribbean can learn from 
The Bahamas with regards to disaster preparedness and response?  ____ 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
RESPONDENT INFORMATION: 
Island(s) Represented:  ____________________________________________ 
How many years have you served as an Island Administrator?  _____________ 
 
General Comments:  _______________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix B: Understanding The Hazard - The Development and Impact of the 
Six Study Hurricanes 
 
B.1  Introduction 
 Appendix B examines the development and impact of Hurricanes Andrew, 
Floyd, Michelle, Frances, Jeanne, and Wilma on the Commonwealth of The 
Bahamas.  Provided is an overview of the development and physical parameters 
of each storm based on data gathered through official reports issued by The 
Bahamas Department of Meteorology, archival research, and personal 
correspondence with Meteorologist Trevor Basden.   
 Included in this chapter are the development characteristics of each storm 
and the impact to the Islands of The Bahamas.  Maps are provided to display the 
historic path of each storm as it passed through the archipelago.  Understanding 
the development of each hurricane is critical to examining the disaster response 
activities that resulted.  Disaster response decisions regarding evacuations, 
sheltering, and movement of resources and supplies are directly linked to 
information obtained by officials.  This chapter will provide the information that 
was available to decision makers at the time of each storm event as well as 
provide personal accounts of the impact of each storm on residents.  A detailed 
discussion of the national response to each of the study hurricanes begins in 
Chapter 5 of this dissertation.   
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B.2  Hurricane Andrew 1992 
 Hurricane Andrew became the first named storm of the 1992 season and 
very quickly became the first major hurricane (category 3 or higher) to impact 
The Bahamas since Hurricane Betsy in 1965.  As Andrew slammed into the 
Central Islands of The Bahamas, it caused major damage and destruction before 
continuing on to South Florida and South Central Louisiana.  Map B.1 illustrates 
the historic path that Andrew took through The Bahamas. 
B.2.1 Hurricane Andrew Storm Development 
 According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology on August 14, 
1992 satellite photos indicated a strong tropical wave off the African coast in the 
area of the Cape Verde Islands.  Two days later (Sunday, August 16th) the 
satellite images indicated a tropical depression had formed and was located mid-
way between Africa and the Lesser Antilles.  Early reports on Monday, August 
17th indicated that the depression was moving west at 21 mph and was located 
near 11.6N and 40.4 W.  Within 24 hours the depression strengthened to 
become the first tropical storm of the 1992 season and was named Andrew.  At 
this time, The Bahamas Department of Meteorology was reporting that Andrew 
had sustained winds of 40mph and was approximately 1,175 miles east of the 
Lesser Antilles.   
 Andrew moved west-northwest at 25 miles per hour with storm 
development alternating between periods of weakening and strengthening.  For 
the next 30 hours (11pm on the 19th to 5am on the 21st) Andrew moved on a 
northwest course at 14 miles per hour.  According to the August 21, 1992 
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11:00am report from The Department of Meteorology, Andrew was becoming 
better organized and was predicted to strengthen to hurricane force within the 
next 12 to 24 hours.  Maximum sustained winds at the time of the report were 
measured at 60mph and the storm had shifted to a west-northwest course at 10 
miles per hour.  
 Information gathered by the United States Air Force Reserve Unit Aircraft 
on Saturday August 22nd at 5am confirmed that Andrew had reached hurricane 
intensity.  The Bahamas Department of Meteorology reported that the center of 
the storm was located near latitude 25.8 N and longitude 67.5 W.  At this time 
Andrew was approximately 610 miles slightly north and east of Nassau, 
Bahamas and was still on a west-northwest course moving at 10 mph with 
sustained winds of 75mph.  The 11am report placed the islands of the Northwest 
Bahamas under a hurricane warning until Monday August 24th at 7am.   
 On Sunday August 23rd official reports from The Bahamas Department of 
Meteorology noticed strengthening of the hurricane.  By early morning Andrew 
reached category four strength with sustained winds of 135 mph.   The storm 
was approximately 100 miles east of Harbour Island, Eleuthera and 160 miles 
east of Nassau.  The course of the hurricane had shifted and Andrew was 
moving due west at 16 mph projected to cross northern Eleuthera, north of 
Nassau, through the Berry Islands, South of Bimini and south of Miami, Florida. 
 According to reports from The Bahamas Department of Meteorology 
Hurricane Andrew’s central pressure fell steadily as it passed through the islands 
reaching a minimum of 922mb at about 2pm on Sunday, August 23rd 
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approximately 60 miles east of the Island of Eleuthera.  The eye of Andrew 
moved over Harbour Island about 5pm the same day, with a central pressure of 
935mb.  (See Picture B.1) 
 
Picture B.1 – Hurricane Andrew as it passes over The Bahamas.  (Source:  
NOAA, 1992) 
 Hurricane Andrew officially moved through the Islands of The Bahamas as 
a category 4 hurricane.  However damage to monitoring equipment limited data 
collection.  After passing through the Bahamas Hurricane Andrew moved across 
Southern Florida where the National Hurricane Center (NHC) recorded gusts of 
164 mph before the main radar at the NHC was destroyed.  Hurricane Andrew 
crossed the State of Florida with sustained winds of 125 mph and a forward 
speed of 18 mph.  Andrew then moved into the Gulf of Mexico and into Louisiana 
where it subsequently merged with a frontal trough and died. 
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B.2.1.1 Central Pressure and Intensity of Hurricane Andrew 
 Figure B.1 below shows the related wind speed and central pressure 
associated with Hurricane Andrew.  The data illustrate the relationship between 
the drop in central pressure and the increase in wind speed.  Hurricane Andrew 
impacted the Islands of The Bahamas on August 23rd when its winds were at 
their peak.   
 
Figure B.1 – Hurricane Andrew Wind Speed and Central Pressure (Data Source: 
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology).   
B.2.2  Hurricane Andrew Impact  
 According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology (1992), Hurricane 
Andrew generated hurricane force winds outward as far as 30 miles from the eye 
and gale force winds for 105 miles.  The Current and Lower Bogue, both 
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settlements of North Eleuthera, reported storm surges of 25 feet and 16 feet 
respectively.  The Bahamas Department of Meteorology also reported numerous 
tornadoes were spawned from “thunderclouds associated with Hurricane 
Andrew” (The Bahamas Department of Meteorlogy, 1992:3).   
 Hurricane Andrew passed over Eleuthera, the Berry Islands and South 
Bimini on the 23rd of August, 1992.   Flooding and property damage were 
reported on all of the respective islands and four (4) deaths were officially 
reported.   Below are comments from Hurricane Andrew preliminary damage 
assessment reports (The Bahamas Department of Meteorlogy, 1992). (see 
pictures B.2 - B.4) 
? The settlements of James Cistern, Gregory Town, Alice Town and 
Palmetto Point on the Island of Eleuthera suffered minor damages.  
Coastal roads were damaged by high seas, and docks throughout the 
island had been extensively damaged.  Minor damage was also 
reported in The Bluff and Lower Bogue. 
? The Current and Current Island were extensively damaged as a result 
of Hurricane Andrew.  Twenty-four of the thirty homes on Current 
Island where destroyed.  Government buildings were destroyed and 
docks were unusable.  The islands were devastated and in need of 
immediate emergency assistance.   
? On Spanish Wells, the bridge that joined Russell Island to Spanish 
Wells was destroyed while many other fishing boats were lost to the 
high seas.  The two main food stores on the island were also 
completely destroyed, while others were seriously damaged.  
Movement throughout the island was impaired due to debris and 
damage to roadways.     
? The Government Dock on Harbour Island was the only dock on the 
island left standing as a result of Hurricane Andrew.  All buildings on 
the island suffered considerable damages and the main tourist 
destination, The Pink Sands Hotel, was destroyed.   
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B.2.3 Hurricane Andrew Discussion 
 When Andrew swept through The Bahamas it was the first major storm to 
impact the Commonwealth in twenty-seven (27) years.  The storm cost the nation 
an estimated $250 million dollars, left 1,500 homeless, and killed four (4) 
residents (Caribbean Disaster Advisory Subcommittee, 1994).  Also, during this 
period The Bahamas was adjusting to a new government.  Just weeks before 
Hurricane Andrew made landfall, the Free National Movement lead by Hubert 
Ingraham won general elections, ending Prime Minister Lynden Pindling’s 25 
year rule.  The Royal Bahamas Defence Force took the lead role in responding to 
Hurricane Andrew with strong support from Social Services.  Additional agencies 
and organizations provided support in response operations but no centralized 
emergency management structure existed in 1992.  These are important social 
and political components that influenced the national governments response 
capabilities.  Hazards literature (Tobin and Montz, 1997) has shown that hazards 
experience can change perception and response and were examined as part of 
this research. 
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Picture B.2 – Hurricane Andrew Damage on the Island of Abaco, The 
Bahamas. (Source: The Bahamas Information Service published in Neely 
2006) 
 
Picture B.3 – Hurricane Andrew Damage on the Island of Eleuthera. 
(Source: The Bahamas Information Service published in Neely 2006) 
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Picture B.4 – Hurricane Andrew Damage on the Island of Eleuthera. 
(Source: The Bahamas Information Service published in Neely 2006) 
B.3 Hurricane Floyd 1999 
 Hurricane Floyd was a powerful Cape Verde hurricane that impacted The 
Bahamas during the 1999 hurricane Season.  Floyd pounded the Central and 
Northwest Bahamas particularly Cat Island, San Salvador, Eleuthera, New 
Providence, Abaco and Eastern Grand Bahama.  Floyd was a category four 
hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson Scale and was the most intense and destructive 
hurricane on record to impact the Bahamas.  Map B.2 illustrates the historic path 
that Floyd took through The Bahamas. 
B.3.1 Hurricane Floyd Storm Development 
 According to reports from The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, on 
Tuesday September 7th, 1999 tropical depression number eight formed 
approximately 1000 miles east of The Lesser Antilles, moving west at 14 mph.  
The following day the tropical depression was upgraded to a tropical storm and 
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given the name Floyd.  As Floyd moved west northwest at 10-16 mph it began to 
slowly strengthen.  The Friday, September 10th 8pm report from The Bahamas 
Department of Meteorology indicated that the United States Air Force Reserve 
reconnaissance aircraft confirmed that Floyd had strengthened to hurricane 
status with maximum sustained winds of 80 mph (70 knots) and a central 
pressure of 989mb.   
 The storm continued to intensify over the next day and by the 5am report 
on Saturday, September 11th Floyd had developed into a category two.  
Sustained winds were recorded at 105mph moving in a northwest direction at 
10mph.  In the very early morning hours of September 12th The Bahamas 
Department of Meteorology noted a rising mid- to upper-level tropospheric 
heights to the north of Floyd was forcing the storm to turn west.  This westward 
turn marked the start of a major period of strengthening for the storm.   
 The 8am report on Monday, September 13th indicated that Floyd, had 
continued to strengthen and was currently a category three storm.  By the 5pm 
report on the same day Floyd had again strengthened to a category-four storm 
with maximum sustained winds of over 131 mph.  At this time Floyd was located 
350 miles east-southeast of San Salvador, 580 miles east-southeast of Nassau, 
and 225 miles northeast of the Turks and Caicos Islands.  A tropical storm 
warning was issued for the Southeast Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos 
Islands.  A Hurricane Watch was also posted for the Central Bahamas.  Floyd 
moved within 425 miles east-northeast of the Island of Mayaguana on a track 
that was taking it due west at 14 mph.  Floyd continued to strengthen and before 
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the 13th came to an end Hurricane Floyd was packing sustained winds of 155 
mph, the upper end of a category four hurricane.  The Bahamas Department of 
Meteorology attributed the explosive strengthening of Hurricane Floyd to the very 
warm shallow ocean waters east of the archipelago.   
 Floyd was in position to strike the central Bahamas when it began moving 
towards the west-northwest and moved some 20-30 miles north of San Salvador 
around midnight on Tuesday, September 14th.  As the storm continued to move 
west-northwest it weakened slightly in intensity as it moved within 25 miles of 
Orange Creek and Arthur’s Town, Cat Island.   
 Tuesday, September 14th Hurricane Floyd was moving at 14 mph in a 
west-northwest track parallel to Eleuthera.  The eye of the storm was 
approximately 10 miles east of South and Central Eleuthera; with the western 
eye-wall of the hurricane crossing Central and North Eleuthera.  The eye of Floyd 
made landfall near Alice Town, Eleuthera around 8am.  In this position it passed 
some 65 miles northeast of New Providence by 11am.   
 After traveling across North Eleuthera and turning towards the northwest, 
Floyd struck Abaco making landfall around 2pm near Cherokee Sound, Abaco.  
According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, Floyd had weakened 
very slightly before hitting Abaco and was still a category four hurricane when it 
made landfall.  The eye of the storm traversed Abaco moving south to north, 
pummeling the island with maximum sustained winds of 115 mph.  The Bahamas 
Department of Meteorology reported downdrafts and tornadoes on Abaco as a 
result of Floyd.  The eye of the storm crossed over Crossing Rock, Mastic Point, 
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Woolen Dean Cay, and Cooper’s Town, Abaco.  After three hours, the eye of 
Hurricane Floyd emerged over waters north of Cedar Harbour, Abaco, around 
5pm on the 14th.   
 During the evening hours Floyd passed 30 miles northeast of Eastern 
Grand Bahama bringing with it 75 mph winds with gusts of 94 mph.  Wednesday 
September 15th, Floyd left the waters of the Bahamas as it established a 
northwest and then a north-northwest course around 5am.  Floyd followed the 
coast of Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina before making landfall in the 
United States on September 16th near Wilmington, North Carolina. (See Picture 
B.5) 
 
 
 
Picture B.5 – Hurricane Floyd Satellite Image as it passes over The Bahamas.  
(Source:  NOAA, 1999) 
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B.3.1.1 Central Pressure and Intensity of Hurricane Floyd 
 Figure B.2 below shows the related wind speed and central pressure 
associated with Hurricane Floyd.  The data illustrates the relationship between 
the drop in central pressure and the increase in wind speed.  Hurricane Floyd 
impacted the Islands of The Bahamas on September 13th and 14th when the 
winds were at their peak.   
 
Figure B.2 – Hurricane Floyd 1999 Wind Speed and Barometric Pressure (Data 
Source: The Bahamas Department of Meteorology) 
 
B.3.2 Impact of Hurricane Floyd on the Islands 
 With sustained winds of 155 mph, torrential rains, and over a 20 foot storm 
surge Floyd devastated the islands.  Many coastal communities suffered from 
severe flooding and widespread damage.  Toppled power and telephone lines 
throughout the islands disrupted electricity and communications.  Initial damage 
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assessment reports estimated that around 27,000 persons living in the Family 
Islands were affected and were urgently in need of water, temporary shelter and 
food.  The islands most significantly impacted included: Abaco, Eleuthera, Grand 
Bahama, The Berry Islands, Cat Island, San Salvador and New Providence.  
Provided below are brief overviews of the damage assessments made 
immediately following the passage of Hurricane Floyd. 
 
B.3.2.1 New Providence (Nassau) 
 Experiencing less damage than the Family Islands, New Providence 
reported sustained wind of 80mph.  Minor damage to buildings such as windows 
and roofs were reported, while landscaping throughout the island was badly 
impacted with hundreds of downed trees.  Movement around the island was very 
difficult due to blocked roadways.  The storm surge caused damage to marinas 
and ports on the island, and many small boats were beached or sunk in the 
Nassau Harbour.  Two barges were also reported washed ashore.  Over 2000 
tourists weathered the storm in the capital city of Nassau.  However, no deaths 
were reported on the Island of New Providence as a result of Hurricane Floyd. 
B.3.2.2 The Abacos 
 Hurricane Floyd left over 2,000 people homeless in the Abacos.  
Approximately ten percent of the islands homes were destroyed and forty percent 
were severely damaged.  Mud Town, a settlement of Haitian immigrants was 
destroyed.  Settlements on the northern and southern extremes of the Abaco’s 
suffered catastrophic damages with most, if not all, homes destroyed.   
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“Parliamentarian Mr. Robert Sweeting estimated that damage in Abaco alone 
was in the range of over $750 million dollars” (Neely, 2006:130).  Government 
reports indicated that seventy-five percent of the Moores Island’s homes were 
completely destroyed or uninhabitable.  In Marsh Harbour many large buildings 
were completely destroyed and much of the area suffered considerable flooding.    
 Storm surge caused widespread beach erosion throughout the Abaco’s.  
In Hope Town, homes which sat on the ocean’s edge were completely 
submerged under water.  Both airports (Treasure Cay and Marsh Harbour) 
sustained major damage from flooding and were forced to close for several days 
following the storm.  The connecting road between Marsh Harbour (South 
Central Abaco) and Treasure Cay was impassable and areas of Perimeter Road 
ceased to exist.  Agriculture in the area was also significantly impacted with the 
citrus harvest, an estimated 3,000 acres, loosing the entire 1999 crop.  Hurricane 
Floyd was so great that it changed the size and shape of many of the cays that 
make up the Abaco’s.  
B.3.2.3 Grand Bahamas 
 On Grand Bahama, the storm produced extensive flooding and caused the 
closure of the Airport for several days.  Flooding on the western end of the island 
stranded residents cutting off roads.  Agriculture was significantly impacted with 
thirty percent of the broiler production for the nation destroyed and extreme 
reductions in the citrus crops reduced from 1,500 acres to 150 acres.  Minor 
damage to homes throughout the island were also reported. 
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B.3.2.4 Eleuthera 
 Approximately 25% of Homes on the Island of Eleuthera sustained 
damage as a result of Hurricane Floyd, with 1% of the homes classified as 
destroyed.  Major damage was assessed to all mail-boat docks as well as the 
Rock Sound Airport.  Government structures such as the docks and customs 
warehouse located at The Bluff were seriously damaged.  The dock at Jean’s 
Bay was destroyed as were many of the roadways on the islands.  The Spanish 
Wells fishing fleet was devastated, many of the vessels having been breached 
and others having sunk in the harbour.   Of greatest concern following the 
passage of Hurricane Floyd was clean drinking water.  Eleuthera, which is 
normally supplied with potable water by boat, could not receive water due to 
damage to the ports.  Additionally, storm surge associated with the storm had 
severely impacted the water well fields, causing salt water intrusion making the 
water undrinkable.   
B.3.2.5 San Salvador 
 The eye of Hurricane Floyd passed just north of the island of San 
Salvador.  The island sustained damage to most structures including tourist 
facilities, the Bahamian Field Station (BFS), Club Med Columbus Isle Resort, and 
the Riding Rock Inn.  No injuries were reported on the island as a result of the 
storm.  The island was without power and telecommunication systems for several 
weeks after the storm passed.  Like in many of the other islands, damage to 
roadways and key transportation components such as airports and docks were 
also reported.  San Salvador suffered significant beach alteration changing the 
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shape and size of the island.  The main concern for residents of San Salvador 
immediately following the storm was drinking water. 
B.3.2.6 Cat Island 
 With A total population of 1,700 residents, Cat Island suffered significant 
damage to homes and government facilities, although no injuries were reported.  
However the two medical facilities on the island lost their roofs.  Beach erosion, 
flooding and damage to roadways were considerable.   
 
Picture B.6 – Hurricane Floyd Damage on Arawak Cay, The Bahamas (Source: 
Neely 2006) 
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Picture B.7 – Hurricane Floyd Damage on the Island of New Providence, The 
Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006) 
 
Picture B.8 – Hurricane Floyd Damage on the Island of New Providence, The 
Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006) 
 
B.3.3 Hurricane Floyd Discussion 
 
 Hurricane Floyd devastated the central and northern islands of The 
Bahamas.  The key concerns for the nation were meeting immediate emergency 
needs of food and clean water to all areas impacted.  Damage to well fields, and 
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transportation routs (airports, ports, and roadways) prevented the movement of 
emergency goods between islands as well as on the island.   
 The Royal Bahamas Defence Force led by Commander Steven Russell, 
activated an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) based at the Cabinet Office in 
Nassau.  Although the response and eventual recovery of Hurricane Floyd 
required multiple ministries, agencies, and organizations the coordination of 
assets was not centralized.       
B.4 Hurricane Michelle 2001 
 Hurricane Michelle was the first hurricane in over 35 years directly to 
impact the Island of New Providence.  New Providence is not only the most 
densely populated island in the archipelago it is also home to the City of Nassau, 
the nation’s capital.  Interruption in government operations would devastate the 
economy of the nation and Hurricane Michelle served as a reminder to many 
residents of New Providence that the island is very much at risk to the impact of 
hurricanes.  Map B.3 illustrates the historic path that Michelle took as she passed 
through The Bahamas. 
B.4.1 Hurricane Michelle Storm Development 
 Tropical depression number 15 of the 2001 season, developed on Monday 
October 29th near the coast of Nicaragua.  The depression remained virtually 
stationary until the very early morning hours of Wednesday, October 31st.  
According to reports by The Bahamas Department of Meteorology on the 
morning of October 31st, the depression began to move slowly towards the north 
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at 6mph, with no change in strength.  Reports from Thursday, November 1st 
indicated a drop in the central pressure to 997 with a corresponding increase in 
the winds to 60mph.  This resulted in the fourteenth tropical storm for the season 
and was given the name of Michelle.  At this time Michelle was not of particular 
concern as the tropical storm continued to move north-northwest at 5 mph. 
 Morning reports on November 2nd showed Michelle had begun to slow to 3 
mph as it intensified to hurricane strength.  The maximum sustained winds were 
measured at 75 mph, and a central pressure of 980 millibars.  By the next 
morning Hurricane Michelle, which was somewhat erratic, began to intensify 
rapidly becoming a category four hurricane, with sustained winds of 135 mph.  
Near the end of the day on November 3rd Hurricane Michelle slowly picked up 
forward speed with a shift in track towards the north-northeast.  A hurricane 
watch was posted at 11pm on the 3rd for the Northwest and Central Bahamas to 
include: Bimini, Grand Bahama, Abaco, The Berry Islands, Andros, New 
Providence, Eleuthera, Exuma, Cat Island, Ragged Island, Long Island, Rum 
Cay and San Salvador.  The Bahamas Department of Meteorology “urged 
residents in the Northwest and Central Bahamas to monitor the progress of 
Michelle closely and be prepared to take quick action” (Dean & Rolle, 2001:3).   
 The afternoon report on Sunday November 4th noted that Hurricane 
Michelle’s forwards speed had accelerated to 13 mph.  While over Cuba late 
around 7pm, Michelle began to lose strength and her maximum sustained winds 
decreased to 125mph.  By 10 pm that night reports indicated that the weakening 
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trend was continuing and Michelle’s sustained wind speed decreased to 110 
mph.   
 According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology at around 1am on 
Monday, November 5th the leading edge of Michelle began to impact the island of 
Andros.  While still on the northern shore of Central Cuba, about 175 miles 
southwest of Red Bays Andros, tropical storm force winds began to batter the 
island of Andros.  Approximately an hour later the first tropical storm force winds 
were recorded on the Island of New Providence.  By 7am that morning, the eye 
of Michelle was over the island of Andros.  Maximum sustained winds outside of 
the eye were around 80-85 mph with higher gusts and very heavy rain showers.  
Michelle continued tracking northeast at 19 mph and by 9:30am the eye of the 
hurricane moved over the island of New Providence.  According to Reports from 
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, “the passage of the eye over the 
island caused some persons to believe that the hurricane had passed” (Dean & 
Rolle, 2001:3).  Just before 11am the second assault began with winds shifting 
northwest to north and increasing from 16 mph to sustained winds of 46 mph 
sustained with peak winds up to 103 mph.   
 By 4pm on the 5th Hurricane Michelle passed over North Eleuthera, as the 
storms track shifted towards the east-northeast at 21 mph.  The Bahamas 
Department of Meteorology reported that by 10pm on November 5th all warnings 
were dropped as Michelle moved away from The Bahamas and back into the 
open ocean. (See Picture B.9) 
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Picture B.9 - Hurricane Michelle Satellite Image as it approaches The Bahamas.  
(Source:  NOAA, 2001) 
B.4.1.1 Central Pressure and Intensity of Hurricane Michelle 
 Figure B.3 shows the related wind speed and central pressure associated 
with Hurricane Michelle.  The data illustrate the relationship between the drop in 
central pressure and the increase in wind speed.  On October 29th Michelle, a 
tropical depression at the time had a central pressure of 1005 mb.  Michelle’s 
pressure slowly began to fall reaching a low of 933 mb on November 3rd.  At this 
time Michelle was a category four hurricane and was moving towards Cuba and 
The Islands of The Bahamas.  The storm impacted The Bahamas on the 4th and 
5th of November as the wind speed began to diminish.  
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Figure B.3: Hurricane Michelle Wind Speed and Central Pressure (Data Source: 
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology).   
B.4.2 Impact of Hurricane Michelle on the Islands 
 According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology (2001), Hurricane 
Michelle produced a 10 foot storm surge.  Many of the islands suffered moderate 
to severe coastal flooding as a result.  Washed out roads on the islands of New 
Providence, Andros, Eleuthera, Cat Island, Exuma and Abaco were reported.  
Damage to roofs throughout the islands were also noted in preliminary damage 
assessment reports.  Government buildings reported minor to major damage, 
with missing roofs and broken windows.  Damage to communication equipment 
and broadcast towers were severe with many radio stations being put out of 
commission as a result of the storm.   
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 There was no loss of life in The Bahamas associated with Hurricane 
Michelle.  The storm caused extensive flooding throughout the islands dumping 
more then thirteen (13) inches of rain in some areas.  As with Andrew and Floyd 
the well fields, located in low-lying areas, suffered extensive flooding.  Saltwater 
intrusion occurred and contaminated the main supply of fresh water.  
 Reports from the Bahamas Electric Company (BEC) indicated that two 
days following landfall of Hurricane Michelle, the island of New Providence 
remained in darkness with 60% of the population without electricity.  Additionally, 
The Bahamas Telecommunications Company (BTC) also reported that 
thousands of telephones were still out of order a week following the storm.  Many 
residents were also struggling with no water or low water pressure a week 
following Michelle’s impact.    
 For several days following Michelle banks and government offices 
remained closed, with the Police and Royal Bahamas Defence Force calling for 
people to remain in their homes to allow for the clearing of the roads and the 
restoration of utilities. (See Pictures B.10 – B.12) 
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Picture B.10 – Hurricane Michelle Damage on the Island of New Providence, The 
Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006) 
 
 
 
Picture B.11 – Hurricane Michelle Damage on the Island of New Providence, The 
Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006) 
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Picture B.12 – Hurricane Michelle Damage on the Island of New Providence, The 
Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006) 
 
B.4.3 Hurricane Michelle Discussion 
 Although Hurricane Michelle was not as destructive as Hurricanes Andrew 
or Floyd, the impact to Nassau highlighted the gaps in emergency response 
capabilities at the national level.  Hurricane Michelle response activities were 
spearheaded by the Royal Bahamas Defence Force with disjointed support from 
a variety of ministries and organizations.  The impact of Michelle on the citizens 
of Nassau and daily government activities shed light on the need for a well 
coordinated emergency management structure.    The impact to the nation’s 
capital, created the necessary advocacy seeking action helping to initiate the 
birth of a coordinated and centralized emergency management structure.     
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B.5 Hurricane Frances 2004 
 Hurricane Frances was the sixth named storm of the 2004 Atlantic 
hurricane season and the fourth hurricane.  Frances was also the first hurricane 
since 1866 to impact the entire Bahamian Archipelago.  Frances was a slow 
moving storm with a very large eye, approximately 80 miles across, which 
impacted the island chain for over 72 hours.  The center of circulation remained 
in the northwest Bahamas for an extraordinarily long time causing substantial 
damage to the northern islands (Rolle & Simmons, 2004a).   Map B.4 illustrates 
the path that Frances took as he passed through The Bahamas. 
B.5.1 Hurricane Frances Storm Development 
 According to the Bahamas Department of Meterology, Tuesday, August 
24th satellite images indicated that a tropical depression had formed from a 
strong topical wave in the Eastern Atlantic, approximately 870 miles west-
southwest of Cape Verde.  Movement of the depression was to the west at 17 
mph.  Within less then 24 hours the depression gained strenth and was upgrated 
to a tropical storm and given the name Frances.  By Thursday August 26th, 
Frances was again upgraded to hurricane status (Rolle & Simmons, 2004a).   
 Frances continued to strengthen rapidly and by Friday, August 27th it 
reached category 3 status (winds of 111-130 mph).  Exactly twenty-four hours 
later Frances was upgraded to category 4 status (winds of 131-155 mph).  On 
August 31st, a hurricane warning was issued for the Turkes and Caicos Islands 
and the Southeast Bahamas as Frances was approximately 600 miles east-
southeast of the island of Inagua.  A hurricane watch for the central Bahamas 
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and a Hurricane Alert for the Northwest Bahamas was also issued by The 
Bahamas Department of Meterology (Rolle & Simmons, 2004a).  
 At noon on September 1st, a hurricane warning for the entire archipelago 
was issued.  At this time Hurricane Frances was about 80 miles east-southeast 
of the island of Mayaguana.  Frances’ intensity fluctuated over the next few hours 
before winds peaked at 145mph on September 2nd.   
 With sustained winds measuring 145mph Frances moved diretly over the 
Island of San Salvador near to Cat Island.  Frances was moving on average 
13mph in a west to west-north-west direction.  However, on September 3rd as 
Frances moved over James Cistern, Eleuthera the forward speed decreased 
dramaticly to 5 mph.  Frances began to stall as it passed into the vicinity of 
Abaco and directly over Grand Bahama.  Although Frances was downgraded to a 
category 3 and later to a category 2 storm the slow forward movement and the 
abundance of rain created devistating flooding to the northwest islands.   
 Sunday, September 5th  the center of the broad eye of Frances finally 
moved inland over Florida provinding relief to The Bahamas.  Frances impacted 
the whole of the Bahamas and according to data from The Bahamas Department 
of Meterology sustained hurricane force winds were experience in the islands of 
Abaco, Grand Bahama, San Salvador, Rum Cay, Cat Island and Eleuthera as 
the eye passed near or over.  New Providence and many of the other islands 
received sustained tropical storm force conditions.  (See Picture B.13) 
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Picture B.13 - Hurricane Frances Satellite Image as it approaches The Bahamas.  
(Source:  NOAA, 2004a) 
 
B.5.1.1 Central Pressure and Intensity of Hurricane Frances 
 Figure B.4 shows the related wind speed and central pressure associated 
with Hurricane Frances.  The data illustrate the relationship between the drop in 
central pressure and the increase in wind speed.  Hurricane Frances impacted 
the Islands of The Bahamas over a 72 hour period September 1st – 3rd when the 
hurricane was at peak intensity.   
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Figure B.4:  Hurricane Frances Wind Speed and Central Pressure (Data Source: 
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology). 
B.5.2 Impact of Hurricane Frances on the Islands 
 Hurricane Frances is a perfect example of why disasters should not be 
classified merely by the number of deatlhs directly associated with the event.  
Although the loss of live was small the livelyhoods of many were destroyed.  For 
instance, Hurricane Frances was the first storm since 1866 to impact the entire 
archipelago.  Frances strong winds and heavy rains caused substantial damage 
especially to Grand Bahama where the storm stalled for over 24 hours.     
 According to the Bahamas Water and Sewerage Corporation (2004) storm 
surge from Frances caused dramatic increase in chlorides in the trenches in the 
North Andros Wellfields and the Grand Bahama Wellfields.  The water supply to 
New Providence, where over sixty percent of the population resides, was 
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seriously affected due to the fact that the wellfields were inoperable as was the 
Reverse Osmosis plant, due to power outages.   
 Further compounding water availability issues, damage to ports on almost 
all the islands prevented the barging of water between islands.  Freshwater 
supplies were delayed for several days and in some cases several weeks.  
(Bahamas Water and Sewerge Corporation, 2004) 
 Island infrastructure was heavily impacted by Hurricane Frances.  
According to the Ministry of Public Works (2004), New Providence sustained 
major damage to roadways as a reslut of inadequate storm surge protection.  
Extensive damage was also done to the roads in James Cistern and Governor’s 
Harbour, Eleuthera and Elbow Cay, Abaco.  Other islands notably impacted were 
Cat Island, Long Island and Mayaguana all suffing damage to roadways.   
 Docks and Ports throughout the country were heavily damaged and in 
some cases they were completely destroyed.  According to the Bahamas Port 
Authority (2004) three docks in Lower Bogue, South Palmetto Point and James 
Cistern, all settlements of the island of Eleuthera were destroyed.  Similar 
damage was seen on the island of Abaco.  Docks in Cat Island, Long Island and 
Mayaguana also suffered some degree of damage. 
 According to the Bahamas Airport Authority (2004) damage to airport 
facilites at Freeport, Grand Bahama and Marsh Harbour, Abaco were completely 
inundated with water as a result of sotrm surge and compromized the structural 
integrity of the facility.  There was no major damage to the Control Tower in 
Grand Bahama closing the airport for more then a week.   
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 The Bahamas Ministry of Education (2004) reported major damage to 
public school facilities on the Berry Islands, and Grand Bahama.  As a result 
school opening were significantly delayed.   
 Bahamas Electric Corporation (BEC) (2004) reported widespread power 
outages throughout the islands.  Damages included downed power lines, downed 
poles and structural damage to power station sites on many of the islands.  The 
impacts were minimized due to preplanning and mitigation efforts which allowed 
for the shutting off of power before and during the storm.  Grand Bahama, which 
is part of a private electrical supply had the most extensive damage with over 
1300 power poles downed (NEMA, 2004). (See Pictures B.14 - B.22) 
 
Picture B.14 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The 
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) 
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Picture B.15 – Hurricane Frances on the Island of Grand Bahama, The Bahamas 
(Source: NEMA, 2004) 
 
 
 
Picture B.16 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The 
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) 
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Picture B.17 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The 
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) 
 
 
 
Picture B.18 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The 
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) 
 
 
 341
 
 
Picture B.19 – Hurricane Frances Damage in the settlement of Gregory Town on 
the Island of Eleuthera, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture B.20 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of Andros, The 
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) 
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Picture B.21 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of New Providence, The 
Bahamas (Source: Erin Hughey, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture B.22 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of New Providence, The 
Bahamas (Source: Erin Hughey, 2004) 
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B.5.3 Hurricane Frances Discussion 
 Hurricane Frances impacted the whole of The Bahamas.  The key 
concerns for the nation were meeting immediate emergency needs of fresh 
drinking water and shelter.   Extensive damage to well fields, and transportation 
routs (airports, ports, and roadways) made difficult the movement of goods 
between the islands as well as on the island.  Hurricane Frances was the first 
NEMA coordinated emergency response.  Strong support came from the Royal 
Bahamas Defence Force as well as a variety of ministries.   
 
B.6 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 
 Hurricane Jeanne was the second hurricane of the 2004 season to hitt 
The Islands of The Bahamas, making landfall less then three weeks after 
Hurricane Frances.  The tenth named storm of the 2004 season, the sixth 
hurricane, and the fifth major hurricane (category 3 or greater) Jeanne developed 
as an open water hurricane east of the Lesser Antilles.  With plenty of time to 
develop Jeanne gained and lost speed, twisted and turned, all before slamming 
into the Northwestern Islands of The Bahamas.  This erratic storm caused 
problems for forecasters and emergency management officials who were not 
sure were it was headed.  While watching Jeanne, officials were also continuing 
with Hurricane Frances response operations.  Map B.5 illustrates the path that 
Jeanne took through The Bahamas. 
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B.6.1 Hurricane Jeanne Storm Development 
 According to the 5pm tropical report on Monday, September 13th issued by 
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, tropical depression eleven had 
formed from a tropical wave 70 miles east-southeast of Guadeloupe in the 
Lesser Antilles.  By the next morning the storm had been upgraded to a Tropical 
Storm and was named Jeanne. 
 Jeanne was moving in a west-northwest direction at 8-12 mph and 
attained hurricane strength two days later on September 16th.  It was not long 
before Jeanne lost strength and on September 17th it was downgraded to a 
tropical depression as it moved across the Dominican Republic.   
 On September 18th, while near the southern Bahamian Island of Great 
Inagua, a new center formed to the northeast and the previous circulation 
dissipated.  The 5pm report issued by The Bahamas Department of Meteorology 
on September 20th indicated that the newly developed center of Jeanne had 
strengthened again and becoming a hurricane for the second time.   
 Hurricane Jeanne meandered for days before moving in a westerly 
direction towards the Northwest Bahamas.  “This behavior was similar to that of 
Hurricane Betsy of 1965 and presented numerous challenges for forecasters and 
their models” (Rolle & Simmons, 2004b:3).  Continuing to strengthen Hurricane 
Jeanne headed toward the west, making landfall on the Island of Abaco in the 
early morning of September 25th.  “Shortly thereafter, it reached category 3 status 
on the Saffir-Simpson scale and maintained this intensity as it passed over 
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Grand Bahama during the remainder of the day” (Rolle & Simmons, 2004b:3). 
(See Picture B.23) 
 
Picture B.23 - Hurricane Jeanne Satellite Image as it impacts The Bahamas.  
(Source:  NOAA, 2004b) 
 
B.6.1.1 Central Pressure and Intensity of Hurricane Jeanne 
 Figure B.5 shows the related wind speed and central pressure associated 
with Hurricane Jeanne.  The data illustrates the relationship between the drop in 
central pressure and the increase in wind speed.  Hurricane Jeanne impacted the 
Northwestern Bahamas on September 25th when the storm was at peak intensity.   
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Figure B.5:  Hurricane Jeanne Wind Speed and Central Pressure (Data Source: 
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology).   
B.6.2 Impact of Hurricane Jeanne on the Islands 
 There were no deaths or reported injuries in association with Hurricane 
Jeanne.  However according to a report issued by The Bahamas Department of 
Meteorology, “many residents in the extreme northwest Bahamas (Abaco and 
Grand Bahama, in particular), had to undergo psychiatric evaluation after 
experiencing two hurricanes in approximately three weeks and losing all of their 
belongings” (Rolle & Simmons, 2004b:7).   
 Attempting to attribute damages exclusively to Hurricane Jeanne was 
difficult since Frances impacted the same islands less then three weeks prior.  
The northwestern Bahamas received the brunt of Hurricane Jeanne and 
extensive flooding occurred.  As a result local and national resources were 
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heavily taxed during the 2004 hurricane season in response to both storms.  
(See Pictures B.24 – B.29) 
 
 
Picture B.24 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage on Treasure Cay, The Bahamas 
(Source: NEMA, 2004) 
 
 
 
Picture B.25 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage, Abaco (Source: NEMA, 2004) 
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Picture B.26 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage on the Island of Abaco, The Bahamas 
(Source: NEMA, 2004) 
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Picture B.27 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage on the Island of Abaco, The Bahamas 
(Source: NEMA, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture B.28 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage, Haitian Community on the Island of 
Abaco, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) 
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Picture B.29 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage, Haitian Community on the Island of 
Abaco, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) 
B.6.3 Hurricane Jeanne Discussion 
 Hurricane Jeanne impacted the northern islands of the Bahamas just three 
weeks after the archipelago was impacted by Hurricane Frances.  The key 
concerns for the nation continued to be meeting the immediate emergency needs 
of fresh drinking water and shelter.  Logistics and communication were extremely 
challenging as transportation routes and communication lines were damaged.  
Hurricane Jeanne was the second NEMA coordinated emergency response and 
it occurred simultaneously to the Hurricane Frances response.  Strong support 
came from a variety of ministries and organizations and was coordinated through 
the National Emergency Operations Center in Nassau.  
B.7 Hurricane Wilma 2005 
 The 2005 Hurricane Season experienced a record breaking 26 tropical 
cyclones and two tropical depressions, it also also marked the first time that 
meteorologists had to utilize the Greek alphabet for the naming of storms.  Five 
tropical cyclones impacted the Bahamian archipelago that year: Franklin, Katrina, 
Ophelia, Rita and Wilma.  However, it was Hurricane Wilma that “wreaked havoc 
on the nations second largest city Freeport, in Grand Bahama” (The Bahamas 
Department of Meteorology, 2005:1).  Wilma was also the only storm of the 
season that required a national response.  Map B.6 illustrates the path that 
Wilma took through The Bahamas. 
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B.7.1 Hurricane Wilma Storm Development 
 According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, on Saturday, 
October 15th Hurricane Wilma developed from a tropical depression that formed 
about 195 miles southeast of Grand Cayman.  The system was monitored over 
the next few days as the system moved slowly between a west and northwest 
direction in the Western Caribbean Sea.  The 11am report from the Department 
of Meteorology on Tuesday, October 18th indicated that Wilma had officially 
become the twelth hurricane of the season.  Hurricane Wilma struck Cozumel, 
Mexico and Honduras before making a turn to the northeast and accelerating 
towards Florida on Sunday, October 23rd.   
 The Bahamas Department of Meteorology reported on Monday, October 
24th that Hurricane Wilma was moving to the northeast near 25 miles per hour 
and was passing within 60 nautical miles northwest of Freeport, Grand Bahama.  
“Tropical storm force winds (sustained 39-73mph) were experienced by residents 
in Grand Bahama from 7:00am through 8:00pm.  However, during the period of 
11:00am to 2:00pm hurricane force winds (winds of 74 mph or greater) were 
experienced.  The later event appeared synchronous with the intesnsification of 
Wilma to Category 3 (115 mph) status around 1pm of the same day” (The 
Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2005:1).  It was high tide (1:49pm) when 
Hurricane Wilma hit the southwest shoreline of Grand Bahama and the Lucayan 
Harbour.  These areas sustained major damage from strong waves and high 
storm surges.  (See Picture B.30) 
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Picture B.30 - Hurricane Wilma Satellite Image as it impacts The Bahamas.  
(Source:  NOAA, 2005) 
 
B.7.1.1 Central Pressure and Intensity of Hurricane Wilma  
 Figure B.6 below displays the relationship between wind speed and 
central pressure associated with Hurricane Wilma.  The data illustrate the 
relationship between the drop in central pressure and the increase in wind speed.  
Hurricane Wilma impacted the Northwestern Bahamas on October 24th luckily, 
this was not at its peak intensity.   
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Figure B.6:  Hurricane Wilma Wind Speed and Central Pressure (Data Source: 
The Bahamas Department of Meteorology).   
B.7.2 Impact of Hurricane Wilma on the Islands 
 Hurricane Wilma was the only storm to cause any significant damage to 
The Bahamas during the 2005 Hurricane Season.  One death was reported as a 
result of Hurricane Wilma and was directly related to storm surge inundation.  
The concentration of damages was mainly in the vicinities of the northwestern 
coastal areas.  It was in this area that storm surge was measured at 12 feet (The 
Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2005).  Early damage estimates were in 
the amount of $6.5 million and ranged from widespread destruction of roofs and 
vehicles to the uprooting of poles and trees and the displacement of tombs from 
the graveyard near the coast (The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2005).  
(See Pictures B.31 – B.36) 
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Picture B.31 – Hurricane Wilma Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The 
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) 
 
 
Picture B.32 – Hurricane Wilma Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The 
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) 
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Picture B.33 – Hurricane Wilma Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The 
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) 
 
 
Picture B.34 – Hurricane Wilma Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The 
Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) 
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Picture B.35 – Bahamas Telecommunications Company Building Hurricane 
Wilma Damage, Jones Town, Grand Bahama (Source: NEMA, 2004) 
 
 
Picture B.36 – Hurricane Wilma Damage.  Ray of Hope Church, Hanna Hill, 
Grand Bahama (Source: NEMA, 2004) 
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B.7.3 Hurricane Wilma Discussion 
 Hurricane Wilma significantly impacted the northwestern Bahamas with 
concentrated damage on the western portion of Grand Bahama.  The islands of 
Abaco and Bimini also sustained considerable damage.  The key concerns for 
the nation were meeting immediate emergency needs of fresh drinking water and 
shelter.  The response to Hurricane Wilma was coordinated by NEMA.   
 
B.8 Conclusions 
 
 Chapter 5 provided the development characteristics of each hurricane 
events as well as the impact each storm had on The Bahamas.  Table B.1 
provides a summary of the key characteristics of the six hurricanes.  Of important 
note is Hurricane Michelle, although Andrew and Floyd both violet category four 
storms caused major destruction, it was the category two storm making landfall in 
Nassau that triggered an overhaul to the emergency response structure.   
 The impact to government and 60% of the nations population highlighted 
the within The Bahamas.  response only a category two storm it was the first 
storm to impact Nassau, the nation’s capital.  Michelle, interrupted the business 
of government raising 
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SUMMARY TABLE 
Hurricane 
Name 
Date of 
Landfall in 
The Bahamas 
Category 
at 
Landfall 
Sustained 
Wind Speed 
At Landfall 
(mph) 
Barometric 
Pressure  
At Landfall 
(mb) 
Number 
Dead 
Andrew 8/23/1992 4 150 922 4 
Floyd 9/14/1999 4 135 921 2 
Michelle 11/05/2001 2 105 965 0 
Frances 9/2-5/2004 4 145 936 2 
Jeanne 9/25/2004 2 105 952 0 
Wilma 10/24/2005 3 125 950 1 
Table B.1 – Study Hurricane Summary Table (Data Source:  Bahamas 
Department of Meteorology) 
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Appendix C: Interview With Prime Minister Perry G. Christie 
C.1 Interview with Prime Minister Perry G. Christie (January 25, 2007) 
 To assess the national governments position on emergency management 
an interview was conducted with Prime Minister Perry G. Christie in January of 
2007 (See Picture 5.1).  The transcript and discussion of the interview is provided 
below.   
Question:  What is your vision for NEMA and emergency 
management in The Bahamas? 
 
“Firstly, it is of critical importance that The Bahamas applies the same 
level of interest in developing a disaster preparedness entity that it does in 
developing its economy, because our ability to respond and manage 
disasters will be directly related to our ability to secure our future.  The 
fact that we are a different kind of country than most countries in the 
region, and in the hemisphere, in that we are a chain of islands separated 
by expanses of water with sparse population centers throughout makes our 
task even more onerous as well as more important.  Therefore, the people 
who are invited to be a part of NEMA must be prepared to be special 
people in terms of the initiatives that they take, really the preparations 
that they make to prepare themselves.  They must ‘know’ the Bahamas and 
so the government must be committed and in its commitment the 
government must be sure to recruit the right people with the right 
qualifications to lead NEMA.  Those qualifications must be beyond 
academic qualifications, they must I think, give a lot of weight to 
leadership.  The ability to lead and inspire people, get people to listen to 
you and to understand is critical.  They must have special qualities of 
being able to ensure that they are able to lead a coordinated and 
integrated sort of effort to ensure that all of the sectors of government and 
private sector are working together.  My vision is that we begin… I think I 
should also add that through the leadership must also have people who 
can easily work with persons from outside the country.  It is necessary for 
us to have good working relationships with those international agencies at 
the regional level, or across border in the United States of America.  
NEMA personnel must have the stature and ability to lead NEMA in that 
direction on a sustained basis.  Having done all of those things, having 
 360
ensured that the right legislation is in place, the government must 
demonstrate its continuing support for the strengthening of NEMA, 
because of that level of importance that I have assigned when I spoke of it 
being directly linked to the economy of the country, and therefore the 
survival of our people.  The final point I want to make about it is, because 
we are a chain of islands we have to put a lot of effort into planning.  So 
the most important aspect of NEMA is anticipating the varying types of 
disasters that could impact our country and creating models for the 
necessary response that would be there.  For example, when we are 
confronted by the enormity of the potential impact; like an island really 
having 200mph force coming into it.  What do we do in terms of 
evacuation?  If one were to therefore look at the fact that we are a chain 
of islands the question for the country is do we have an organization in 
place that is efficiently empowered and funded to go through the various 
studies and determinations that would be there to protect our country.  It 
therefore requires the political will and the political commitment to ensure 
the success of that.  Hopefully I have given you the right feel for my 
vision”.  (Prime Minister Perry G. Christie, January 25, 2007) 
 
 Prime Minister Christie’s response illustrates a clear awareness of the 
importance of emergency management, and the economic and political impact a 
major disaster could have on the Nation.  Also revealed is his understanding that 
the geography of The Bahamas places it at a high and recurrent risk of 
hurricanes.  Weeks after Prime Minister Christie took office Hurricane Michelle 
impacted the nation’s capital.  The interruption to government caused by Michelle 
as well as the impact of September 11th on the world, created within the nation 
an advocacy supporting action.  As a result, the Prime Minister pushed for the 
development of a national agency focused on managing disasters.  Financial 
support for the development of NEMA was provided by the office of the Prime 
Minister and later legislated under the 2006 Disaster Preparedness and 
Response Act.   
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 Strong support from the Prime Minister for the creation of NEMA and the 
implementation of a CEM system has brought disaster awareness to the 
forefront.  Through this process resources have been made available to develop 
planning and training initiatives in an effort to improve disaster response.  The 
political support provided by the Prime Minister has made emergency 
management a national priority.   
 
Question:  The Bahamas has a unique Geography with over 700 
islands and cays covering over 100,000 square miles.  Is there one 
thing that you think other island nations could learn from how The 
Bahamas are managing disaster preparedness and response?  
 
“Again it is difficult for me to comment on what other nations are doing in 
terms of their levels of preparation.  I would like to believe The Bahamas 
in terms of our resent experiences, has gone about using all of our 
resources and international help, like the International American Bank, to 
affect an understanding to the entire country of the importance of working 
together and not underestimating a potential impact always knowing that 
the country could be cut-off and that we have to be prepared to deal with 
that.  I think if one were to look at The Bahamas over the last five to ten 
year and see the rapid progress that we have made forging an 
understanding that we have to be strong and we have to integrate the 
necessary forces in the country.  NEMA will never have the manpower 
available to it, in terms of its own 1000 staff members and so therefore it 
needs to forge relationships and models of participation that will be 
triggered when disasters strike.  Blend everyone into a working instrument 
that would properly coordinate and properly manage, is the goal of 
NEMA.  So, I think the challenge for us is that that we look to the future to 
develop a model of each island taking into consideration all of their 
peculiarities so that this coordinating body at the center in the capital 
would be able to coordinate.  I think currently there are levels of that, but 
we need to continue to move in that direction.  My job would be to ensure 
that those who are leading NEMA are in fact making progress and are 
moving forward not just waiting for the next hurricane season and so it is 
a full time preoccupation and something that we will manage effectively.”  
(Prime Minister Perry G. Christie, January 25, 2007) 
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 Prime Minister Christie’s responses illustrate his understanding of the 
critical nature of emergency management.  He is committed to a comprehensive 
preparedness and response campaign that requires an understanding of the 
unique physical and social environment of the nation.  His commitment has been 
articulated through legislation and financial support for NEMA.  He believes 
strongly that his job is to ensure NEMA is properly equipped to effectively 
manage disaster and protect the nation.   
 
Picture 5.1 – Prime Minister Perry G. Christie and Erin Hughey, January 25, 
2007.  (Photographer:  Gayle Outton-Moncur) 
 
 The intent of the interview with the Prime Minister was to assess the 
national governments position on emergency management.  Through strong 
political and fiscal support for NEMA position of the government with regards to 
emergency management is a proactive one.  Prime Minister Christie personally 
provided strong support to NEMA in response to Hurricanes Frances, Jeanne, 
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and Wilma through participation in media briefings, active involvement in 
discussions with Family Island Administrators, and contributions to the national 
EOC.  His involvement has raised awareness within the nation and facilitated the 
development and implementation of a CEM system.  
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